INDIAN EASEMENTS ACT, 1882

Facts: The parties are descendants from a common ancestor and they owned joint properties. A partition took place between the parties where under survey Nos. 95 and 96 fell to the share of the plaintiffs and 15 cents of land in plot where the common well is situated and the channel running from that common well were, however, kept joint for the common enjoyment of the parties. The defendants objected to the use of the common land and the common channel for taking water from their exclusive well. Hence the plaintiffs filed the suit. The trial court by its judgment found that the plaintiffs being co-owners of the common property were entitled to use the property in the way most advantageous to them and the defendants having not pleaded or proved any damage or loss to the common property cannot obstruct the plaintiffs from taking water to their lands from their exclusive well through the common channel. On the first appeal by the defendants , with the little modification the first Appellate Court confirmed the decree of the trial court. The defendants feeling aggrieved took up the matter in second appeal and the High Court reversed the judgments and decrees of the two courts below and dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiffs did not acquire any right either by grant or by prescription by way of easement. The plaintiffs-appellants have now approached this Court.

Held: In absence of any specific pleading regarding detriment to respondents-defendants, appellants-plaintiffs have every right to use common land and common channel. Appellants were claiming their right on basis of admitted co-ownership rights which includes unrestricted user, unlimited in point of disposition, and High Court was not justified in holding that appellants' right to take water was not acquired by any grant from respondents or from any other sale deed. Right of co-ownership presupposes a bundle of rights which has been lost sight of by High Court. Appellants claim easementary right only as an alternative ground but main ground on which they based their claim is on right of co-ownership. In these days of scarcity when every effort is being made at all levels to increase agricultural production to country's teeming millions it would not be desirable to allow respondents to create any hurdle in irrigation of appellants' plots through common channel from their exclusive well. Thus, neither law nor expediency warrants a conclusion as desired by respondents

Facts: The plaintiff possessed a lease of land on which he erected a building, which building had windows overlooking the adjoining land which belonged to the plaintiff's lessor. There was a division of the freehold interest, the freehold of the land leased to the plaintiff going to the sons of the former owner, and the freehold of the alleged servient tenement, to his grandsons. The plaintiff acquired the freehold of the property on which he held the lease, and the defendant acquired the adjoining land, that is to say, the alleged servient tenement." This suit was filed. It is, therefore, clear that the plaintiff cannot prove twenty years' enjoyment of light and air through his windows without including part of the period when the alleged servient tenement belonged to his landlord.

Held: An easement of light, like any other easement, must be acquired, under Section 12, by the owner, or on his behalf, by the person in] possession. Therefore, if the lessee acquires a right to light, he acquires it on behalf of the owner which means the absolute owner, and he cannot acquire it on behalf of the owner as against such owner, A man cannot acquire an easement as against himself. In present case, a lessee cannot acquire by prescription a right to light over adjoining property which belongs to his landlord.

Facts: Certain properties belonged to Ranchhodbhai, which were succeeded by his two sons, namely, Laxman Ranchhod and Tulsidas Ranchhod. The said two brothers agreed to partition the properties and since after the partition enjoyed as the absolute owners without any interference by the other party. The property of Laxman Ranchhod was sold to Kurgi Jina, who, in his turn, sold the property in favour of the present plaintiff - Vrajlal in 1976. As the present defendant, Tulsidas, started erecting a wall adjoining the wall of the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed the suit seeking injunction against the defendant-Tulsidas that he be restrained from raising the wall, as the plaintiff has perfected his easementary right to get light and air. It was submitted that conditions, as provided under Section 15, read with Section 35, of the Indian Easement Act, 1882 have not been fully satisfied and that the right enjoyed by the plaintiff's predecessor in title was a permissive right, the present plaintiff would not be entitled to claim the easementary rights. Trial Court held the evidence as inadmissible and as Laxman and since thereafter the predecessors were exercising their easementary right over the servient heritage belonging to Tulsidas and as the right has perfected by lapse of time, the defendant cannot raise the wall. The dissatisfied defendant preferred an appeal, who, being unsuccessful before the first Appellate Court, is before this Court.

