CHAPTER 11

Questions and Answers

Q.1. Distinguish between sale and hire purchase.

Ans. A sale is different from hire purchase as the sale gives complete authority to buyer to use or dispose off the goods on his own Will. But, a hirer gets only possession of goods. He cannot pass the title of goods to any buyer. Secondly, sales tax is not leviable on hire purchase unless and until it is converted into a sale.

If the hirer does not have the option to return the goods to its owner then it will be an agreement to buy and not a hire purchase.

The hirer cannot be compelled to buy as observed by the Supreme Court in the case K.L. Johar & Co. v. Dy CTO, MANU/SC/0348/1964 : AIR 1965 SC 1082, Wanchoo, J. said-

The essence of sale is that the property is transferred from the seller to the buyer for a price, whether paid at once or paid later in instalments. On the other hand, a hire purchase agreement has two aspects. There is first an aspect of bailment of goods subject to the hire purchase agreement, and there is next, an element of sale which fructifies when the option to purchase is exercised by the intending purchaser.

It was further added-

"Coming into being of sale is a question of fact and it takes place when the hirer exercises the option. It cannot be said that merely because the hire purchase agreement stipulates a particular period for the total payment of the consideration and for the purchaser to exercise the option to purchase at the end of the said period, the sale does take place at the end of that period willy-nilly. There may be cases where the hirer may default in paying the amount within the stipulated period, he may ask for extension and the dealer may grant it. In such cases, the sale obviously takes place only when the purchaser exercises the option to purchase after fully paying the agreed amount."

We can take another example of the case Lee v. Butler, where a lady hired certain furniture from the plaintiff for which the price was to be paid in two instalments. The condition was also there that in case the lady fails to give instalments, the plaintiff had right to take the furniture back. But, before the last instalment was paid, the furniture was sold by the lady to defendant.

The court held that the defendant had acquired a good title, the lady being in possession of the furniture under an agreement to buy. She did not have the option to return, but was compellable to buy.

Q.2.Can a buyer claim the price of goods if it was found on possession that it was stolen and seller sold it knowingly?

Ans. In sale, the ownership of goods is transferred from seller to buyer. The law confers the rights on seller to sell the goods if there is an implied condition that the seller has the right to sell. Buyer may reject the goods if, the title of the seller turns out to be defective.

In a case, Rawland v. Divall, (1923) 2 KB 500 CA, the buyer had purchased a second hand car from a dealer and used it but within few months, the care was seized by the police as it was stolen. Here, the buyer may recover the full price from the buyer (dealer) although he had used it for few months. Lord Atkin said-

"There can be no sale at all of goods which the seller has no right to sell. The whole object of a sale is to transfer property from one person to another.....In fact the buyer has not received any part of that which he contracted to receive - namely, the property and right to possession - and that being so, there has been a total failure of consideration. Even, when a seller has full ownership of the goods, yet he may commit a breach of this condition.

In Niblett v. Confectioner's Materials Co., (1921) 3 KB 387: (1921) All ER Rep 459 CA,

3000 tins of condensed milk was sold by the defendants. The consignment reached from New York to London and the plaintiff found that 1000 tins were labelled as "Nissly brand". Another manufacturer of condensed milk under the name of 'Nestle brand' claimed that that this was an infringement of their trade mark. Then the plaintiff removed the labels and sold it on reduced price. Then the plaintiff sued the sellers for the breach of the condition as to title.

In the case, it was held that the plaintiff had the right to reject the goods or was entitled to recover the damages what he lost due to sale of milk on reduced prices.

Lord Atkin has explained the meaning of the words "right to sell" as follows-

"The seller had not the right to sell these goods.....having admitted that there being an infringement of the Nestle Company's trade mark they were liable to an injunction restraining the sale. Therefore, they had no right to sell these goods at the time when the property was to pass".

It was the view of their Lordship that the defendants could have passed the property in the goods but for the intervention of the third party, they had nevertheless no right to sell the goods arising to the existence of a title superior to that of the vendor, so that the possession of the vendee may be disturbed. In the words of Scrutton, L.J.-

"The defendants impliedly warranted that they had then the right to sell them. In fact they could have been restrained by injunction from selling them, because they were infringing the rights of third person. If a vendor can be stopped by process of law from selling he has not the right to sell".

Q.3. Discuss sale by sample with the help of relevant cases.

Ans. Section 17 of the Sale of Goods Act puts three conditions into every contract of sale by sample:

(i)that the bulk shall correspond with the sample in quality.

(ii)that the buyer shall have a reasonable opportunity of comparing the bulk with the sample,

(iii)that the goods shall be free from any defect rendering them unmerchantable which would not be apparent on reasonable examination of the sample.

If a buyer purchases the goods on the basis of sample and finds that the goods are defective which was not apparent on reasonable examination of the sample, the buyer has got the right to reject the goods on discovering the defect later. Further, even on partial defects on some of the goods, the buyer can reject the entire quantity of goods.

In the case, Prabhu Dayal v. Bhagwan Sahai, AIR 1955 NVC 4067 Raj, the goods were found defective which was purchased on the basis of sample and it was unmerchantable too. Here, the buyer was justified in not accepting the goods on delivery. Here, the buyer has not committed any breach of contract and the seller is not entitled to any damages which he may have suffered on release of the goods.

Section 41 gives the buyer an opportunity to examine the goods which have been delivered and it was not previously examined, he is not deemed to have accepted them unless and until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract.

It the buyer rejects the goods after inspection due to its non-conformity with the samples and if he has already paid for the goods then he can recover the price as money had and received for his use.

When there is a dispute which arises from indifferent supply of goods (regarding quality), it would be the duty of the seller to prove that the goods were of the quality contracted for (Beharilal Baldeo Prasad, Re), AIR 1975 Mad 271.

Q. 4. Define 'ascertained goods' and differentiate it with 'unascertained goods'.

Ans. "Goods must be ascertained-Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained goods, no property in the goods in transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained."

