INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000

Facts: The petitioner is a licensed custom agent house and respondent is a company is engaged in the manufacture, sales and distribution of scrubbing or drying machines and all kinds of industrial or domestic vacuum pumps at the request of respondent, petitioner had carried four consignments by shipment which were covered by four Bills of Lading. the dispute arose as to the non-payment of Bills from respondent. The respondent contented that the acknowledgment of debt via mail by him is not valid in the eye of law since it is not duly signed by the respondent.

Held: The court held that an email communication is legally recognized by S. 4 of the IT Act, 2000. The court further held that section 18 does not provide that acknowledgement has to be in any particular form or to be express. According to the court, even a statement which amounts to an acknowledgement may be sufficient, if it implies an admission of liability and it can be made by an email. It held that an acknowledgement of debt by e-mail originating from a person who intends to send or transmit such electronic message to any other person who would be the 'addressee' would constitute a valid acknowledgment of debt and it would satisfy the requirement of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 when the originator disputes having sent the e-mail to the recipient.

Facts: The appellant is a company managed by its Chairman and CEO some defamatory, derogatory, humiliative, abusive and obnoxious e-mails from Aruna Kashinath and Avinash Agnihotry from the e-mail IDs kashinath.aruna@gmail.com and avinash.agnihotry@gmail.com respectively. It is pertinent to point out that both Aruna Kashnath and Avinash Agnihotry are part of the top management team of the appellant company. It is further submitted that the appellant has made enquiries from both Aruna Kashinath and Avinash Agnihotry who had flatly refused and denied connection with the aforesaid email accounts or their creation maintenance or with the sending of the aforementioned emails. The Respondent contended that appeal is void ab initio as the appeal can be filed under Section 57 of the Information Technology Act only against an order of the Controller that too as per the Chapter relating to Digital signature. In the instant case since no order has been passed by the Controller, no appeal can be filed.

Held: The Court held that Act provides for adjudicating the offences i.e. Certifying Authority and Adjudicating Officer in respect of the different offences. After taking into account definitions of S.48,57,58 (Procedure to be followed by Cyber Appellate Tribunal) the statute provides that the appeal can be filed only against the orders passed by the Adjudicating Officer. It is held that without exhausting alternative remedy of approaching the Adjudicating Officer appointed under the Information Technology Act, 2000, no appeal is maintainable under Section 57 of the Information Technology Act.

Facts: The Maharashtra Police arrested two women for posting a post on Facebook regarding Maharashtra bandh on account of death of a political leader u/s-66A of the IT Act,2000. Their arrest led to an outrage amongst the citizens. Although both the girls were released from prison but they challenged the constitutional validity of S.66A of the IT Act,2000.

Held: The Court discussed three fundamental concepts in understanding the freedom of expression: discussion, advocacy, and incitement. Further it held that S.66A is restrictive in the sense as it restricts all forms of internet communications as it makes no distinction “between mere discussion or advocacy of a particular point of view, which may be annoying or inconvenient or grossly offensive to some and incitement by which such words lead to an imminent causal connection with public disorder, security of State etc. The Court also held that the government failed to show that the law intends to prevent communications that incite the commission of an offense because “the mere causing of annoyance, inconvenience, danger etc., or being grossly offensive or having a menacing character are not offences under the Penal Code at all.” It held that because the provision fails to define terms, such as inconvenience or annoyance, “a very large amount of protected and innocent speech” could be curtailed. The Court invalidated Section 66A of ITA in its entirety as it violated the right to freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.

Facts: The facts of the case are that the prosecutrix was forcibly dragged into the jeep by the said respondents and was taken to a place where she was raped by them. They also made a video of the whole barbaric act in the the mobile thereby threatenend her of uploading it on the internet if she told anyone about the same. On refusing to being exployed by the respondents again and again the respondents in turn uploaded the video of the rape on the internet.

Held: The court while perusing the facts of the case and the evidence produced held the respondents liable under various sections including Sections 366, 366-A, 367, 292, 120-B IPC and under Sections 66-E, 67, 67-A, 67-B of IT Act along with fine as imposed by the trial court .

Facts: The petitioner is a social activist and she is involved in various social issues including abolition of manual scavenging. In pursuance of her mission of creating awareness for abolition of manual scavenging, she has taken a documentary film, namely, "Kakoos". This was also widely viewed in the you-tube. The second respondent has given a complaint to the first respondent police to the effect that he saw the documentary taken by the petitioner, in the you-tube and the documentary proceeds as if this work is done by a particular community called Thevendra Kula Vellalar. By projecting this work to be performed by persons belonging only to this community, the second respondent alleges that the petitioner has taken the documentary with malafide intention and has thereby defamed and brought a very bad name to the concerned community. As a result of this documentary, the petitioner is attempting to create a caste conflict and promoting enmity and thereby is disturbing the public tranquility. An FIR came to be registered by the first respondent police against the petitioner for an offence under Section 153(A) and 505 (1)(b) of IPC r/w 66F of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

Held: In order to commit cyber terrorism, it must be shown that the act must be done to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of people. The complaint given by the second respondent does not in any way attract the provisions of Section 66F of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The documentary that has been produced by the petitioner cannot be termed as a cyber terrorism. In the considered view of this Court, the FIR that has been registered against the petitioner is clearly an abuse of process of law, which requires the interference of this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The complaint given by the second respondent and the FIR registered by the police clearly amounts to interfering with the fundamental right of speech and expression guaranteed to the petitioner. In the result, the FIR in Crime No. 469 of 2017 on the file of the first respondent is hereby quashed.

Facts: The Appellant along with co-Accused and others was arrayed as an Accused. When the co-accused filed a appeal he was acquitted on S.67 charges but not on charges of S.292 of IPC. On prefering appeal, it was allowed and the proceeding against the co-Accused was quashed. After the judgment was delivered, the Appellant filed an application before the Trial Court to drop the proceedings against him. The trial court dropped the proceedings under S.67 of IT Act,2000 but not under S.292 of IPC. Hence, the present appeal was filed.

Held: It was held that the charge under Section 292 could not survive. The decision was on the basis that Sections 67, 67A and 67B was a complete code regarding offence concerning publishing and transmitting obscene material in electronic form and non-obstante provision under Section 81 makes IT Act a special law which will prevail over the general law, IPC.

Facts: A secret information was received by the local police that one private detective was obtaining call records of different people. The police caused the arrest of said detective and sought call details . FIR, was registered against said person. The chat record collected by the police during the investigation indicated accused's involvement in the commission of offence. On that basis, police arrested husband of Respondent and jurisdictional Magistrate gave the police custody after recording his satisfaction for such police remand. The Respondent filed a writ petition for a direction to the Appellants to produce her husband before the Court and to justify his detention in accordance with procedure established by law.

Held: The court held that the appellant should have challenged the order passed by the magistrate for passing an order of judicial remand before filing this writ. The High Court should have been loath to enter upon the merits of the arrest in absence of any challenge to the judicial order passed by the Magistrate granting police custody and more particularly for reasons mentioned in that order of the Magistrate. Since the Respondent's husband had already been released after the impugned judgment, the Investigating Officer may proceed against him in connection with the stated crime registered as FIR strictly in accordance with law and not merely because the impugned order had been set aside.