Held: Once it is held that the document of 1946 (Exh.58) is inadmissible in evidence, then, the very first condition of Section 15 of the Easement Act would stand proved because right from 1946, the access and use of light or air to and for any building have been peaceably enjoyed therewith by Laxman at least for a period of twenty six years. The right was uninterrupted and was within the knowledge of the servient heritage. It is settled law that when a property is sold, it passes to the purchaser with all the rights and obligations. If the plaintiff has purchased the property with all the rights and obligations, then, the right of easement would also stand transferred in his favour and he would be entitled to tack the right of easement in retrospection right from 1946 to 1976, that is, for a period of thirty years.

Facts: Appellant was running motor garage on suit plot for which she had motorable access only through plot of, R-1., who constructed gate on his plot which obstruct the way approaching Appellant's plot. Appellant opposed the same and filed suit for injunction to restrain R-1 from constructing or placing any gates upon way of Appellants. Trial Court initially granted interim injunction. Respondent opposed the same on grounds that he acquired right over said plot through valid sale deed. Thus, Trial Court dismissed suit. Appellant approached Appellate Court which granted access on foot and denied motorable access to Appellant through plot of R-1. Hence, present appeal.

Held: From facts it is established that till the construction of road on adjacent plot, Appellant had no motorable access to her premises. Thus, balance of convience lies in her favour. Directed that motorable access through plot of R-1 must be provided to Appellant till completion of road through which Appellant can access her plot. After completion of road, Appellants easementary right over said plot will expire.

Facts: The plaintiffs are the owners of two houses adjacent to each other and also to the property of the defendants. The defendants had a structure on their own property. On the roof of that structure they had made three morries (narrow outlets for the outflow of dirty water). These morries opened towards the property of the plaintiffs. In an earlier suit, the defendants had obtained an injunction directing the plaintiffs not to block the flow of dirty water from the said three morries. The defendants were, however, permitted to fix up pipe lines to receive the said water and carry it to a nali (drain) towards the East of their houses. The plaintiffs complied with the terms of the decree granting the said injunction. The defendants then raised the height of the first floor of their structure by three feet and on a part of the terrace over the first floor they constructed two additional storeys. In raising the height of the roof over the first floor, the defendants blocked the three original morries and opened three new morries on the roof over the first floor and opened six more morries on the respective terraces over the second and third floors in the new construction. They opened all the morries in such a way that the outflow of water from all the said morries was directed towards the properties of the plaintiffs. The defendants also constructed new windows which opened towards the houses of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs blocked these new windows by raising the height of their respective walls and the defendants claimed the right to break these walls which obstructed the view from their new windows.

Held: The defendants not merely altered the position of the said three morries by raising the height of his first storey and the roof thereon but have opened six new morries so that in the place of three old morries, there are at present nine morries in existence. Now, it is a matter of commonsense that the outflow of water from the nine morries would be larger than the outflow of water from the three old morries and hence, it must be held that the burden of the easement has been increased by the action of the defendants. Section 23 of the Indian Easements Act on which reliance was placed provides that the dominant owner may, from time to time, alter the mode and place of enjoying the easement provided that he does not thereby impose any additional burden on the servient heritage. In the present Appeal before us, as additional burden on the property of the plaintiffs has been imposed by the action of the defendants, the provisions of the said section cannot come to the aid of the defendants. As far as the question of opening of new windows is concerned, it is open to the defendants to use their property in any manner permitted by law; and hence they cannot be restrained from opening new windows, as no customary right of privacy appears to have been pleaded or proved. It is, however, equally clear that, if the defendants open any new windows, the plaintiffs are fully entitled to block the same by raising the height of their walls and the defendants are not entitled to break or damage the said walls or any portion thereof so as to remove the obstruction to their new windows.

Facts: The Plaintiff and Defendant are owners of adjoining properties, the Defendant being the owner of the northern property. Between the houses of the Plaintiff and the Defendant there is a strip of vacant land. Normally there would have been no obstruction to the Plaintiff having access to the northern side of his compound wall for repairing, over the space of the Defendant. But he brought opposition to this course from the Defendant by his own act, namely his instituting the suit claiming title to the vacant space and a mandatory injunction for pulling down some construction which the Defendant had erected. The wall in question was in the open and the right asserted by the Plaintiff in this suit is the right of access over the available open space to repair and white wash the northern face of the wall periodically. The trial Court decreed the suit subject to some restrictions. The first appellate Court took a contrary view. On second appeal to the High Court.