The Supreme Court in the case, Badri Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, MANU/SC/0079/1969 : (1971) 3 SCC 23, defined the term 'ascertained goods' as follows-

"It is true that trees which are agreed to be cut before sale or under the contract of sale are "goods" for the purposes of the Sale of Goods Act. But before they cease to be "proprietary" right or interest in proprietary rights within the meaning of sections 3 and 4(a) of the Act they must be felled under the contract. It will be noticed that under clause 1 of the contract the plaintiff was entitled to cut teak trees of more than 12 inches girth. It has to be ascertained which trees fell within that description. Till this was ascertained, they were not "ascertained goods" within section 19 of the Sale of Goods Act. Clause 5 of the contract contemplated that stumps of trees after cutting had to be 2 inches high. In other words, the contract was not to sell the whole of the trees. In these circumstances property in the cut timber would only pass to the plaintiff under the contract at the earliest when trees are felled. But before that happened the trees had vested in the State."

Unascertained goods are distinct from specific or ascertained goods in that sense that future goods include those goods which are not in existence yet or goods which have not been acquired so far by the seller. It may also be said that future goods for purposes of passing of property can never be distinct.

Unascertained goods are not defined by the Sale of Goods Act but they fall under following categories-

Ist-Goods, which are to be manufactured or grown by the seller which are necessarily future goods,

2nd-Generic goods, e.g. 20 tonnes of sugarcane or similar goods which must also be future goods where the seller does not own sufficient goods of the description in question to appropriate the contract, and

3rd-An unidentified part of a specific whole, e.g. 1000 tonnes of sugarcane out of a particular lot of 5000 tonnes of sugar cane.

Q.5.Explain the meaning of 'Buyer is without Title when sale is by a person who is not the Owner of the Title'

Ans. The buyer doesn't get the title if the goods have been sold by a finder or a thief.

In the case Farquharson Bros. v. King & Co., (1902) AC 325 (335-36), the Judges said-"if a person leaves a watch or a ring on a seat in the park or on a table at a cafe, and it ultimately gets into the hands of a bona fide purchaser, it is no answer to the true owner to say that it was his carelessness and nothing else, that it enabled the finder to pass if off as his own".

Other examples:

(a)Delivery of goods by A on sale or return to B, upon the condition that they are to remain the property of A until the price is paid. B sells them to C without paying A for them. C purchases in good faith and without notice of A's title. Here, A can recover the goods or their value from C [Edwards v. Vaughan, (1910) 26 TLR 545 (CA)].

(b)A stolen horse was sold at a public auction, the fact of theft being known neither to the auctioneer nor to the buyer [Leo v. Bayer, (1856) 18 CB 599: 107 RR 424].

(c)A, the bus owner appointed B to ply his bus for hire. Then A handed over B a letter which was to be delivered to the Magistrate to obtain a permit for hiring the bus. B fraudulently altered the letter into one addressed to the District Superintendent of Police requesting him to transfer the bus in his own (B's) name. After this, he sold the bus to stranger. Here, the buyer does not obtain any title against the real owner (Mohambaram v. Ram Narayan).

(d)A sold goods to the plaintiff, but was allowed to keep possession of them upon payment of a weekly rent, and an undertaking to deliver them upon demand. He subsequently sold them to the defendant. He thereby determined the bailment of the goods to him, and the defendant, though he bought in good faith, acquired no title against the plaintiff. (Cooper v. Willomatt)

In all the abovementioned cases the buyer could not get a good title.

Q.6.Can a buyer reject the goods after delivery if he finds that the supplied goods do not commensurate with the quality agreed at the time of contract? Explain it

Ans. Section 41, of the Sale of Goods Act speaks about rights of buyer to examine the goods which he has not examined previously.

"1. Where goods are delivered to the buyer which he has not previously examined, he is not deemed to have accepted them unless and until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract.

2. Unless otherwise agreed, when the seller tenders delivery of goods to the buyer, he is bound, on request, to afford the buyer a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods for purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract."

Right to Examine the Goods-It is very genuine on the part of buyer to examine the goods what he has purchased or proposed to purchase. As per sub-section (1) in cases where there has been no previous examination of the goods, 'the mere fact that the buyer has taken delivery of them does not amount to an acceptance until he has had a sufficient period for examining them to see whether they are or are not in accordance with the contract. A right of inspection to ascertain whether such condition has been complied with is in the contemplation of both parties to such a contract, at the same time no complete and final acceptances so as to irrevocably vest the property in the buyer can take place before he has exercised or waived that right.

This section gives buyer a right to examine the goods and not a right to repudiate the contract. The right of inspection could only arise either when the consignee had taken the delivery from the carrier or when the goods were tendered for delivery to the buyer.

In the case, Ruttonjey v. Jamnadas, (1882) 6 Bom 692, it was observed that reasonable opportunity of examination is all that the Act requires: it is buyer's business to verify, not the seller's to supply further proof, that the goods are according to contract. What is a reasonable time in which the buyer should examine the goods when they are available to him for inspection is a question of fact to be judged on facts and circumstances of each case. The Bombay High Court while projecting the facts stated the principles. The facts of the case were that the defendant agreed to purchase from the plaintiff, 100 bales 'fully good fair Kishli Cotton', to be delivered from 15th March to 1st April, 1881. On 30th March, the plaintiffs sent the defendant a letter enclosing a sampling order, which was received by the defendant's agent at 11.30 a.m. that day. The defendant got samples taken of the cotton, and a dispute having arisen as to the quality and classification of the cotton, the plaintiffs wrote to the defendant on 31st March asking him to attend with the surveyor at 1 p.m. on that day to survey the cotton as, otherwise an ex parte survey would be held. It being a mail day, the defendant's surveyor could not attend at the appointed hour, and the plaintiffs had an ex parte survey held by their own surveyors, and they pronounced the cotton to be of the description contracted for. Shortly afterwards the defendant asked for a survey by a letter which reached the plaintiffs at 2.19 p.m. on that day.

The plaintiff did not comply with the application, and called upon the defendant to take delivery of the goods.

The plaintiffs filed a suit for breach of contract. It was defendant's plea that no reasonable opportunity was given to them to examine the goods, as there was no joint survey, and that the time allowed by the plaintiffs for examination of the cotton was not sufficient. It was held by the court that the defendant had reasonable opportunity within the meaning of this section.

Latham, J. said as-

The rule in the section 38 of the Contract Act agrees with the rule of English law laid down in Benjamin's Sale of Goods,1 but there is little authority as to what is a reasonable opportunity of inspection.......in the present case the sampling order was delivered to the defendant by 11.30 a.m. on the 30th March, and he had till 1 p.m. on the 31st March, before any refusal by the plaintiffs to allow a further examination is alleged. Now Vizbookanda Atmaram seems to have been certainly dilatory in his examination, he not having compared the samples with the standards till past noon on the 31st and it seems to me that a period of over 24 hours gave a reasonable opportunity to see whether the cotton offered was the cotton which the plaintiffs were bound by their contract to deliver.

