CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

Facts: The Accused-applicant, neighbour of the complainant, entered her house and caught hold of the complainant's hand, and allegedly attempted to harass her sexually. Accordingly, Crime was registered, investigated and a charge sheet was filed. The Accused filed an application under Section 438 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking pre-arrest bail. The High Court, by the impugned order, even while granting bail to the applicant imposed the condition that the applicant along with his wife shall visit the house of the complainant with Rakhi thread/band with a box of sweets and request the complainant to tie the Rakhi band to him with the promise to protect her to the best of his ability.

Held: The use of reasoning/language which diminishes the offence and tends to trivialize the survivor, was especially to be avoided under all circumstances. Thus, the following conduct, actions or situations were hereby deemed irrelevant, e.g. to say that the survivor had in the past consented to such or similar acts, etc. The law did not permit or countenance such conduct, where the survivor could potentially be traumatized many times over or be led into some kind of non-voluntary acceptance, or be compelled by the circumstances to accept and condone behavior what was a serious offence. Therefore, the bail conditions in the impugned judgment, were set aside, and expunged from the record.

Facts: The bail application of Appellant-Accused was rejected by the trial court. After being in judicial custody for more than 73 days, the Appellant filed an application for grant of bail on account of passage of such 73 days and non-filing of charge sheet. One of the contentions of the Appellant before the High Court was that charge sheet having not been filed, the Appellant had become entitled for bail by default as contemplated u/s. 167(2) of the CrPC. High Court denied the relief that period of submission of charge sheet stood extended by concerned order dated 23.03.2020 as passed by the Apex Court. Hence, the present appeal.

Held: The order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 never meant to curtail any provision of Code of Criminal Procedure or any other statute which was enacted to protect the Personal Liberty of a person. The right of prosecution to file a charge sheet even after a period of 60 days/90 days is not barred.Monday, April 17, 2023

Facts: Appellant in the instant matter sought default bail after being kept in house arrest for 34 days. No charge sheet was filed in stipulated 90 days and it was sought that period of 34 days of house arrest to be included in 90 days. The question that arose for consideration was to determine whether order passed by High Court would include an order under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Held: Act of Court should not negatively impact the investigating agency. The maxim "Actus curiae neminemgravabit" would apply in the present case. House arrest, in turn, involved, deprivation of liberty and will fall within the embrace of custody under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was not apparently in the minds of both this Court and the High Court of Delhi. On the other hand, Article 21 of the Constitution of India, provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. In view of the fact that the house arrest of the Appellant was not purported to be under Section 167 and cannot be treated as passed thereunder, appeal dismissed.

Facts: There was a bomb blast at the place called Malegaon in Mumbai on 29.9.2008. With reference to it, FIR was registered on 30.9.2008. On 26.10.2008, the said FIR was transferred and the investigation was taken over by ATS. Thereafter the Appellant, namely, one Rakesh Dattaray Dhawade was arrested by ATS on 02.11.2008. earlier on 21.11.2003, there was a bomb explosion at Mohammedia Masjid, Nanal Peth, Parbhani. There was another bomb explosion at Kaderia Masjid, Jalna during Friday Namaz. All of these incidents were registered as separate cases. In the case pertaining to Parbhani, the charge-sheet was filed on 07.09.2006 against A1-Sanjay Choudhary. A supplementary chargesheet-I was filed in Parbhani case against four accused. In Jalna case, charge-sheet was filed against A-1 on 30.9.2006. In Jalna case, two supplementary charge-sheets were filed on 7.1.2008 against four additional accused and against five accused on 14.1.2008. It was contended that the cognizance should be with reference to the offender and not the offence which has to be mandatorily satisfied.

Held: When we apply the requirement as stipulated under the provisions, it can be safely held that the requirement of filing of the charge-sheet in two earlier cases before the competent court can be held to be satisfied once cognizance is taken by a Judicial Magistrate of first class or for that matter an empowered second class Magistrate, in the event of filing of a police report as prescribed Under Section 173(2)(i) by virtue of the power vested Under Section 190(1)(b) of CrPC. If the ingredients of the above requirements are fulfilled it will have to be held, that part of the requirement, namely, the competent court taking cognizance of the offence in respect of two earlier cases will get fulfilled. The said statement of law reinforces the legal position that cognizance is always of the offence and not the offender and once the Magistrate applies his judicial mind with reference to the commission of an offence the cognizance is taken at that very moment.

Facts: One R.N. Lokesh, lodged an FIR alleging that on 14.1.2005, he along with some other persons was celebrating Sankranthi festival when the respondent Pastor P. Raju, who is a member of Christian community, came there and made an appeal to them to get converted to Christian religion where they would get many benefits and facilities which were not available to them in Hindu religion to which they belong. On the basis of the FIR, a case was registered at the concerned police station. The respondent was arrested on 15.1.2005 and was produced before a Magistrate on the same day who remanded him to judicial custody as no application for bail had been filed. Subsequently, a bail application was moved which was rejected on the ground that the offence was a non- bailable offence. The respondent filed a petition for quashing of the proceedings initiated against him under.