Held: For any enjoyment of the right of the easement of lateral support which the Plaintiff had acquired to his wall, the wall itself must be kept in good repair and as an accessory to that easement, it could be held that he might do acts necessary to secure the full enjoyment of the easement right. Of course, there was a limitation in the exercise of such rights. Section 24 of the Easements Act itself limits the exercise of accessory rights by providing that it must be done at such time and in such manner, as, without detriment to the dominant owner, to cause the servient owner as little inconvenience as possible.If the act proposed was necessary for the enjoyment of the easement, the dominant owner in such cases had to suit his time and manner to the reasonable convenience of the servient owner. The dominant owner should not increase the burden on the servient owner, nor cause unnecessary inconvenience and hardship to the servient owner. The time and manner of doing it must be such that the dominant owner if he were the servient owner and a reasonable man, would prefer to have it done. In this case the Plaintiff had the right he claimed to go over the vacant space of the Defendant to carry on repairs to the exposed northern wall.

Facts: Concerned house was an ancestral property of plaintiff-appellant Padam Singh and the defendants Bakhtawar Lal son of Gopal Lal and Shanti Lal son of Bakhtawar Lal. On a partition, the ground floor became the property of defendants and the upper storey consisting of first floor and second floor became the property of plaintiff Padam Singh. As a result of this partition of one property, plaintiff became entitled to vertical support of walls of building on ground floor. It appears that the building was in dilapidated condition, there was a notice from the Municipal Council, Udaipur for demolishing of the house. As a result of which the first and second floors belonging to the plaintiffs were demolished. The plaintiff demanded of defendants to repair and reconstruct the ground floor so that he can make reconstruction on his portion of his house. Having failed to get response from the defendants, he has filed the suit for permanent injunction against the defendants that they may be directed to construct ground floor or allow the plaintiff to construct it and to recover the costs of such construction of the defendants and if the plaintiff is not permitted to construct the ground floor, such construction may be made through Public Works Department at the costs of the defendants. The defendant's were restrained from obstructing the plaintiffs in carrying out the construction as directed by the decree.

Held: Both the courts below have examined the case from the point of view that the case is covered by Sections 45 and 51 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. The suit has been filed in March 1967 within 20 years of the approximate date of the demolition of the upper storey, as admitted by the defendant in the written statement and claiming relief of the repair and reconstruction of servient tenement within 20 years, must be held to be within limitation. It is declared that the plaintiffs had an easement of absolute necessity of vertical support from the whole of ground floor for use and enjoyment of his ownership of the first and second floor of the tenement including his right to construct or reconstruct his share of the original tenement. The plaintiff has acquired a right of easement of vertical support from the servient heritage from the date when the whole tenement which was once a one unit was divided by partition and was converted into two heritages. The owner of the first floor and second floor being the owner of dominant heritage acquired the right of easement of vertical support of the servient heritage of the ground floor. The suit filed by plaintiffs is within limitation. Section 24 which authorises the dominant owner to do all acts necessary to secure the full enjoyment of the easement, without detriment to the dominant owner. Unless the right of easement enjoyed by the dominant heritage is adversely affected by any act of the servient owner, servient owner is not liable for maintenance and upkeep of servient heritage. Any act of servient owner, the right of enjoyment of easement is affected, the dominant owner is entitled to damages.

Facts: The plaintiff had a privy at one end of his property, which was cleaned by a sweeper who used to pass through a lane (gully) belonging to defendants, and had obtained a decree establishing his right of the easement. Subsequently the defendants having moved the Municipality, the plaintiffs existing privy was demolished, and a new one was erected at a point further down on the plaintiff's property. The defendants having obstructed the plaintiff's sweeper from passing through their lane to clean the new privy, the plaintiff applied to execute his decree.

