FACTORIES ACT, 1948

Facts: The petitioner, Seshadrinatha Sarma was convicted, upon two counts, under Rules 3 and 4 (1) of the Madras Factories Rules read with Section 92 of the Madras Factories Act, and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 200 on each count. The question arose if the accused was actually working in a 'factory' as it was contended that no manufacturing process was taking place.

Held: That "manufacturing process" includes where there has been an indisputable transformation of substance by the use of machinery, and the transformed substance is commercially marketable.

Facts: The Magistrate who tried the respondents for offences under Section 27 of the Act held that the field workers were employees of a Commercial Establishment. The High Court at Allahabad took a contrary view, and the State of Uttar Pradesh has appealed to this court against the order of the High Court with special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution.

Held: By the combined operation of the definitions under Section 2 (l) and 2 (m) of Factories Act, 1948, persons employed in any manufacturing process or part of the premises used for the manufacturing process or any other kind of work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process or the subject of the manufacturing process are deemed to be workers in a factory. Further, if the workers are employed in a factory, the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 apply to them and they would not fall within the definition of 'Commercial Establishment'.

Facts: A beedi factory was engaged in the manufacture of beedis. The process of manufacture was divided into two stages. For the first stage, the Company employed Sattedars who further employed coolies. The names of the same were not in the register of adult workers in violation of provisions of Factories Act. The main question for consideration before the Court was whether the sattedars and their employees were workers within the meaning of the Factories Act, 1948?

Held: that the concept of employment involves three ingredients:
(1) employer,
(2) employee and
(3) the contract of employment.
There is a clear-cut distinction between a contractor and a workman. The identifying mark of a workman is that he should be under the control and supervision of the employer in respect of the details of the work. The Court accordingly, held that neither Sattedars nor coolies were workers, as they were not employed by the mangement as workers but were only independent contractors.

Facts: The main question for determination in this appeal was whether Salt Works come within the definition of the word "factory" under clause (m) of Section 2 of the Act. The answer to this question was dependent on the meaning of the word "premises" in the definition of the word "factory" and on the determination whether what is done at Salt Works in connection with the conversion of sea water into crystals of salt comes within the definition of the expression "manufacturing process" in clause (k) of Section 2 of the Act.

Held: that the salt works, in which the work done is of conversion of sea water into crystals of salt, come within the meaning of the word 'premises' as the legislature showed no intention to discriminate between workers engaged in a manufacturing process in a building and those engaged in such a process on an open land. It was held that the word 'premises' is a generic term meaning open land or land with buildings or building alone.