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1. 2nd Edn., pp. 573 and 576.

Then we have to go further and to say that the purchase is entitled to continue inspecting and examining until there are expiration of the period for delivery? I find no authority for this and in many cases it would be unreasonable to place no limit on the inspection. Is a purchaser at liberty to open and taste every bottle of wine in a lot sold, or in the present case to pass every pound of cotton through an expert's hands? There must be some limit, and I think that a reasonable opportunity is the limit alike for vendor and purchaser and that such a reasonable opportunity had been had by 1 p.m. on 31st March. The goods need not be in the seller's actual possession, control is enough.1

Q.7.When it can be said that the goods have been accepted by the buyer? Explain it with the help of relevant cases.

Ans. Section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act define the acceptance of goods which says that a buyer accepts the goods as soon as he intimates it to the seller that he has accepted the goods.

From the section, it appears that buyer may accept the goods even before they are delivered, by intimating to the seller that he accepts them, as he may do by actually selecting the goods, or directing delivery to be made to third parties. (Cusack v. Robinson, (1861) 1 B&S 299).

Just to take delivery does not amount to acceptance and this is particularly the case where delivery is made to a carrier. If, however, after delivery the buyer deals with the goods in a manner inconsistent with the ownership of the seller, he thereby accepts them, nor does it signify that he so deals with them before the time which he has for examining them has elapsed.

In the case Hardy & Co. v. Hillerns & Fowler, (1923) 2 KB 490 (498) (CA), the corresponding section of English (Section 35) was discussed by Atkin, L.J. as follows-

"One of the acts upon the doing of which the buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods is that he intimates to the seller that he has accepted them. I think it is plain that such an intimation may be made before he has had a reasonable opportunity of examination and if such an intimation is made then it appears to me that without more the section operates and he is deemed to have accepted them. In the same way, when he does an act in relation to the goods which is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller, the section must be treated as coming into operation notwithstanding that the reasonable opportunity of examining them has not expired; as for instance where a man having had goods delivered to him turns them, or part of them, at once into his mill and uses them in the manufacture. In the present case the Tribunal of Appeal have found that the buyer had not had a reasonable opportunity of examination until 23rd March, a date which is subsequent to the act relied on by the sellers as being inconsistent with their ownership, but that finding is, in my opinion, immaterial.

Therefore, we have here to face the problem whether the act of the buyers in reselling and dispatching the goods was inconsistent with the ownership of the sellers. If it was, they must be deemed to have accepted them. I should like to point out, in reference to that provision, that all the words of the section must have effect given to them. The words are 'when the goods have been delivered to him'-that is to the buyer-'and he does any act' of the kind specified. That means that the buyer must have got delivery before he does the act. (J&J Cunningham Ltd. v. Robert A Munro & Co., (1922) 28 Comp Cas 42)

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1. Pollock and Mulla, the Contract and Specific Relief Act, 11th Edn., 1994, p. 515; also cited Arunachalam Chettiar v. Krishna Aiyyar, (1925) 49 Mad LJ 530.

Time for Rejection

By contract, the parties may limit the time within which the buyer must determine whether to accept or reject the goods and if after the expiration of such a limit, or if no time be fixed, he does not reject, within a reasonable time, he is deemed to have accepted them. We can understand it further, where it was considered that whether a buyer had goods for a reasonable time, and hence had lost his right to reject them, the nature of the particular defect and the speed with which it might have been discovered were irrelevant, since section 42 was directed solely to what was a reasonably practical interval between a buyer receiving the goods and his ability to return them, while keeping it in mind regarding desirability of finality in commercial transactions.

Q. 8. Distinguish between payment by bill and payment by Credit Card

Ans. Payment by Bill - Conditional Payment.-If a seller has taken a negotiable security as an absolute payment is no longer an unpaid seller, and therefore has no rights against the goods. [Cowasjee v. Thompson, (1845) 3 MIA 422: 5 Moore CP 165: 70 RR 27]

If under the contract, the bankers arranges for a banker's commercial credit in favour of the seller for payment of the price of goods then the opening of the credit would normally be only conditional payment and in the event of the banker's default in honouring the credit the seller is entitled to claim the price from the buyer and his remedies against the goods would revive [Man (Ed&F) Ltd. v. Nigerian Sweets & Confectionery Co. Ltd., (1977) 2 Lloyd's Rep 50].

In Charge Card Service Ltd., (1988) All ER 702 (707) (CA), it was held that there is no general principle of law, that whenever a method of payment was adopted involving a risk of non-payment by a third party, it was presumed that the acceptance of payment through the third party was conditional on his making (third party) the payment and if he failed to pay the original obligation of the purchaser remained. So, each method of payment has to be considered in the light of the consequences and other circumstances attending that type of payment. In the modern times, payment through Credit Card has started and in new circumstances, it becomes necessary to consider whether such payment should be treated as absolute or conditional in the light of consequences of such payment and not according to any general principle.

Payment by Credit Card.-In the transactions, where credit card is used, there is an underlying contractual scheme which predates the individual contracts of sale. In this scheme, sellers agree to accept the card payment worth the price of goods and the buyers commit the credit card company to pay the sellers/suppliers.

Here, there are two separate contracts-first, between the credit card company and the seller and second, between the credit card company and the card holder in the first case, the credit card company agrees to reimburse the amount what the buyer has incurred on purchasing the goods and in the latter case, the card holder agrees to reimburse the credit company what it has paid to seller.

It is a tacit assumption that the legal consequences will be regulated by the separate contractual obligations between the seller and the credit company when a credit card is tendered and accepted. Credit card system is beneficial for both sellers and card holders. Sellers attract customers by agreeing credit cards as the buyer can purchase the things even when he has no cash since he had to be paid the due amount to the credit card company on a later date. At the same time card holder is free from carrying cash.

Q.9.Discuss the position of unpaid seller regarding stoppage of goods in transit if the buyer turns insolvent.

Ans. Section 50 empowers the unpaid seller to stop the goods in transit if the buyer becomes insolvent before paying the price of goods. It says-

"Subject to the provisions of this Act, when the buyer of goods becomes insolvent, the unpaid seller, who has parted with the possession of the goods has the right of stopping them in transit, that is to say, he may resume possession of the goods as long as they are in the course of transit, and may retain them until payment or tender of the price.