Held: The dominant heritage was not the privy but the plaintiffs house and land within which the privy was. The removal of the privy and its rebuilding on a different spot on the plaintiff's land had not the effect of extinguishing the easement under Section 45 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. As long as the sweeper entered the plaintiff's land or rather left the defendants' land at the same point, there was no increase in the burden, and that the case was governed by Section 23 of the Act. The decree of the plaintiff was capable of execution, since the right of way to which the plaintiff was entitled was in respect of cleaning the privy standing in his land and the fact that the privy was moved further down in the plaintiff's property made no difference.

Facts: The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of the easementary right of the plaintiff to let off rain water discharged from the western plots A and A-1 towards east across the plots B and B-1 belonging to the defendants and for the issue of a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove the elevated portion. It was alleged that the defendants dug up two wells and dug channels also. The earth so removed was placed along the ridge thereby preventing the water from A, A-1 plots to flow into B, B-1 plots with the result that the water was stagnating and causing damage to the lands of the plaintiff. The trial Court after recording the evidence of the parties upheld the contention of the plaintiff and decreed his suit. The matter was then carried in appeal but the 1st defendant was not successful. Hence, the second appeal.

Held: Section 44 of the Easements Act has no application to the facts of the present case. That section relates to the extinction of easementary right because of permanent alteration of servant heritage by superior force. It is not the defendant's case that the ridge channel and the wells were brought into existence by any superior force. Section 44 of the Act, therefore, has no relevance. Section 26 plainly applies to the easementary rights. The right to drain off the rainwater according to the lie of the land in a natural way, is a natural right and is not restricted by any such limitation. According to the lie of the land the water was flowing in its natural way. By a device the defendants seem to have obstructed it. The device was employed to create obstruction all along the ridge. I do not think, therefore, that the decree granted by both the Courts below in favour of the plaintiff is in any way inconsistent with the findings of the Courts below.

Facts: The plaintiff had a privy at one end of his property, which was cleaned by a sweeper who used to pass through a lane (gully) belonging to defendants, and had obtained a decree establishing his right of the easement. Subsequently the defendants having moved the Municipality, the plaintiffs existing privy was demolished, and a new one was erected at a point further down on the plaintiff's property. The defendants having obstructed the plaintiff's sweeper from passing through their lane to clean the new privy, the plaintiff applied to execute his decree.

Held: The dominant heritage was not the privy but the plaintiffs house and land within which the privy was. The removal of the privy and its rebuilding on a different spot on the plaintiff's land had not the effect of extinguishing the easement under Section 45 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. As long as the sweeper entered the plaintiff's land or rather left the defendants' land at the same point, there was no increase in the burden, and that the case was governed by Section 23 of the Act. The decree of the plaintiff was capable of execution, since the right of way to which the plaintiff was entitled was in respect of cleaning the privy standing in his land and the fact that the privy was moved further down in the plaintiff's property made no difference.

Facts: The plaintiff and the defendants are the owners of two contiguous houses. The plaintiff's house has got, besides the ground floor, a first floor and also a second floor. The plaintiff's case is that the defendants are attempting to raise a wall 12 feet above the existing wall of their house in order to build a terraced upstairs and that this wall will shut out the light and air which formerly used to enter through the apertures mentioned above. The defendants resisted the suit on two grounds, namely that the plaintiff had not acquired an easementary right to light and air by prescription as alleged by him and also that the proposed wall would not substantially diminish the light and air which used to be admitted through the apertures in question.The trial Judge found that though the proposed wall would cause some diminution of light and air the diminution would not be so much as to cause physical discomfort. He was of opinion that in the circumstances no injunction should be granted as desired by the plaintiff. Hence, this appeal.

Held: A case of this kind is governed by Section 35, Easements Act, according to which, subject to the provisions of Sections 52 to 57, Specific Relief Act, an injunction may be granted to restrain the disturbance of an easement where the disturbance is only threatened or intended when the act threatened or intended must necessarily, if performed, disturb the easement. Proposed wall would amount to a nuisance if built though it would to some extent be inconvenient and diminish to some extent light and air that was now available to inmates of Plaintiff's house. In these circumstances, Plaintiff Appellant failed to show that trial Court was wrong in refusing to grant an injunction.

