MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988

Facts: Parents of Appellants died in a road accident. Appellants initiated claim petition before MACT seeking compensation. The present appeal was in respect of Appellant's mother who was aged about 37 years and was a self-employed individual. Tribunal applied multiplier of 15 and determined liability upon the insurer. High Court in appeal deducted 50% of income towards personal and living expenses, while holding deceased ineligible for the grant of future prospects as she was self-employed. Hence the present appeal.

Held: The compensation as awarded to the Appellants by the High Court is modified to the extent of deduction towards personal and living expenses, determined to be one-third, and 40% addition towards future prospects. The multiplier of 15 is appropriate, considering the age of the deceased. No reason found to interfere with any other heads as determined by the High Court.

Facts: The claim petition was filed by the Respondent under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation for the injury sustained by him in a road accident occurred on 20.11.2006. The Tribunal after recording the evidence and after hearing the parties, vide its order dated 16.8.2011 passed an award for a sum of Rs.3,50,000/- along with interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of the filing of the petition till realization. Aggrieved by the same, the Insurance Co. filed an appeal before the High Court which dismissed the appeal on the ground of non-compliance of Section 170 of the Act by the Insurance Company. Hence, the appeal lies before the Supreme Court.

Held: Grant of compensation on the basis of the structured formula is in the nature of a final award and the adjudication there under is required to be made without any requirement of any proof of negligence of the driver/owner of the vehicle(s) involved in the accident. This is made explicit by Section 163A(2). In light of the above reasons, the Court answered the question by holding that in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act it is not open for the Insurer to raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim.

Facts: Ajai Vishen, the owner of mini bus, entered into an Agreement of Contract with the Corporation on 07.08.1997 for allowing it to ply mini bus, as per the permit issued in favour of Corporation, by the concerned Road Transport Office. On account of State amendment incorporated in Section 103 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the Corporation is vested with right to take the vehicles on hire as per the contract and to ply the same on the routes as per the permit granted to it. According to the terms and conditions of the Agreement, the mini bus was to be plied by the Corporation, on the routes as per the permit issued by R.T.O. in its favour. Except for the services of the driver, which were to be provided by the owner, all other rights of owner were to be exercised by the Corporation only. The conductor was to be an employee of the Corporation, and he was authorised and entitled to collect money after issuing tickets to the passengers and had the duty to perform all the incidental and connected activities as a conductor on behalf of the Corporation. The collection so made was to be deposited with the Corporation. Feeling aggrieved by the awards of the Tribunal, Corporation comes with the appeal before this Court.

Held: Insurance Company cannot escape its liability of payment of compensation to Third Parties or claimants. Admittedly, owner of the vehicle has not violated any of the terms and conditions of the policy or provisions of the Act. The owner had taken the insurance so as to meet such type of liability which may arise on account of use of the vehicle, the Insurance Company would be liable to pay the amount of compensation to the claimants.

Facts: The Appellant was a fruit seller whose right hand was amputated after the accident. In the claim petition, the claimant has claimed that he is entitled for compensation of Rs. 9,05,000/- from the Respondents jointly and severally and the claimant is suffering from financial crisis, therefore, he is unable to pay court fees on the said amount. Therefore, he had restricted his claim to the tune of Rs. 3,00,000/-. The Tribunal accepted the case by the Appellant and allowed the claim to Rs. 1.50 lacs. Aggrieved by the said order, the appeal was filed in the High Court. The High Court found substance in the appeal and allowed the appeal by enhancing compensation from Rs. 1.50 lacs to Rs. 2.50 lacs. Aggrieved by the decision, the appeal lies to Supreme Court.

Held: The Appellant has expressly stated that if it is entitled to get more than Rs. 3 lacs the claimant is ready to deposit deficient court fee. This clearly means that neither the Tribunal nor the High Court was precluded from awarding higher than Rs. 3 lacs. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, Supreme Court awards an amount of Rs. 5 lacs as compensation to the appellant; which shall be just and reasonable. Hence, allowed the appeal and enhanced the compensation amount to Rs. 5 lacs. The compensation amount shall also bear 9% interest per annum from the date of claim petition.