The essentials of this section are-first - the seller should be unpaid; second - the buyer should have become insolvent, third - the property should have passed to the buyer, for if the seller reserves the right of disposal, the goods remain his property, and therefore under his lien and last and most important that the goods should be in the course of transit out of the above four, first three can be ascertained very easily but about the fourth i.e. the goods is in the transit or not is little difficult to ascertain sometime. Sometimes the goods may be with the carrier but not in transit. If there is some middle man and the middleman is seller's agent and the goods lying with him then the goods are very much in the possession of the seller and if the middleman holds the goods on behalf of buyer then it has already gone to buyer's possession. If the seller holds the goods as an independent contractor i.e. in his own right as a carrier or bailee, that there is transit in law and that there is question of stoppage in transit. It is not necessary that the goods should be actually moving. In the case, Berndison v. Strang, (1868) LR 3 Ch App 588 (591) Lord Cairns had said-

"If they arrive injured and damaged in bulk or quality, the right to stop in transitu is so far impaired; there is no contract or agreement which entitles the vendor to go beyond those goods in the state in which they arrive, and to claim some moneys which have been paid by the under writers to the purchasers of the goods in respect of their loss by the non-arrival of their property."

Q.10.What are damages available for non-acceptance of goods and breach of contract? Explain it with the help of relevant cases

Ans. Damages for non-acceptance.-If, the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to accept and pay for the goods then, the seller may sue him for his wrongful conduct. Section 56 says-

"Where the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to accept and pay for the goods, the seller may sue him for damages for non-acceptance."

We can understand the above section with the help of some cases-

(a)In the case, Boorman v. Nash, (1829) 9 B&C 145: 32 RR 607, the goods were deliverable by instalments, and the buyer refuses to accept one or other instalments. It was held that the differences in prices is to be reckoned on the day that a particular instalment was to be delivered.

(b)In the case Union of India v. Kesar Singh, AIR 1978 J&K 102, the military authorities were to receive the supply of cots as per the contract but when if reached to them, they refused to accept some supplies. In breach of their contract, the J&K High Court allowed Rs. 4 per cot to supplier as damages being the profit which the supplier would have earned under his contract of supply.

(c)In the case Lazenby Garages Ltd. v. Wright, (1976) 2 All ER 770, a dealer who was dealing in second hand car, purchased a car for œ 1325. Then decided to resale the car to the defendant for œ 1670, but the defendant finally did not take the car. Then the dealer sold it to another buyer for œ 1770 but even then brought an action against the defendant to recover œ 345 as damages, being the difference between his purchase price and the resale price to the defendant. Although, the Court of Appeal agreed in principle for damages but since, as a matter of fact, they had suffered no loss, they were entitled to no compensation.

There is a case Jamal, A.K.A.S. v. Moola Dawood Sons & Co., (1916) 43 IA 6: ILR (1916) 43 Cal 493, where it was held that if a seller does not resell the goods and his loss is aggravated by the falling market, he can recover the enhanced loss. Here the plaintiff contracted to sell to the defendants 23,500 shares to be delivered and paid for on December 30, 1911. The shares were tendered on the stipulated date, but the defendants declined to take delivery or to pay for them. The shares could have fetched a sum of Rs. 1,09,218 less than their price under the contract. But the plaintiff sold the shares only after February when the market was again rising and he realized only Rs. 79,862 less than the price under the contract.

The defendants contended that they should be held liable to pay the loss of only Rs. 79,862. But, he was held liable for Rs. 1,09,218. Lord Wrenbury explained the principles of law as follows-

It is undoubted law that a plaintiff who sues for damages owes the duty of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss subsequent upon the breach and cannot claim as damages any sum which is due to his own neglect. But the loss to be ascertained is the loss at the date of the breach. If at that date the plaintiff could do something or did something which mitigated the damage, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of it.

Damages for breach of contract

In the case Stoczina Gdanska SA v. Latvian Shipping Co., (1998) 1 All ER 883 HL, the question arose before the House of Lords whether damages for breach of contract can be recovered and also unpaid instalments upto the date of breach.

Here, the contract was to design and build a number of ships. The contract was so designed that the payment was to be done in four instalments - first 5% of total payment at the outset, second 20% when the keel was laid, third 25% on successful launching and 50% on delivery.

The property was to pass on delivery. The supplier had the right to rescind the contract on default in payment of instalments. The buyer failed to pay the second instalment. The supplier terminated the contract and brought an action to recover the unpaid second instalment and also damages for breach of contract. The House of Lords accepted the proposition that the seller had the right to recover damages and that did not affect the right to the unpaid instalment. The fact that the buyers got nothing was not the same thing as a total failure of consideration. Their Lordship held that the contract between both the parties was not simply to require the sellers to deliver the vessels, but rather the sellers were obliged to design and build the vessels. If the contract was to an end before the passing of property, the consideration provided by the sellers would not have totally failed and they would remain entitled to claim instalments and also damages for breach. The fact that the buyers had not received any benefit under the contract did not mean that the consideration provided by the sellers had totally failed.

Table of Cases

A

A.P. Tobacco Growers Coop. Union Ltd. v. Anjaneya Tobacco Co., (1998) 5 Andh LT

112, 116

Abdul Aziz v. Jogendra Krishna Roy, (1917) ILR 44 Cal 98

43, 50

Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 516:

AIR 1997 SC 2502

12, 13, 43, 45, 46, 48

Alco Chem. Ltd. v. Hyderabad Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd.,

(2003) 3 Banking Cases 508 (AP)

112, 120

Aldridge v. Johnson, (1857) 26 LJQB 296

12, 15

Aluminum Industries Ltd. v. Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India Ltd.,

AIR 1998 Mad 239

43, 49

Aluminum Industries v. Romalpa, (1976) 2 All ER 552

43, 46

Ambalavana Chettiar v. Express Newspapers Ltd., MANU/SC/0052/1967 : AIR 1968 SC 741

97, 110

Ancona v. Rogers, (1876) 1 Ex D 285 (CA)

75, 79

Andhra Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Sri Lakshmi Ganesh Cotton Ginning Mill,

