Q. Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to arbitration proceedings held under the IDPASC and MSMED Acts and whether counter claim is entertainable in the arbitration proceedings held pursuant to the provisions of the IDPASC and MSMED Acts?

In the instant case, it was held that the counter claim is maintainable before the authorities constituted under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006. Further, it is submitted that when the conciliation is failed, for further proceedings, provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are made applicable as if there is an agreement between the parties Under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the 1996 Act, as such there is no reason for not allowing counter claim by the buyer. Thus, it wasruled that in absence of jurisdiction, no counter claim can be entertained. Furthermore, it was held that in any event as the supply of goods and services were made much prior to filing of memorandum by the Appellant, the Appellant cannot make any claim before the authority constituted under MSMED Act.

Furthermore, the court is of the view that the High Court has rightly relied on the judgment in the case of Andhra Pradesh Power Coordination Committee 468 and held that Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the arbitration proceedings under Section 18(3) of the 2006 Act. Thus, the court held that no further elaboration is necessary on this issue and that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 will apply to the arbitrations covered by Section 18(3) of the 2006 Act.

Silpi Industries and Ors. vs. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. MANU ID - MANU/SC/0390/2021

Q. Whether any period of limitation was applicable to the transactions in question prior to 29th August, 1998 or thereafter in view of Section 2(4) read with Section 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and what is the effect of the amendment to Bye-law 252(2) amended by the Stock Exchange, Mumbai providing that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable?

In the instant case, the High Court of Bombay held that in view of Section 2(4) of the Act, period of limitation for arbitration was not applicable to the transactions entered into between the appellant and the respondent, being an arbitration under a different enactment, prior to 29th August, 1998 when the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 were extended to the arbitral proceedings under the Stock Exchange Bye-laws. However, the court rejected the appellant's contention that even after applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, appellant would be continued to be governed by no period of limitation in view of Section 2(4). The Court held that since the period of limitation was prescribed by amendment to Bye-laws on 29th August, 1998, the appellant ought to have filed arbitral proceedings within three years from the date of amendment of the Bye-laws framed by the Stock Exchange, Mumbai which are statutory bye-laws. Held, alleged rights, if any, in favour of the appellant in view of Section 2(4) of the Act to file claim without period of limitation stood abrogated in view of the amendment to Bye-law 252(2). Further, it was held that even though cause of action arose before the said amendment but as no arbitration had been instituted, the provisions of amendment would apply with respect to limitation.

Satish K. Narang and Co. vs. Jamnadas Morarje Secs. Ltd. (04.05.2021 - BOMHC) : MANU/MH/1182/2021

Q. Whether a delay in preferring the application under Section 33(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is condonable?

In the instant case, the High Court of Delhi held that unlike Section 34, Section 33(1) does not contain any provision permitting condonation of the period of limitation stipulated therein. The Court held that it cannot read into Section 33(1), a power of condonation of delay, where none exists. Further, the fact that delay cannot be automatically condoned by the Arbitral Tribunal, in the case of application under Section 33(1), stands underscored by the stipulation "unless another period of time has been agreed upon by the parties" in Section 33(1). Lastly, it was held that the period of 30 days as stipulated in Section 33(1) is relaxable only if, ad idem, the parties agree to another period for filing the application thereunder and de hors any such mutual agreement between the parties, the period of 30 days in Section 33(1) is sacrosanct and is not relaxable.

Tantia Construction Limited vs. Ircon International Ltd. (13.04.2021 - DELHC) : MANU/DE/0735/2021

Q. Whether condonation of delay in an application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is appealable?

A three judge bench of the Appellate Court held that the condonation of delay can be appealable and the court widened the interpretation of the of Section 34 as award holders can appeal under Section 37 of the Act after filing the application of condonation of delay after three months.

Chintels India Ltd. v Bhayana Builders P. Ltd : MANU/SC/0070/2021

Q. What is the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

Supreme Court noted that in the absence of a provision prescribing a limitation period to file a Section 11, Application for Appointment of Arbitrator, the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable. Supreme Court while referring to earlier high court decisions upheld that Article 137 would be applicable for computing the limitation period for a Section 11 application.

The Apex Court also clarified that the limitation period for filing a Section 11 application must not be confused with the limitation period applicable to substantive claims made in the underlying contract as both are distinct.

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. and Ors. vs. Nortel Networks India Pvt. Ltd. (10.03.2021 - SC) : MANU/SC/0171/2021

Q. Whether the delay that has been occasioned in making the application under Section 34(2) of the Act of 1996 can be regarded as one seeking benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, without expressly saying so or praying in those terms?

Relying on M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise MANU/SC/0484/2015, the Supreme Court held in the instant case that merely because the application made by the appellant does not formally invoke Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the Court below could not have turned its face away from considering the appellant's case, invoking benefit of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, if that is otherwise made out on the terms of the Statute and the facts and evidence.

Moradabad Development Authority vs. V.R. Construction and Engineering Company (02.03.2022 - ALLHC) : MANU/UP/0608/2022

Q. Can the High Court decide on the issue of Limitation under Section 11 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

The scope of examination is confined only to the existence of the arbitration agreement at the Section 11 stage, and nothing more. All other preliminary or threshold issues are left to be decided by the arbitrator Under Section 16, which enshrines the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle.

The doctrine of "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" implies that the arbitral tribunal is empowered and has the competence to Rule on its own jurisdiction. This doctrine is intended to minimize judicial intervention, so that the arbitral process is not thwarted at the threshold, when a preliminary objection is raised by one of the parties. In view of the provisions of Section 16, and the legislative policy to restrict judicial intervention at the pre-reference stage, the issue of limitation would require to be decided by the arbitrator.

Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Limited vs. Northern Coal Field Limited (27.11.2019 - SC)