Facts: On 25.07.2005 while the deceased Narayana was proceeding towards Padmini Show room at about 4.30 pm when he reached Marrichenna Reddy Statue, Mettuguda, the auto allegedly came in rash and negligent manner at high speed and dashed against him, as a result, he sustained fractured injuries and on the same day night he was succumbed to injuries at NIMS hospital while undergoing treatment. The fact that the deceased as a pedestrian sustained injuries having been dashed by unknown auto is therefrom on record. The unsuccessful claimant maintained O.P. No. 394 of 2006 on the file of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal against two respondents i.e., owner and insurer of auto bearing No. AP 22U 7736 for a compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- under Section 166 of M.V Act for the accidental death of her husband M.Narayana. The Tribunal, after contest by the 2nd respondent-insurer, from 1st respondent-owner remained ex parte, dismissed the claim on 25.03.2008. Impugning the same, the claimant maintained the present appeal.

Held: Coming to the case on hand from the above legal position, it is since a proved death case of hit and run by unknown vehicle and as such, the Tribunal can award Rs. 25,000/- under Section 161 of M.V Act without prejudice to the rights of the claimant to approach the authorities concerned under the Special Scheme under Section 163 of M.V Act for any higher compensation to enquire and determine.

Facts: The petitioners are the owners of goods motor vehicles and were plying the same on the basis of pucca national/State permits issued by the appropriate transport authorities. When they challenged the validity of order issued by the Department of Transport (Roads and Buildings) enhancing the compounding fee from Rs. 10 per k.g. to Rs. 100 per k.g. as being violative of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and arbitrary being violating Article 14 of the Constitution, the Division Bench in the impugned judgment upheld the said order. Therefore, this special leave petition arises from the Judgment and order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

Held: As regards canalisation and prescription of the amount of fine for the offences committed, Section 194, the penal and charging section prescribes the maximum outer limit within which the compounding fee would be prescribed. The discretion exercised by the delegated legislation, i.e., the executive is controlled by the specification in the Act. It is not necessary that Section 200 itself should contain the details in that behalf. So long as the compounding fee does not exceed the fine prescribed by penal section, the same cannot be declared to be either exorbitant or irrational or bereft of guidance. It would, therefore, be clear that the Government as a delegate, did not exceed its power under Section 200 of the Act in prescribing the compounding fee for the offence punishable under Section 194 of the Act.

Facts: According to the claimant-petitioner on 29.5.1992 he was travelling from Kangra to Palampur by a scooter. He claims that he was driving the scooter and was alone on the scooter. At a place known as 61 Miles, a bus belonging to respondent No. 2 and driven by Pritam Singh, respondent No. 1, is alleged to have come from the opposite direction. He further alleged that the said bus was driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner and it struck against the scooter as a result of which he was thrown on the ground. The appellant-claimant claims that he sustained multiple grievous injuries including fracture of his right leg. He stated that his right leg was amputated at the mid-thigh level resulting in 80 per cent permanent disability. The respondents resisted the claim petition and they have stated that scooter was not hit at all by the bus. As per the respondents, there were three persons riding on the scooter and the scooter was driven by one Mohinder Singh and the claimant was in fact a pillion rider. As per version of the respondents, there was no impact between the bus and the scooter. All the three persons riding the scooter were in state of intoxication. The scooter skidded and fell down resulting in injuries to the three persons. The respondent No. 1 as a humanitarian gesture had taken the three injured to the hospital where they were got admitted. In fact, according to the Tribunal the accident was result of rash and negligent driving on the part of the scooter driver. The claim petition, therefore, was dismissed.

Held: The scooter is meant actually for two persons, i.e., driver and the pillion rider. The scooter is not expected to be ridden by three persons. When three persons who are under the influence of alcohol go on a scooter ride, it is clear that they are asking for a trouble to say the least. This by itself may not be a sufficient ground to hold that the claimant or the other scooter driver was negligent. However, when this is coupled with the fact that claimant has tried to hide material facts especially with regard to driving of the scooter, the number of persons on the scooter, the manner in which the accident occurred, etc., it can safely be presumed that accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the scooter driver who along with pillion riders was under the influence of alcohol at the relevant time. The claimant who has obviously violated Sections 128 and 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act and has told blatant lies in court cannot be granted any relief.