(1996) 1 ALT 537 AP

112, 120

Andrews v. Singer, (1934) 1 KB 17: (1933) All ER Rep 479 CA

121, 122

Anguis v. McLachlan, (1883) 23 Ch D 330

96, 101

Arunachalam Chettiar v. Krishna Aiyyar, (1925) 49 Mad LJ 530

91, 134

Asfar & Co. Ltd. v. Blundell, (1896) 1 QB 123

13, 19

Aswan Engineering Establishment Co. v. Lupine Ltd., (1987) 1 WLR 1: (1987) 1 All ER 135

22, 37

Azemar v. Casella, (1867) 2 CP 431

22, 30

B

Badri Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, MANU/SC/0079/1969 : (1971) 3 SCC 23

43, 44, 131

Badri Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, MANU/SC/0030/1965 : AIR 1966 SC 58: (1965) 3 SCR 381

43, 47

Baldry v. Marshall, (1925) 1 KB 260: (1924) All ER Rep 155

22, 25, 34

Barrow Lane and Ballard v. Phillips, (1929) 1 KB 574

13, 18

Bartlett v. Holmes, (1853) 13 CB 630: 93 RR 658

76, 84

Behari Lal Baldeo Prasad (in re:), MANU/TN/0137/1955 : AIR 1955 Mad 271

22, 39, 131

Berndison v. Strang, (1868) LR 3 Ch App 588 (591)

96, 102, 136

Bhagwat Narain Tendulkar v. Goa Coop. Marketing and Supply Federation Ltd.,

(1998) 2 Mah LJ 703 (Bom)

43, 46

Bilasiram Thakurdas v. Gubbay, (1915) ILR 43 Cal 305

111, 113

Bird v. Brown, (1850) 4 Ex 786

97, 105

Bishopsgate Motor Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Transport Brakes Ltd., 1902 AC 325 (326)

61, 63

Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B&C 941 (948): 28 RR 525

96, 99

Bolton v. L&YR Co., (1935) 62 IA 89: 58 Mad 670: 154 IC 1097: AIR 1935 PC 67

75, 81

Boorman v. Nash, (1829) 9 B&C 145: 32 RR 607

136

Bourne v. Noruich Crematorium Ltd., (1967) 1 WLR 691

12, 16

Boyter v. Thomson, (1995) 3 All ER 135 HL

22, 35

Bradley v. H. Newson Sons & Co., (1919) AC 16 (53)

112, 118

Browes v. Shand, (1877) 2 App Cas 455

22, 24

Buchanan Jardine v. Hamlist, (1981) SLT 60

22, 34

C

C.I.T. v. Hind Construction Ltd., MANU/SC/0265/1971 : (1972) 4 SCC 460

12, 14

Capital and Counties Bank Ltd. v. Warriner, (1896) 12 TLR 216

61, 73

Car & Universal Finance Co. v. Caldwell, (1963) 2 All ER 547 (550)

61, 68

Carles Fedorspid & Co. S.A. v. Charles Tueiga & Co. Ltd., (1957) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 240 (255)

43, 54

Castle v. Sworder, (1861) 6 H&N 828: 123 RR 860 Ex Ch

75, 80

Champanhac & Co. Ltd. v. Waller & Co. Ltd., (1948) 2 All ER 724

22, 40

Champion v. Short, (1807) 1 Camp 53: 10 RR 631

76, 85

Chanter v. Hopkins, (1838) 4 M&W 339 (404): 8 LJ Ex 14

121, 122

Charge Card Services Ltd. (in re:), (1988) All ER 702 (707) (CA)

96, 98, 135

Charles Rickards Ltd. v. Oppenhaim, (1950) 1 All ER 420 CA

76, 94

China Pacific SA v. Food Corporation of India, (1982) AC 939

76, 93

City & Industrial Development Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd. v. Nagpur Steel & Alloys Ltd.,

AIR 1992 Bom 55

22, 26

City Fur Manufacturing Co. v. Fureenbond (Brokers) London Ltd., (1937) 1 All ER 799

61, 73

Coffee Board v. Famous Coffee & Tea Works, MANU/TN/0156/1965 : AIR 1965 Mad 14

122, 125

Cointal v. Myham & Sons, (1913) 2 KB 220

121, 124

Comptoir d’ Achat et de Vented du Boernbod Belge S/A v. Luis de Ridder Limitada,

1949 AC 293

44, 59

Consolidated Coffee Ltd. v. Coffee Board Bangalore, MANU/SC/0398/1980 : (1980) 3 SCC 358: AIR 1980 SC 1468

122, 125

Cooper v. Willomatt, (1845) 1 CB 672: 68 RR 798

60, 63, 132

Coventry Shepherd & Co. v. Great Eastern Rly. Co.,

304 (4th Edn.), (Sir Rupert Cross on Evidence)

61, 65

Cowasjee v. Thompson, (1845) 3 MIA 422: 5 Moore CP 165: 70 RR 27

96, 98, 135

Cunliffe v. Harrison, (1851) 6 Ex 903 (906)

76, 85

Cusack v. Robinson, (1861) 1 B&S 299

76, 92, 134

D

Dayabhai Dipchand v. Maniklal Vribhukan, 8 BHC AC 133

75, 78

Demby Hamilton & Co. Ltd. v. Barden (Endeavour Wines) Ltd., (1949) 1 All ER 435

44, 59

Dixon v. Fletcher, (1837) 3 M&W 146: 49 RR 543

75, 78

Doodeward v. Spence, (1908) 5 CLR 406

12, 16

Drummond & Sons v. Van Ingen, (1887) 12 App Cas 284

22, 39

Dudhia Forest Co-op. Labourers & Artisans Society Ltd. v.

