INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

Facts: This appeal by the plaintiff arises from a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction. The appellants claim title by adverse possession. The cause of action for filing the suit was a decree of eviction obtained by Shyamlal(R1) against Chhogalal(R2) and Chothmal(R3). According to R1 he is owner of the premises. He had let out the same on rent to R2 on 29.5.1956. R(2) inducted R(3) as sub-tenant. Shyamlal filed a suit and obtained decree for eviction against them. According to Shyamlal, the appellant had been set up by Chothmal to pre-empt the eviction decree. While dismissing the appellant's suit and deciding issue as to whether R(1) was in possession of the land on the basis of the document executed in favour of his father by Lalu Chamar of Bhilwaraon, the trial Court held, placing reliance on the document, the R(1) had proved the fact that the land was mortgaged by Lalu Chamar in favour of his father Kanakmal, and since then it was in his possession. In recording the said finding, the trial Court inter alia drew presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. At the time of hearing of this appeal, submission was made on behalf of the appellant that the presumption had been drawn without giving opportunity to the appellants to lead rebuttal evidence.

Held: Before answering the question we may refer to the meaning of the expressions "may presume", "shall presume" and "conclusive proof" in Section 4 of the Evidence Act. It would appear these expressions "may presume" or "shall presume" lay down the rules of proof and by legal fiction mandate the Court to treat a fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. In the result, the reference is answered in the negative and it is held that presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act can be claimed and drawn at any stage including the appellate stage; belated claim of presumption will not by itself confer any right on the other party to claim opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal. Such opportunity shall ordinarily be refused at the stage of final arguments save in exceptional cases for cogent and sufficient reasons recorded in writing.

Facts: This appeal by the plaintiff arises from a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction. The appellants claim title by adverse possession. The cause of action for filing the suit was a decree of eviction obtained by Shyamlal(R1) against Chhogalal(R2) and Chothmal(R3). According to R1 he is owner of the premises. He had let out the same on rent to R2 on 29.5.1956. R(2) inducted R(3) as sub-tenant. Shyamlal filed a suit and obtained decree for eviction against them. According to Shyamlal, the appellant had been set up by Chothmal to pre-empt the eviction decree. While dismissing the appellant's suit and deciding issue as to whether R(1) was in possession of the land on the basis of the document executed in favour of his father by Lalu Chamar of Bhilwaraon, the trial Court held, placing reliance on the document, the R(1) had proved the fact that the land was mortgaged by Lalu Chamar in favour of his father Kanakmal, and since then it was in his possession. In recording the said finding, the trial Court inter alia drew presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. At the time of hearing of this appeal, submission was made on behalf of the appellant that the presumption had been drawn without giving opportunity to the appellants to lead rebuttal evidence.

Held: Before answering the question we may refer to the meaning of the expressions "may presume", "shall presume" and "conclusive proof" in Section 4 of the Evidence Act. It would appear these expressions "may presume" or "shall presume" lay down the rules of proof and by legal fiction mandate the Court to treat a fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. In the result, the reference is answered in the negative and it is held that presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act can be claimed and drawn at any stage including the appellate stage; belated claim of presumption will not by itself confer any right on the other party to claim opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal. Such opportunity shall ordinarily be refused at the stage of final arguments save in exceptional cases for cogent and sufficient reasons recorded in writing.

Facts: The prosecution case in nutshell is that the accused had married the deceased Padmavati in June, 1985 and out of the wedlock, a daughter deceased Suneetha was born. The accused earned his livelihood by doing tailoring work. On account of financial stringency faced by the accused, often he harassed the deceased Padmavati and forced her to get money from her parents. It was informed to the parents of the deceased by a phone call by the parents of the accused that the accused had killed the two deceased. Learning about the death of their daughter and granddaughter, the parents of the deceased rushed to the place of occurence. The accused himself made a confession that he murdered the two deceased persons. On the basis of the First Information Report, the police registered a case and took up investigation. The learned Sessions Judge, relying upon the circumstantial evidence, convicted the accused of the charge under Section 302 IPC. The High Court however, came to the conclusion, that the conviction of the charge under Section 302 cannot be, sustained and accordingly set aside the same and acquitted the accused of the said charge.

Held: In absence of a finding as to whether the information by accused's parents to deceased's parents that accused has killed the deceased was either at the time of commission of the crime or immediately thereafter, so as to form the same transaction, such utterances cannot be considered as relevant under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. In this state of affairs, it may not be proper to accept that part of the statement of deceased's parents and the said circumstances cannot be held to have been established. But even excluding such circumstances, if all other circumstances enumerated above are taken into consideration, which must be held to-have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the conclusion is irresistible that all these circumstances point towards the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. We, therefore, unhesitatingly, come to the conclusion that the High Court committed serious error in acquitting the accused respondent of the charge under Section 302 IPC.

Facts: The accused persons were illegally harvesting paddy from the field of the deceased. They were variously armed. On being asked to not do such illegal act, they threatened the deceased. The argument got heated up and eventually led to the death of Prankrishna and severe injuries to Nepal. The two witnesses reached the place of occurrence immediately after the incident had taken place and found the dead body of Prankrishna and injured Nepal in an unconscious state. One of them found the mother of Prannkrishna and Nepal weeping and heard about the entire incident from an eye-witness and the role played by each of the appellants.

Held: A right of private defence cannot be claimed when the accused are aggressors, when they go to complainant's house well prepared for a fight and provoke the complainant party resulting in quarrel and taking undue advantage that the deceased was unarmed causes his death. It cannot be inferred that there was any sudden quarrel or fight, although there might be mutual fight with weapons after the deceased was attacked. In such a situation, a plea of private defence would not be available. The depositions of the witnesses clearly establish that the accused persons armed with deadly weapons went to the plot of complainant party with a common object to harvest the paddy and when asked not to do so, they were attacked and when they retreated to some extent, they chased and caused injuries to the deceased and other witnesses. This clearly establishes that the said act was in furtherance of a common intention. The fact that evidence of other independent witnesses also points out the overt acts played by each one of the accused is also not in dispute. Nothing has been brought to our notice to show that the presence of the eye- witnesses who were independent witnesses are wholly unreliable. Therefore, accepting the testimonies of the witnesses u/s. 6 of Evidence Act, the accused are liable to be convicted for the charge of murder and grevious hurt.

Facts: In the present matter, conviction recorded against Appellants for an offence punishable under Section 302, 201 of IPC. Prosecution examined 10 witnesses. Defence of Accused was of total denial. They did not produce any evidence. Sessions Court found that even though it was a case of circumstantial evidence, prosecution had succeeded in establishing guilt of Accused beyond all reasonable doubt and found them guilty of offences under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC. Sessions Court vide judgment awarded death sentence. All three Appellants carried matter in appeal before High Court. High Court noted that, facts and circumstances of present case would not come within purview of a rarest of rare case, for which reason it did not confirm sentence of death awarded to Appellants. High Court, instead, commuted sentence to life imprisonment for offence under Section 302 of IPC. Hence, the present appeal.

Held: Fact that the three witnesses became hostile and prosecution could not establish factum of motive could not be basis to doubt correctness of finding of guilt recorded by two Courts against Accused on basis of other proved circumstances including confession of Accused about murder and more importantly, having dumped dead bodies in septic tank in backyard of their house and to have led police to that place from where two dead bodies, whose identity also had not been disputed, came to be recovered, coupled with medical evidence that, cause of death of the two dead persons was due to ante-mortem injury caused on neck resulting in their death due to asphyxia and was a homicidal death, as per the language of section 8 of the Evidence Act.