Facts: P.C. Krishnakumar was traveling on the pillion of a motorcycle bearing registration No. KRH-7599 which was ridden by Respondent No. 2 along Koimbatore-Palakkadu National Highway. On reaching Puthusserichellakkadu, the motorcycle dashed against the rear side of a stationary lorry which was parked at the national highway. The parking lights of the stationary lorry were not switched on and as a result of the impact Krishnakumar sustained serious injuries and he succumbed to those injuries on way to Palakkadu District Hospital. Legal heirs of the deceased Krishnakumar, who are Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 herein, filed a claim petition before the Tribunal seeking compensation for the accidental death of Krishnakumar. In the claim petition, they alleged that the accident occurred due to the composite negligence of the owner, driver and insurer (Respondents Nos. 8, 9 and 10 herein) of the truck as well as the Respondent No. 2 who was riding the motorcycle. The Tribunal, on consideration of the evidence on record, passed an award on June 3, 2002 in the sum of Rs. 4,76,500/- with interest at 9% per annum from November 8, 1997 till realization in favor of the claimants. The liability was apportioned in the award as the accident was found to have occurred due to composite negligence of the two vehicles. The details of the liability are not relevant. Aggrieved by the award, the owner and rider of the motorcycle preferred appeal before the High Court of Kerala. The High Court proposed to issue some directions related to driving regulations to the State of Kerala relying heavily on Section 118 of the Act, accordingly directed the guidelines to the State. Aggrieved by certain directions (3 and 5) on the decision of High Court, the State of Kerala through Chief Secretary presents this appeal.

Held: Directions 3 and 5 suffer from serious flaw and cannot be sustained. We set aside directions 3 and 5 accordingly and the remaining three directions to be accepted by the Court under Section 118 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Facts: The petitioners invoked Article 226 of the Constitution of India accordingly pray for issuance of appropriate directions directing the respondents herein to implement the provisions of Sections 128 and 129 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 requiring compulsory wearing of protective headgear (helmet) by two wheeler drivers and pillion riders. The petitioners further state that two wheeler vehicle is very vulnerable as its balance can be tilted with a slight touch by another vehicle, skidding and individual losing balance due to absent mindedness. They have given variety of reasons for the fall of a scooter by itself. On the recommendation of G.O.Ms. No. 303, Transport, Roads & Buildings Department, the Government thought it fit to direct the wearing of protective headgear (helmet) to be optional in respect of every person driving of or riding on a motorcycle including scooter and moped. It is under these circumstances, the petitioners invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in purported public interest.

Held: In such view of the matter, we find it difficult to sustain order, dated 23-12-1989 issued by the Government in purported exercise of power under Section 129 of the Act. It is set aside as the same is ultra vires the Section 129 of the Act. Consequently, there shall be a direction directing the respondents herein to implement and enforce the provisions of Section 129 of the Act with such exceptions as the State Government may think fit and proper in its discretion, for which purpose the State Government may have to make rules in accordance with law.

Facts: Respondent/claimants have been awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 9,32,880/- on account of death of Smt. Gianwati, the mother of the claimants, in the motor vehicular accident which took place on 03.03.2013. Learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company contended that the driver and owner of the vehicle did not appear to contest the claim petition and they were proceeded against ex parte. He contended that the driver and owner of the vehicle have not placed on record the driving licence of the vehicle. He contended that as per Section 134(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it was the duty of the driver to supply the information to the Insurance Company with respect to the particulars of his driving licence. The said statutory duty has not been performed either by the owner or the driver of the vehicle. Thus, he contended that the learned Tribunal has wrongly fastened the liability to pay the amount of compensation upon the appellant-Insurance Company. Therefore, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the awrd passed by the Tribunal.

Held: The protection of Section 134(c) cannot be availed by the appellant-Insurance Company to evade its liability to pay the amount of compensation at is an admitted fact that the appellant-Insurance Company has taken no steps to show that the driver of the vehicle had no valid driving licence at the time of the accident, thereby not following the proper procedure.

Facts: Petitioner was granted a stage carriage permit on non-notified route known as Allahabad to Kunda, via Nawabganj, Dahiyaha, Babuganj Chauraha and petitioner is plying her vehicle on the said route. It appears that she entered into an agreement with M/s Rada Ram Singh and sons (filling station), Lalgopalganj, district Allahabad, which is 15 kms. away from Nawabganj, a town on the route of the petitioner. Thus under the pretext of taking diesel the vehicle of the peti-tioner goes out of the route 15 kms. up and 15 kms. down. Petitioner is plying her vehicle daily 30 kms. off the route on which she had been granted permit under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, hereinafter called the Act. The route of the petitioner originates from Allahabad and ends at Kunda and there is no scarcity of diesel, service stations for washing and cleaning or garage for repairing the vehicle either at Allahabad or at Kunda. Lalgopalganj is comparatively a smaller town and does not provide sufficient facilities except having the filling station. The petitioner is seeking relief that the transport and the police authorities be restrained from checking or interfering with the plying of the vehicle when it goes off the route to Lalgopalganj.

