Facts: Husband converted to another religion and married to another woman without having first marriage dissolved.
Held: Conversion does not ipso facto dissolve first marriage. Second marriage during subsistence of first marriage is void even if solemnised after conversion. Apostate husband guilty of bigamy.

Facts: Petitioner/Wife had approached present Court, for assailing divorce pronounced by her Husband in presence of witnesses saying that I gave 'talak, talak, talak'. Petitioner had sought declaration, that talaq-e-biddat pronounced by her husband be declared as void ab initio.
Held: Given the fact that Triple Talaq is instant and irrevocable, it was obvious that any attempt at reconciliation between the husband and wife by two arbiters from their families, which was essential to save the marital tie, could not ever take place. Also, as understood by the Privy Council in Rashid Ahmad, such Triple Talaq was valid even if it was not for any reasonable cause, which view of the law no longer holds good after Shamim Ara. This being the case, it was clear that this form of Talaq was manifestly arbitrary in the sense that the marital tie could be broken capriciously and whimsically by a Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation so as to save it. This form of Talaq must, therefore, be held to be violative of the fundamental right contained Under Article 14 of the Constitution. The 1937 Act, insofar as it seeks to recognize and enforce Triple Talaq, was within the meaning of the expression laws in force in Article 13(1) and must be struck down as being void to the extent that it recognizes and enforces Triple Talaq. The practice of talaq-e-biddat-triple talaq was set aside.

Facts: The appellant, who is an advocate by profession, was married to the respondent in 1932. Three sons and two daughters were born of that marriage. In 1975 the appellant drove the respondent out of the matrimonial home. In April 1978, the respondent filed a petition against the appellant under Section 125 of the Code in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Indore asking for maintenance at the rate of Rs. 500 per month. On November 6, 1978 the appellant divorced the respondent by an irrevocable talaq. His defence to the respondent's petition for maintenance was that she had ceased to be his wife by reason of the divorce granted by him, to provide that he was therefore under no obligation maintenance for her, that he had already paid maintenance to her at the rate of Rs. 200 per month for about two years and that, he had deposited a sum of Rs. 3000 in the court by way of dower during the period the of iddat. In August, 1979 the learned Magistrate directed appellant to pay a princely sum of Rs. 25 per month to the respondent by way of maintenance. It may be mentioned that the respondent had alleged that the appellant earns a professional income of about Rs. 60,000 per year. In July, 1980 in a revisional application filed by the respondent, the High court of Madhya Pradesh enhanced the amount of maintenance to Rs. 179.20 per month. The husband is before us by special leave.
Held: Language of statute provides for no escape from conclusion that divorced Muslim wife entitled to apply for maintenance under Section 125 and 'Mahr' not a sum which under Muslim Personal Law is payable on divorce. we dismiss the appeal and confirm the judgment of the High Court. The appellant will pay the costs of the appeal to respondent 1, which we quantify at rupees ten thousand.

Facts: The writ Petitioner has also prayed for a declaration that the right of a child to be adopted and that of the prospective parents to adopt be declared a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Board objects to such a declaration on the grounds already been noticed, namely, that Muslim Personal Law does not recognize adoption though it does not prohibit a childless couple from taking care and protecting a child with material and emotional support.
Held: While it is correct that the dimensions and perspectives of the meaning and content of fundamental rights are in a process of constant evolution as is bound to happen in a vibrant democracy where the mind is always free, elevation of the right to adopt or to be adopted to the status of a Fundamental Right, in our considered view, will have to await a dissipation of the conflicting thought processes in this sphere of practices and belief prevailing in the country. All these impel us to take the view that the present is not an appropriate time and stage where the right to adopt and the right to be adopted can be raised to the status of a fundamental right and/or to understand such a right to be encompassed by Article 21 of the Constitution.