Mohammed Saiyed and Abdul Rehman’s Co., (1980) 21 GLR 272

76, 85

Dwarka Das Ajodhya Prasad v. Ram Ratan, MANU/UP/0634/1922 : AIR 1922 All 458

43, 47

E

E.&S. Ruben Ltd. v. Faire Bros., (1949) 1 KB 254

22, 39

Edan v. Dudfield, (1841) 1 QB 302: 55 RR 258

75, 80

Edwards v. Brewer, (1837) 2 M&W 375, 46 RR 626

96, 97

Edwards v. Vaughan, (1910) 26 TLR 545 (CA)

60, 62, 132

Elphick v. Barnes, (1880) 5 CPD 321

43, 56

Emperor v. Kuverji Kavasji, MANU/MH/0111/1940 : AIR 1941 Bom 106: (1941) 43 Bom LR 95

43, 53

Ernest Beck & Co. v. K.K. Syzman Owski & Co., (1924) AC 43

121, 123

Evans v. Truman, (1963) 2 All ER 547 (550)

61, 67

F

Farquharson Bros. v. King & Co., (1902) AC 325 (335-36)

60, 62, 132

Folkes v. King, (1923) 1 KB 282 CA

61, 65

Folkes v. R., (1923) 1 KB 282 (305)

61, 66

Four Point Garage Ltd. v. Carter, (1985) 3 All ER 12

75, 79

Freeth v. Burr, (1874) LR 9 CP 208

76, 87

G

G.I.P. Rly. Co. v. Hanmandas, ILR (1889) 14 Bom 57

96, 103

Garnac Gain Co. Inc. v. HMF Faure and Fairclough Ltd., (1968) AC 1130 (1140)

112, 118

Gill & Duffus S.A. v. Berger & Co. Inc., (1984) 1 All ER 438 (445-446): 1984 AC 382 (394)

22, 29

Godley v. Perry, (1960) 1 All ER 36

22, 35

Godts v. Rose, (1855) 17 CB 229: 104 RR 668

75, 80

Gordon v. Whitehouse, (1856) 4 WR 231

111, 113

Goverdhanlal v. Bakhtawarlal, AIR 1955 NUC (Raj) 4063

43, 51

Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, (1936) AC 85: 105 LJ PC 6:

154 LT 18: 52 TLR 38: MANU/PR/0089/1935 : AIR 1936 PC 34

22, 28, 33, 35

Grenon v. Lachmi Narain, (1896) 4 Cal 8 LR 23 IA 119

75, 83

Griffiths v. Perry, (1859) 1 E&E 680 (688): 177 RR 397

96, 99

Grimoldby v. Wells, (1875) LR 10 CP 391

76, 93

Gunn v. Bolckow Vaughan, (1875) LR 10 Ch App 491 (501)

96, 97

H

Haivela Investments Ltd. v. Royal Trusts Co. of Canada (CI) Ltd., (1986) AC 207

121

Hardy & Co. v. Hillerns & Fowler, (1923) 2 KB 490 (498) (CA)

76, 92, 134

Harlington & Leinster Enterprises Ltd. v. Christopher Hill Fine Art Ltd.,

(1990) 1 All ER 737 CA

22, 29, 35

Harlow and Jones Ltd. v. Panex International Ltd., (1967) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 509

76, 94

Harrison v. Knowles and Foster, (1917) 2 KB 606: (1918-19) All ER Rep 306

22, 25

Hartley v. Hymans, (1920) 3 KB 475 (484)

21, 23, 24

Harvela Investments Ltd. v. Royal Trusts Co. of Canada (CI) Ltd., (1986) AC 207

121, 125

Hayman v. Flewker, (1863) 32 LJCP 132

61, 66

Head and Tattersall, (1871) LR 7 Ex 7

43, 56

Healey v. Howlett & Sons, (1917) 116 LT 591: (1917) 1 KB 337

43, 53

Heap v. Motorists Advisory Agency Ltd., (1883) 11 QBB 776

61, 64

Honck v. Muller, (1881) 7 QBD 92 (100)

76, 87

Hop and Malt Exchange and Warehouse Co. Ex P Briggs (in re:),

1866 R1 Eg 483: 35 LJ Ch 320: 14 LT 39

61, 70

Howell v. Evans, (1926) 134 LT 570

76, 87

Hurry v. Mangles, (1808) 1 Camp 452: 10 RR 727

75, 80

I

Instalment Supply Ltd. v. STO, MANU/SC/0359/1974 : (1974) 4 SCC 739

13, 16

J

J.&J. Cunningham Ltd. v. Robert A Munro & Co., (1922) 28 Com Cas 42

76, 92, 134

J.L. Lyons & Co. v. May & Baker Ltd., (1923) 1 KB 685

76, 93

J.V. Gokal & Co. v. Assistant Collector of Sales Tax, AIR 1965 SC 1954

8, 10

Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co., (1874) LR 10 CP 125 Ex Ch

76, 84

Jai Bhavani Timber v. State of Madhya Pradesh, MANU/MP/0055/1992 : AIR 1992 MP 250

122, 126

Jamal v. Moala Dawood Sons & Co., (1916) 1 AC 175

112, 115

Jamal, A.K.A.S. v. Moola Dawood Sons & Co., (1916) 43 IA 6: ILR (1916) 43 Cal 493

111, 113, 137

James v. Griffin, (1837) 2 M&W 623: 6 LJ Ex 241

96, 104

Jenner v. Smith, (1869) 4 CP 270

43, 54

Jones v. Bright, (1829) 5 Bing 533

22, 32

Jones v. Padgett, (1902) 2 IR 585

22, 31

Jones v. Tarleton, (1842) 9 M&W 675: 60 RR 863

96, 102

Juggernath Khan v. Maclachlai, (1881) 6 Cal 681

75, 82

K

K.L. Johar & Co. v. Dy. CTO, MANU/SC/0348/1964 : AIR 1965 SC 1082

13, 17, 129

Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. v. Wallis, (1956) 1 WLR 936 CA

121, 122

Kemp v. Falk, (1882) 7 App Cas 573 (586)

75, 81, 96, 101, 106, 108

Kidar Nath Bihari Lal v. Shimbhu Nath-Mandu Mal,

(1926) 8 Lah 198: 99 IC 812

75, 78

Kingdom v. Cox, (1848) 5 CB 522 (526)

76, 85

Kirkhum v. Altenborough, (1897) 1 QB 201

43, 45

Kotu Mal v. Bihari Lal, AIR 1921 Lah 355

112, 118

Kunwar Bhan-Sukha Nand v. Ganpat Rai-Ram Jiwan, (1926) 7 Lah 442: 94 IC 304

75, 78

Kursell v. Timber Operators and Contractors Ltd., (1926) 135 LT 223

43, 49

L

Laidler v. Burlinson, (1837) 2 M&W 602, 610, 46 RR 717

43, 53

Lake v. Simmons, (1927) AC 487 (501-02)