Held: a. In the present case neither any complaint had been filed nor any police report had been submitted nor any information had been given by any person other than the police officer before the Magistrate competent to take cognizance of the offence. After the FIR had been lodged and a case had been registered under Section 153B IPC, the respondent was arrested by the police and thereafter he had been produced before the Magistrate. The Magistrate had merely passed an order remanding him to judicial custody. Section 190 Cr.P.C. confers power upon a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence. Therefore, an order remanding an accused to judicial custody does not amount to taking cognizance of an offence.
b. The High Court clearly erred in quashing the proceedings on the ground that previous sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government or of the District Magistrate had not been obtained. It is important to note that on the view taken by the High Court, no person accused of an offence, which is of the nature which requires previous sanction of a specified authority before taking of cognizance by the Court, can ever be arrested nor such an offence can be investigated by the police.

Facts: In 1947 the appellant held the office of Regional Deputy Iron and Steel Controller, Kanpur Circle, U.P. The police suspected the appellant to be guilty of the offences u/s.161 & 165 IPC, applied to the Deputy Magistrate, for a warrant of his arrest on the 22nd of October, 1947, and the warrant was issued on the next day. The appellant was arrested on the 27th of October, 1947, but was granted bail. On the 26th of November, 1947, the District Magistrate cancelled his bail as the Magistrate considered that the sureties were not proper. On the 1st of December, 1947, the Government appointed a Special Magistrate to try offences under the Act and on the 1st December, 1947, the appellant was produced before the Special Magistrate and was granted bail. The police continued their investigation. On the 6th of December, 1948, sanction was granted by the Provincial Government to prosecute the appellant inter alia under sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code. On the 31st January, 1949, sanction in the same terms was granted by the Central Government. In the meantime as a result of an appeal made by the appellant to the High Court of Allahabad the amount of his bail was reduced and on the 25th of March, 1949, the appellant was ordered to be put up before the Magistrate to answer the charge-sheet submitted by the prosecution.

Held: a. In the present case on the 25th March, 1949, the Magistrate issued a notice under section 190 of the Code against the appellant and made it returnable on the 2nd of May, 1949. That clearly shows that the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence only on that day and acted under section 190.
b. To answer that, the Government had given its sanction for the prosecution of the appellant before that date. It seems to us therefore that the appellant's contention that the Magistrate had to take cognizance of the offences without the previous sanction of the Government is untenable and the appeal fails.

Facts: In 1996 the accused Directors approached him and offered to supply 5450 metric tones of "Toasted Soyabean Extractions" for a price of nearly four and a half crores of rupees. The rate quoted by the accused was higher than the market price. Appellant had to pay the price in advance as demanded by the accused. But the accused sent the commodity which was of the most inferior and sub-standard quality. The testing laboratory has remarked that the commodity was of "the most inferior and sub-standard quality." The complainant suffered a loss of 17 lakhs of rupees by the aforesaid consignment alone. By supplying the most inferior quality the accused deceived the complainant and thereby the offence was committed. Chairman of the appellant company filed a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Gandhidham (Gujarat) alleging certain offences including the offence of cheating against another company located at Indore (Madhya pradesh) and its Directors. The Magistrate forwarded the complaint to the appellant for investigation. The accused Directors thereupon moved the High Court of Gujarat under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the complaint. A single Judge of the High Court quashed the complaint as also the order passed by the Magistrate thereon. Complainant has, therefore, filed this appeal.

Held: It is an erroneous view that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence must necessarily have territorial jurisdiction to try the case as well. Section 193 imposes a restriction on the court of Sessions to take cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction. But 'any' Magistrate of the First Class has the power to take cognizance of any offence, no matter that the offence was committed within his jurisdiction or not. The only restriction contained in Section 190 is that the power to take cognizance is "subject to the provisions of this Chapter." There are 9 Sections in Chapter XIV most of which contain one or other restriction imposed on the power of a First Class Magistrate in taking cognizance of an offence. But none of them incorporates any curtailment on such powers in relation to territorial barrier. Appeal Dismissed.

Facts: The husband of the petitioner along with his brother were the owners of the property in Maharani Bagh, New Delhi. In January, 1981, the entire ground floor along with two servant quarters at the first floor was let out to M/s. Century Tubes Ltd. (CTL) for residence of its Managing Director Sh. Gautam Hada i.e. respondent no. 1 herein, initially at a monthly rent of Rs. 4,000/-. From time to time, fresh agreements were executed with CTL. It has been pleaded that initially the cheques towards the rent were drawn by CTL but later the cheques were issued by M/s. Pavik Lifestyle Ltd. A suit was filed for recovery of possession, rent ans mesne profit. The petitioner, a lady aged about 78 years who is presently residing in Varanasi, has been shown as a resident of Kolkata besides mentioning the Delhi address and the summoning order has been passed without conducting the mandatory enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C.