Held: The present petitioners are taking the advantage by plying the vehicle in contravention of the statutory provisions under Section 66 of the Act. They have themselves extended/varied their respective routes and started plying their vehicles on the extended/varied portion of the routes and are committing the offences by violating the terms and conditions of their respective permits every day, we direct the respondent No. 3, the Regional Transport Officer, Allahabad to check the case of the petitioners regularly and if they violate the conditions of permit, then to issue them show cause notice under Section 86 of the Act as to why their permits should not be cancelled or suspended under Section 192 of the Act and to punish them under the provisions of Section 192A of the Act.

Facts: The Petitioner-complainant had purchased a Mahindra Pick UP BS-II 4WD vehicle and got it insured for an amount of Rs. 4,30,037/- with Respondent No. 1-M/s. New India Assurance Company Ltd. for the period 12.12.2005 to 11.12.2006. The vehicle was temporarily registered for one month period, which expired on 11.1.2006. However, on 2.2.2006, the vehicle met with an accident and got damaged. The complainant lodged FIR and informed about it to the Respondent-Company, which appointed a surveyor and Assessed the loss at Rs. 2,60,845/- on repair basis. The insurance claim was, however, repudiated by the opposite party on the ground that the person Rajeev Hetta, who was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, did not possess a valid and effective driving licence and also the vehicle had not been registered after the expiry of the temporary registration. Consequently, the Appellant filed a consumer complaint before the District Forum. After hearing parties on either side and scanning the record of the case meticulously, the District Forum allowed the complaint and directed the Respondent-Company to indemnify the complainant to the extent of 75% of 4,30,037/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum thereon with effect from the date of filing of the complaint. Aggrieved by the decision of the District Forum, Respondent-Company as well as the Appellant-complainant approached State Commission by way of appeal. The State Commission by its common order disposed of both the appeals, allowing appeal of the Company and dismissing the complaint of the Complainant due to which the appeal preferred by the Appellant-complainant was dismissed as infructuous. Aggrieved by the decision of the State Commission, the Appellant preferred revision petition before the National Commission Under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, which also stood dismissed. Hence, present appeal by special leave by the complainant

Held: Indisputably, a temporary registration was granted in respect of the vehicle in question, which had expired on 11.1.2006 and the alleged accident took place on 2.2.2006 when the vehicle was without any registration. Nothing has been brought on record by the Appellant to show that before or after 11.1.2006, when the period of temporary registration expired, the Appellant, owner of the vehicle either applied for permanent registration as contemplated Under Section 39 of the Act or made any application for extension of period as temporary registration on the ground of some special reasons. In our view, therefore, using a vehicle on the public road without any registration is not only an offence punishable Under Section 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act but also a fundamental breach of the terms and conditions of policy contract.

Facts: The petitioner is working as driver in Tamil Nadu Transport Corporation at Erode Region. The bus which was driven by the petitioner involved in accident and upon a complaint criminal case has been registered against him. Since one of the offences alleged against petitioner is cognizable one, the licensing authority concerned had issued show-cause notices to the petitioner invoking the provision in Section 19(1)(c) of the Act. Thereafter, appropriate enquiry was conducted and final order has also been passed by the Licensing Authority/Regional Transport Officer thereby suspending the license of the petitioner for a specified period. It is this order which is now under challenge in the instant writ petition. The petitioner submitted that the impugned order suspending the license of the petitioner has been passed by the licensing authority concerned in a cryptic manner in printed format wherein the name of the petitioner and the period of suspension alone has been written in pen and no reason whatever has been assigned to arrive at such conclusion which is totally in violation of the provisions contained in Section 19(1) of the Act. The licensing authority concerned in the instant case did not record any reason whatsoever for suspending the license and the impugned order has been passed in a total non application of mind. The impugned order has been passed in the printed form without assigning any valid reasons for arriving at the satisfaction and the authority had simply filled in the name of the license and the period of suspension of license.

Held: It is mandatory on the part of the licensing authority to issue show-cause notice to the holder of a driving license and the licensee should also be given an opportunity of being heard and after due enquiry, if the licensing authority is satisfied himself that the driving license is liable to be suspended on account of the contingency specified in the show-cause notice, after recording reasons for the same, he may pass appropriate orders as enshrined in Section 19(1)(h)(i) or (ii) of the Act. Thus, the licensing authority in the instant case has flouted the mandatory procedures while invoking the power under Section 19(1) of the Act and on this ground alone the impugned order is liable to be set aside. As the period of suspension is concerned, the license was suspended for the period of six months from 30.06.2018 to 29.12.2018. Now, almost 5 months of suspension period was already over. In the above circumstances, this Court is of the view that there is no need to remit back the matter to the authorities for passing fresh order. Hence, the impugned order is set aside.