Facts: Plaintiffs and the defendant are adjacent neighbours. By two separate sale deeds, plaintiffs purchased land from Sidheswar Sahu. In the very year, plaintiffs constructed their residential houses on the land and continued to reside therein. Defendant purchased land from Atul Ghose by a registered sale deed. He started construction on his land. He did not leave a space of 15 feet as required under the Orissa Municipal Rules, 1953 towards the plaintiff's side; he made construction by leaving a space of 1 to 2 feet and by the date of the suit he was proceeding with the construction of his kitchen and latrine in close proximity to the plaintiff's houses. By the aforesaid illegal act, light and air to the houses of the plaintiffs were obstructed and their privacy was affected. Despite repeated requests from the plaintiffs the defendant did not desist in prosecution of the illegal act, the suit was filed. Hence, this Appeal.

Held: Authorities are consistent that three sections i.e. 28, 33, 35 must be read together. When so read, interference with light and air which is not substantial does not give a cause of action to a person entitled to the right. There was no provision in Act for an aggrieved person to move municipal authorities for redressal of grievances. Act did not oust, either expressly or impliedly, jurisdiction of Civil Court to take cognizance of suits in which relief sought was against injury caused by unauthorised construction. Thus, obligation of Defendant to Plaintiffs complaining of injury was not enforceable through provisions of Act. Plaintiffs complained of invasion of their rights to light, air and privacy. However, even in case where Plaintiff had acquired right of easement to light and air, an action for damages or injunction was not maintainable unless injury complained of was material. Therefore, it was concluded that Defendant's construction was in violation of municipal plan and rules was final.

Facts: The Plaintiff-Respondent filed two suits, firstly, claiming an injunction against the Defendants from using a pathway and claiming exclusive right to use the said path. Another suit was filed restraining the Defendants from preventing the Plaintiff from using the pathway to reach their land. The learned trial Court dismissed the suits holding the Defendants have right of necessity of access to their property over the pathway in the first suit. However, the First Appellate Court allowed the appeal and granted injunction as prayed holding that, there is no necessity of easement as the said Defendant has access from the property of her husband. The High Court has maintained the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court. In present matter, Defendants are in appeal aggrieved against judgment and decree passed by High Court.

Held: The relationship of D-1 & D-2 will not negate the grant of easement right of passage granted to her in the sale deed only because the recital is generic in nature and usually put by the deed writers. Once the land has been sold with the right of access through the land adjoining the property sold, such right could not be exclusively conferred to the Plaintiff in the sale deed. The Plaintiff has to maintain the 16 feet wide passage in any case in terms of the recital in his sale deed. Therefore, if the D-2 or her transferees use the passage, then such use of passage by D-2 or her transferees cannot be said to be causing any prejudice to the Plaintiff. The subsequent events of inheritance vesting the property in the same person will not take away the right of the Defendants to use the passage adjacent to their land only because the D-2 has gifted part of land to D-1 or that after the death of both the Defendants, the common legal proceedings inherited the property. The Appellants have been granted right to use passage in the sale deed. Thus, it is not easement of necessity being claimed by the Appellants. It is right granted to D-2 in the sale deed therefore, such right will not extinguish in terms of Section 41 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. In view thereof, the judgment and decree passed by the High Court suffers from manifest error and, thus, cannot be sustained in law. The passage adjoining the property of the Defendants leading to the property of the Plaintiff is reserved for the common use of D-2 and of the Plaintiff.

Facts: This is the defendant's appeal and arises out of the following circumstances. The plaintiffs brought the suit for recovery of Rs. 600, as damages on the allegation that they had a right to irrigate four plots of land with the water taken from a well situated in plot 2670, that they had grown potatoes in all the plots except plot 2671, that the defendants, without any rhyme or reason stopped the plaintiffs from Irrigating the potatoes field and that a loss was caused to the plaintiffs. The defence was that the well belonged to the defendants themselves, that the plaintiffs had no right to cultivate their lands with the water of the well, that the defendants themselves had been cultivating the four plots which are now in plaintiff's possession and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover any damages.