Held: The complainant, is occupying as a tenant the entire ground floor of the very premises, which are mentioned as the Delhi address of the petitioner in the memo of the complaint, the other being an address in Kolkatta. In spite of that, there is not even a whisper let alone an averment to the effect that the petitioner has been residing at the given address in Delhi. In these circumstances, in absence of any averment in the complaint or the material on record to the aforesaid effect coupled with the fact that an alternate address of the petitioner is given which is outside the jurisdiction of the court, then an enquiry ought to have been conducted. When the law casts a duty on the court to conduct an enquiry once an accused is stated to be a resident of a place which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, in the opinion of this Court, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it was obligatory on the part of learned ACMM to conduct an enquiry envisaged under Section 202 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 01.10.2016 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the concerned court for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The matter shall be initially listed before the concerned court on 01.07.2020 for directions.

Facts: The vehicle had been sold by the Respondent by putting forged signatures of the complainant's father. The Respondents filed complaint against Appellants. The Judicial Magistrate First Class dismissed complaint by holding that no prima facie case was made out against Accused persons. The complainant being aggrieved, filed Revision before the Additional Sessions Judge. The Complainant submitted that he wished to withdraw the Revision with liberty to file a fresh complaint on the basis of certain new facts, which request was opposed. After perusing the record and considering the submissions, the Revisional Court observed that if there were new facts, complainant, in law would be entitled to present new complaint and there was no need of any permission from Court and thereby dismissed complaint. Thereafter, Complaint Case was preferred by the Complainant on same allegations but relying on additional material.

Held: The first complaint contained the basic allegations that the vehicle belonging to the father was sold after the death of the father, that signatures of the father were forged, that signatures on the affidavit were also forged and that on the basis of such forged documents the benefit of sale consideration of the vehicle was derived by the Accused. The order passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, shows that after considering the evidence and documents produced on behalf of the complainant, no prima facie case was found and the complaint was rejected under Section 203. There was no legal infirmity in the first complaint filed in the present matter. The complaint was filed more than a year after the sale of the vehicle which meant the complainant had reasonable time at his disposal. The earlier complaint was dismissed after the Judicial Magistrate found that no prima facie case was made out, the earlier complaint was not disposed of on any technical ground, the material adverted to in the second complaint was only in the nature of supporting material and the material relied upon in the second complaint was not such which could not have been procured earlier. Pertinently, the core allegations in both the complaints were identical. The High Court was thus not justified in holding the second complaint to be maintainable.

Facts: It was alleged in the charge-sheet that the acts of the Accused, seven in number, including the third Accused (Appellant), constitutes criminal offences punishable the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The allegations include the allegation that the Accused conspired to commit theft of Government property, i.e., mineral ore. They allegedly trespassed into the forest area and other areas of Bellary District, carried out illegal mining and transported it. Though, second Accused (A2) to seventh Accused (A7) filed applications under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking discharge. The Trial Court discharged the second Accused and the Appellant. It was this order which had been set aside by the High Court by the impugned Order. Hence, the present appeal.

Held: It is, no doubt, true that there may not be any other material to link the Appellant with various other acts and omissions which have been alleged against the first Accused in particular along with the fifth Accused and other Accused. However, the fact remains, if the defence of the Appellant is not to be looked into, which included the practice obtaining in the past whenever the firm was reconstituted, and also the version of the Appellant that he did in fact speak with the Deputy Director (Legal) and acted on his advice and further that this fact would be established if the Deputy Director (Legal) was questioned in his presence, they would appear to be matter which may not be available to the Appellant to press before the court considering the application Under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This being the outcome of our discussion, the inevitable consequence is that we are not persuaded to hold that the High Court was in error in the view it has taken. Consequently, the appeal fails.

Facts: The FIR had been registered against Accused-Respondents under Section 302 of IPC pursuant to direction of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. The charge sheet had been filed against the Accused-Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 302 of IPC read with Section 34. Upon hearing the prosecution and also the Respondents-Accused, the Second Additional Sessions Judge had found that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the Accused and framed the charges against the Accused-Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 302 read with Section 34 of Code.

Held: In the present case, upon hearing the parties and considering the allegations in the charge sheet, the Second Additional Sessions Judge was of the opinion that there were sufficient grounds for presuming that the Accused had committed the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. The order framing the charges was not a detailed order. For framing the charges under Section 228 CrPC, the judge is not required to record detailed reasons. As pointed out earlier, at the stage of framing the charge, the Court was not required to hold an elaborate enquiry, only prima facie case was to be seen. Upon hearing the parties and based upon the allegations and taking note of the allegations in the charge sheet, the Second Additional Sessions Judge was satisfied that there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused and framed the charges against the Accused-Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. While so, the High Court was not right in interfering with the order of the trial court framing the charges against the Accused-Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 302 of Code read with Section 34 of IPC and the High Court, erred in quashing the charges framed against the Accused.