61, 70

Lazenby Garages Ltd. v. Wright, (1976) 2 All ER 770

111, 113, 137

Lee v. Butler, (1893) 22 QB 318: (1893) 62 LJ QB 591

13, 17, 129

Lee v. Griffen, (1861) 30 LJ QB 252

12, 15

Leo v. Bayes, (1856) 18 CB 599: 107 RR 424

60, 62, 132

Levy v. Green, (1859) 1 E&E

76, 86

Lexmead (Basingstoke) Ltd. v. Lewis, (1981) 55 Aust LJ 753

112, 117

Litt v. Cowley, (1816) 7 Taunt 169: 17 RR 482

96, 101, 107

Loeschman v. Williams, (1815) 4 Camp 181: 16 RR 772

43, 57

Longbottom & Co. Ltd. v. Bass, Walker & Co., (1922) WN 245 (246)

96, 97

Loon Karan Sohan Lal v. Firm John & Co., MANU/UP/0102/1967 : AIR 1967 All 308

43, 53

Lowther v. Harris, (1927) 2 KB 393: (1926) All ER Rep 352

61, 65

Lyons v. Honffnung, (1890) 15 App Cas 391 PC

96, 104

M

M.S. Madhusoodhanan v. Kerala Kaumudi (P) Ltd., AIR 2004 SC 909:

(2004) 9 SCC 204: (2003) 117 Comp Cas 19

13, 19

Man (Ed&F) Ltd. v. Nigerian Sweets & Confectionery Co. Ltd.,

(1977) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 50

96, 98, 135

Manchester Liners Ltd. v. Rea Ltd., (1922) 2 AC 74

22, 33

Maneckji Pestonji Bharucha v. Wadilal Sarabhai & Co., (1926) 50 Bom 360:

53 IA 92: 94 IC 824: AIR 1926 PC 38

96, 101

Manior Narottam Das Dharamshi v. Barjatya Traders, 21(2) GLR 89

76, 88

Marten v. Whale, (1917) 2 KB 480

61, 73

Martindale v. Smith, (1841) 1 QB 389: 55 RR 285

21, 23

Martinean v. Kitching, (1872) LR 7 QB 436

44, 58

Marwar Tent Factory v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0354/1989 : (1990) 1 SCC 71: AIR 1990 SC 1753

112, 119

Mason v. Burningham, (1949) 2 All ER 134

112, 117

Mc Ewan v. Smith, (1849) 2 HLC 309: 81 RR 166

97, 108

McEntire v. Crossley Bros. Ltd., (1895) AC 457 (467)

43, 45, 47

McEwan v. Smith, 166 (1849) 2 HLC 309: 81 RR 166

108

Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. v. Central Bank of India Ltd., 1938 AC 287

61, 64

Milgate v. Kebble, (1841) 3 Man & Gr 100: 60 RR 475

75, 79

Millett v. Van Heek & Co., (1921) 2 KB 369 CA

112, 119

Mohambaram v. Ram Narayan, (1935) 69 MLJ 691: 158 IC 535: MANU/TN/0077/1935 : AIR 1935 Mad 850

60, 63, 132

Moore & Co. v. Landauer & Co., (1921) 2 KB 519 CA

22, 28

Morelli v. Fitch & Gibbons, (1928) 2 KB 636

22, 36

Morton v. Lamb, (1797) 7 TR 125: 4 RR 395

75, 77

Morvi Mercantile Bank Ltd. v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0064/1965 : AIR 1965 SC 1954

8, 11

N

Nagnath Kaulwar & Sons v. Govindram Shyamsunder, MANU/MH/0282/2004 : AIR 2004 Bom 271

75, 83

National Traders v. Hindustan Soap Works, MANU/TN/0137/1959 : AIR 1959 Mad 112

112, 118

Newtons of Wembley Ltd. v. Williams, (1964) 3 All ER 332 CA

61, 73

Niblett v. Confectioner’s Materials Co., (1921) 3 KB 387: (1921) All ER Rep 459 CA

22, 27, 130

Nicholson v. Bradfield Union, (1866) LR 1 QB 620

76, 86

O

Oppenheimer v. Attenborough & Sons, (1908) 1 KB 221: (1904) All Rep 1016

61, 66

Oppenheimer v. Fraze and Wyatt, (1907) 2 KB 50 CA

61, 67

Orissa Textile Mills v. Ganesh Das, MANU/BH/0027/1961 : AIR 1961 Pat 107 (109)

22, 23

Oxendale v. Wetherell, (1829) B&C 386: 33 RR 207

76, 87

P

P.P. Looke v. N.S. Mathew, (1967) 11 Comp LJ 146

76, 84

Pacific Motor Auctions Pvt. Ltd. v. Motor (Hire Finance) Ltd.,

(1965) 2 All ER 105 (PC): (1965) 2 WLR 881

61, 72

Parchim (in re:), (1918) AC 157

3

Pattison v. Robinson, (1816) 5 M&S 105 (110)

76, 84

Pearl Mill Co. v. Ivy Tannery Co., (1919) 1 KB 78

76, 84

Peter Darlington Partners Ltd. v. Gesho Co. Ltd., (1964) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 149

22, 38

Pfizer Corpn. v. Ministry of Health, (1857) 7 E&B 885: 26 LJQB 296

12, 14

Phaggu Mal v. Babu Lal, (1913) 35 All 325: 19 IC 254

76, 93

Phillips v. Brooks, (1919) 2 KB 243

61, 71

Pignataro v. Gilroy & Sons, (1957) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 230 (240)

43, 54

Poeahontas Fuel Co. v. Ambatielos, (1922) 27 Com Cas 148

121, 123

Prabhu Dayal v. Bhagwan Sahai, AIR 1955 NUC 4067 (Raj)

22, 39, 131

R

R. v. England, (1864) 4 B&S 782: 33 LJQB 195

12, 14

R.D. Goyal v. Reliance Industries Ltd., MANU/SC/1025/2002 : (2003) 1 SCC 81

12, 15

Rawland v. Divall, (1923) 2 KB 500 CA

130

Reese River Silver Mining Co Ltd v. Smith., (1869) LR WHL 64: 39 LJ Ch 849

61, 69

Regent OHG Aisenstadt and Barig v. Francesco of Jermyn Street Ltd., (1981) 3 All ER 327