Held: It cannot be laid down as a broad proposition of law that a tenant cannot acquire an easement against property held by another tenant under the same landlord. A tenant may acquire a right of easement to the use of water for irrigation from a well owned by an adjoining tenant. An easement remains suspended when the dominant and the servient tenements become rested in the same person, but revives when the tenements again vest in different persons.

Facts: This case is focused on the liability of a landlord to one of his tenants for the collapse on of part of a large building let out mainly in rooms. Plaintiff No. 1's husband was the tenant of a room on the fourth floor of a building belonging to the defendant. While he was in the privies and the wash-room on that floor that part of the building collapsed killing him and others. The rent-bills only purported to show that a room was let. They were silent about the user of the privies and the wash-room.The trial Judge held that the defendant was negligent in not making proper repairs to the building and awarded Rs. 6,500 as damages to the plaintiffs by the defendant.

Held: That there was no contractual obligation on the defendant to repair either the room let or the privies. The deceased's right over the privies amounted to a license under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, it was the duty of the defendant under Section 57 of the Act to disclose any defect in the building likely to be dangerous to the deceased of which the defendant was aware but the deceased was not. The defendant knew of the dangerous condition of the building, he laid a trap for the deceased or failed in his duty under Section 57 of the Indian Easements Act to disclose such danger, and was, therefore, liable for negligence. The defendant, therefore, owed a duty to the deceased not to lay a trap for him in respect of such user.

Facts:The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit against the appellant-defendant praying for the grant of mandatory and prohibitory injunction seeking eviction allegedly on the ground of his being a licensee. In the written statement filed the appellant herein pleaded that he was not a licensee but a lessee. During the trial of the suit the appellant filed an application for amendment of the written statement to incorporate an alternative plea that in case the court found that the defendant was a licensee, he was not liable to be evicted as according to him the licence was irrevocable. He further wanted to add a plea that first and second prayers in the plaint were barred by limitation and that as acting upon the licence he has executed works of permanent nature and incurred expenses in execution of the same his licence cannot be revoked by the grantor under Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. The prayer was rejected by the Trial Court as also by the High Court on the ground that the proposed amendment, was mutually destructive which, if allowed, would amount to permitting the defendant to withdraw the admission petition allegedly made by him in the main written statement.

Held: The appellant-defendant is permitted to amend the written statement to the extent of incorporating the plea of his entitlement to the benefit of Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 only subject to his paying all the arrears on account of licence fee and costs assessed at Rs. 3,000 within a period of one month from the date the parties appear in the Trial Court. The payment and receipt of the arrears of licence fee shall be without a prejudice to the rights of the parties which may be adjudicated by the trial court.

Facts: P-1 and D-1 are brothers. P-2 and D-2 are cousins, being the son of P-1 and the son of D-1 respectively. Originally they formed a joint family, but in 1921 a deed of partition was executed by the parties. Under this deed a certain house with a well at the back fell to the share of the defendants, while the neighbouring house fell to the plaintiffs' share with no Well. The deed of partition provided that the second brother should "out of brotherly affection be allowed to take the water of the well," and recited that he was "asking, not as a matter of right, but simply out of regard." Disputes arose about the use of the water from the well in question, and the defendants built a wall which the plaintiffs contend obstructed their old passage to the well, and their right to take water from it. Trial Court held that the plaintiffs had no right to ask for the removal of the wall, which the defendants had put up. On appeal, the District Judge has held that what is granted by this clause amounts to an easement to take the water of the well, vesting in the plaintiffs and that the defendants had no right to prevent the plaintiffs from exercising this right of easement and taking water from the well in suit. Hence, present is the second appeal.

Held: That the right acquired by the plaintiff under the deed, though not an easement, was a license as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act 1882. As the license was granted as part of a partition which granted certain property to the plaintiff, it was a license coupled with a transfer of property and irrevocable as such, under Section 60(a) of the Act. It is a personal right granted merely to Ramchandra and Gopal. The words "save as aforesaid" in the second part of Section 56 of the Indian Easements Act bring in the words "unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied"; and having regard to the nature of the license, namely, a right to go and take water from the well, which would ordinarily be done, if so desired, by servants or agents, I think it must be taken that there is an implied intention in the grant that the right could, to a reasonable extent, be exercised by servants or agents. The words "an interest in the property" in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act 1882, are presumably intended to cover cases where there might be a right in the property granted such as a lease or a right of joint possession. Section 60(a) of the Act does not necessarily use the words "transfer of property" in the limited sense of a transfer as defined in the Transfer of Property Act 1882, it is fairly clear that it was coupled with a transfer of the property. That transfer is in force, and the plaintiffs have a right to use the water of the well.