76, 85

Reuter v. Sala, (1866) LR 1 QB 620

76, 86

Roservear China Clay Co. ex p., (1879) 11 Ch D 560

96, 105

Rowland v. Divall, (1923) 2 KB 500 CA

22, 27

Rugg v. Minett, (1809) 11 East 210: 10 RR 475

43, 51

Ruttonjey v. Jamnadas, (1882) 6 Bom 692

76, 90, 133

S

Sanwick v. Sothern, (1839) 48 RR 704

43, 52

Scarf v. Jardine, (1862) 7 AC 345: 51 LJQB 612

61, 69

Seedaln Suppliers Syndicate v. H.P. State Coop. Marketing and

Development Federation Ltd., (1995) AIHC 373 (HP)

112, 120

Shankar Das v. Bhanna Ram, AIR 1926 Lah 606

43, 48

Shoshi Mohun Pal Chowdhry v. Nobo Kristo Poddar, (1878) 4 ILR Cal 801

43, 52

Shree Bajrang Jute Mills Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 376

76, 88

Sitaram Srigopal v. Daulati Devi, MANU/SC/0035/1979 : (1979) 4 SCC 351

111, 115

Sivayya v. Ranganayakulu, (1935) 62 IA 89: 58 Mad 670 154 IC 1097: AIR 1935 PC 67

75, 81

Smith v. Chance, (1819) 2 B & Ald 753 (755)

75, 82

Smith v. Wheatcroft, (1878) 9 Ch D 230 (233)

61, 71

Somes v. British Empire Shipping Co., (1860) 8 HLC 338: 30 LJ QB 229

96, 100

Sramajibi Stores v. Union of India, AIR 1982 Del 76

122, 127

Staffs Motor Guarantee Ltd. v. British Wagon Co. Ltd., (1934) 2 KB 305:

(1934) All ER Rep 322

61, 66, 72

State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kone Elevators (India) Ltd., (2005) 3 SCC 389

12, 13

Steel Bros. & Co. v. Dayal Khatao & Co., ILR (1923) 47 Bom 924

121, 124

Stephens v. Wilkinson, (1831) 2 B&Ad 320

97, 110

Sterns Ltd. v. Vickers Ltd., (1923) 1 KB 78 CA

44, 58

Stoczina Gdanska SA v. Latvian Shipping Co., (1998) 1 All ER 883 HL

111, 114, 137

Sudbrook Trading Estates Ltd. v. Eggleton, (1983) 1 AC 444: (1982) 3 WLR 315

13, 20

Summer Permain & Co. v. Webb & Co., (1922) 1 KB 55

22, 36

T

Tarling v. Baxter, 6 Barn & Cress 360: 5 LJKB 164: (1827) 30 RR 355

43, 47, 50

Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., Bombay v. S.R. Sarkar, MANU/SC/0270/1960 : AIR 1961 SC 65

8, 10

Thornelt v. Haines, (1846) 15 M&W 367 (372)

121, 125

U

Underwood Ltd. v. Burgh Castle & Cement Syndicate, (1922) 1 KB 343:

(1921) All ER Rep 551

43, 49

Union of India v. Kesar Singh, AIR 1978 J&K 102

111, 113, 136

Union of India v. West Punjab Factories Ltd., MANU/SC/0039/1965 : AIR 1966 SC 395

75, 79

V

Varley v. Whipp, (1900) 1 QB 513 (516)

22, 28

Vishnu Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Food Corporation of India, MANU/BH/0005/1987 : AIR 1987 Pat 22 (31)

75, 78

W

Wait v. Baker, (1848) 2 Ex 1, 7: 76 RR 469

43, 55

Wallis v. Russell, (1902) 2 IR 585

22, 31

Ward v. Hobbs, (1878) 4 App Cas 13

22, 31

Wardar’s (Import and Export) Co. Ltd. v. W. Norwood & Sons Ltd.

43, 55

Whitehead v. Anderson, (1842) 9 M&W 518: 60 PR 819

96, 104, 106

Williams v. Williams, (1882) 29 Ch D 659 (664-665)

12, 16

Withers v. Reynolds, (1831) 2 B&AD 882: 36 RR 782

76, 87

Word v. Turner, 2 Ves Sr 431, 1 Dick 170

75, 79

Z

Zagury v. Furnell, (1809) 2 Camp 240: 11 RR 704

43, 52

Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar v. Udai Veer Singh, AIR 1980 All 64

122, 126

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Section Index

Some browsers do not display table correctly. The following GIF images are here to work around the problem.

Section Pages

Section Pages

1 8

2 8, 9

2(3) 49, 50

2(7) 15

2(9) 65

2(14) 48

3 11, 12, 44, 131

4 13

4(a) 44, 131

5 12, 17

6 12, 18

7 12, 18, 77

8 12, 19

9 12, 19, 20

10 20

11 21, 23

12 21, 24

12(2) 25

12(3) 25

13 21, 26

13(2) 26

14 21, 26

15 21, 28, 30

16 21, 30, 32, 33

16(1) 32

16(2) 32, 35

16(3) 32, 38

16(4) 38

17 21, 38, 39, 130

18 42, 44, 47

19 42, 44, 45, 131

19(1) 48

19(2) 46

20 45, 47, 48, 50, 125

21 42, 51

22 42

22 51

23 42, 52, 55

24 45, 47, 56

25 42, 57

26 42, 58, 59

27 62, 63, 65

28 63, 67

29 67

30 63, 71

30(1) 60, 63, 72

30(2) 60, 63, 73

31 74, 76, 77

32 74, 77

33 74, 78

34 74, 81

35 74, 81

36 74, 82, 83

36(2) 83

37 74, 84

37(1) 86

38 74, 86

39 75, 87, 88

40 59, 75, 89

41 39, 75, 90, 131, 132

42 75, 91, 92, 134, 135

43 75, 93

44 75, 76, 93

45 95, 97

45(2) 93

46 95, 97, 99

47 95, 100

48 95, 100

49 95, 101

50 95, 102, 136

51 95, 102, 103

51(1) 103

51(2) 104

51(3) 104

51(4) 104

51(5) 105

Sale of Goods

Section Pages

Section Pages

51(6) 105

51(7) 105

52 96, 106

53 96, 107

54 96, 109

54(2) 110

55 111, 112

55(1) 51

56 111, 112, 113, 136

57 111, 112, 114

58 111, 112, 116

59 111, 112, 116, 118

60 111, 112, 118

61 111, 112, 119

61(2) 120

62 121, 122

63 121, 122, 124

64 121, 122, 124, 125

64(2) 125

64(3) 125

64A 121, 122, 126, 127

64B 122

65 121, 122, 127

66 121, 122

•••

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