Facts: Respondent's husband was appellants' brother. Appellant allowed respondent's husband to live in one room of suit premises as licensee. After death of respondent's husband, appellant served notice upon respondent and terminated her license. Despite of notice, respondent failed to vacate the room. Appellant filed suit for mandatory injunction for direction to respondent to vacate the same. Trial Court decreed suit in favour of appellant. Respondent filed first appeal which was allowed. Hence, this is the second appeal filed by appellant.

Held: Section 54 of Act provides that grant of license may be expressed or implied from the conduct of grantor. In present case, parties are closely related and it is natural for the close relations to grant permission to one for stay in house owned by the other. As per established facts of present case, husband of the respondent was licensee and after his death, respondent continued living room where her husband used to live. It is also proved that appellant had issued a notice calling upon respondent to vacate the room and hand over possession thereof to her. Although status as licensee enjoyed by husband of respondent may not be inherited by respondent, yet after his death, she was permitted to continue in possession of the suit property. Thus, conduct of parties is such that it would give rise to legitimate presumption that respondent independently acquired the status of licensee and has been continuing in possession as such. However, as ownership of appellant upon suit premises fully established, licensee hold by respondent by implication, stood terminated when appellant issued notice to her vacate the premises. Accordingly, appeal succeeds and respondent directed to hand over vacant possession of suit property to appellant.

Facts: The petitioners were allotted either vacant space or shops in the Mattuthavani Bus Stand owned by the Corporation of Madurai. The petitioners were evicted. Respondents dispossessed Petitioners from shops on ground that places were intended for public purposes. Apart from 188 shops, there were also rooms intended for public purposes and not intended to be let out for commercial purposes. The petitioners herein, participated in the auction and became the successful bidders. Therefore, they were allotted these shops/vacant space and they have been carrying on business. A couple of fire accidents in the shops located in the Bus Stand, had been reported earlier, due to the unauthorised use of gas cylinders and stoves. Therefore, it is claimed that the Collector orally instructed the officials of the Corporation, during his visit, to take appropriate action. On 7.6.2010, the District Collector appears to have sent a written communication in this regard to the Commissioner of the Corporation. But it is claimed by the Corporation that on 6.6.2011 itself, notices were affixed in the shops of the petitioners. The notices which are identically worded, called upon the petitioners to vacate and hand over possession within 24 hours on the ground that these shops had proven to be a hindrance to the public. After 24 hours, the petitioners were thrown out with police help. Some of them have been evicted on 8.6.2011 and some of them later. Aggrieved by their sudden dispossession, the petitioners have come up with these writ petitions.

Held: Respondents were entitled to serve notices personally on Petitioners and obtain their acknowledgements in delivery book but Respondents resorted to affixture even in first instance perhaps with view to pre-empt Petitioners from approaching Court and thwarting their attempts. Therefore when Petitioners had participated in auction conducted in pursuance of advertisements issued in newspapers and had taken shops/vacant space on license, Respondents could not throw them out by adopting dubious methods. Therefore eviction of Petitioners without assailing auction as wholly vitiated was arbitrary especially when Respondents had not followed due process of law. Under Section 63, a licensee is entitled to a reasonable time to leave the property and to remove his goods, upon the revocation of the license. The time of 24 hours granted under the notices dated 6.6.2011, assuming that they were duly served on the petitioners, is certainly not a reasonable time within the meaning of Section 63. Therefore, it is clear that the petitioners have been treated unfairly. Under Section 64 of Act where license was granted for consideration and licensee was evicted without any fault of his own before he has fully enjoyed right for which he contracted, he was entitled to recover compensation from grantor. Therefore appropriate remedy for Petitioners was only to seek compensation and not re-possession especially when places granted to them were no more available for private licensing.