Chapter 9

Summary Procedure: Precision Steel and Engineering Works Case

CHAPTER IIIA, which was inserted in the Rent Control Act, by Amendment Act of 1976, is entitled 'Summary Trial of Certain Applications'. It consists of three sections, namely, sections 25A, 25B and 25C. Section 25A provides that the provisions of Chapter IIIA or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in the Act or in any other law for the time being in force. Section 25B prescribes as its marginal heading shows a 'special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement'. Under section 25B every application by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises, on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1), or under section 14A, or under section 14B¹, or under section 14C²or under 14D³, is to be dealt with in accordance with the special procedure prescribed by this section. The special procedure which has been prescribed for these cases is that on an application being filed on either of these two grounds the Controller is to issue a summons in the form specified in the Third Schedule to the Act. This summons is to call upon the tenant to appear before the Controller within fifteen days of the service of the summons and to obtain leave of the Controller to contest the application for eviction, and it intimates to him that in default of his doing so, the applicant would be entitled after the expiry of the said period of fifteen days to obtain an order for his eviction. Leave to appear and to contest the application is to be obtained by the tenant on an application made to the Controller supported by an affidavit. This affidavit is to disclose such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) or under section 14A. When leave is granted to the tenant to contest the application, the Controller is to commence the hearing of the

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 application as early as practicable. In holding such an enquiry, the Controller is to follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. No appeal or second appeal lies against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with this special procedure. The High Court is, however, given the right to call for the records of the case for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law and to pass such order in respect of thereto as it thinks fit; Narain Khamman v. Parduman Kr. Jain, MANU/SC/0319/1984: AIR 1985 SC 4.

It is now well-settled that though the Statement of objects and Reasons accompanying a legislative Bill cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of a statute, it is permissible to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Bill for the purpose of understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the statute sought to remedy. It will, therefore, be convenient to reproduce at this stage the statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying Bill No. XII of 1976, which when enacted became the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976. The said Statement of Objects and Reasons is as follows:-

"There has been a persistent demand for amendments to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 with a view to conferring a right of tenancy on certain heirs/successors of a deceased statutory tenant so that they may be protected from eviction by landlords and also for simplifying the procedure for eviction of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his personal occupation. Further, Government decided on the 9th September, 1975 that a person who owns his own house in his place of work should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to him before the 31st December, 1975. Government considered that in the circumstances, the Act, required to be amended urgently."¹

By the special procedure provided in section 25B the delay normally involved in following the procedure under section 37 of the Act, is sought to be cut down and the tenant is made to apply and obtain leave to contest the eviction application. Further, the tenant's right of appeal and second appeal have been taken away and the only remedy left to him against an order of eviction passed by the Controller under section 25B is to approach the High Court in revision.

It is pertinent to mention here that the legislature has given the provisions of this Chapter or any rule made thereunder overriding effect on the other provisions of the Rent Control Act, or any other law for the time being in force. One may find some parallel between the procedure provided in this Chapter and the summary procedure as provided under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the concept about the summary procedure as inserted in the Act, by way of aforesaid Chapter IIIA, would be clear by the elaborate

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judgment of the Supreme Court in Precision Steel & Engineering Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, MANU/SC/0210/1982: AIR 1982 SC 1518.

Question of law decided: In an application for eviction of the tenant filed under Chapter IIIA of the Rent Control Act (Summary Trial) at the time of deciding the application of the tenant for leave to defend, the Controller has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant. If the affidavit discloses such facts - no proof is needed at the stage, which would disentitle the plaintiff from seeking possession, the mere disclosure of such facts must be held sufficient to grant leave.

Facts of the case: The respondent Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal (Hindu Undivided Family), through Prem Deva Tayal, constituted attorney of Niranjan Deva Tayal (landlord) moved an application for eviction of the tenant under section 14(1)(e) (bona fide requirement) read with section 25B of the Rent Control Act, on the ground that he required the suit premises bona fide for occupation as residence for himself and the members of his family dependent upon him and that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. In his application, the landlord alleged that the premises in question were first given on leave and license and subsequently relationship of lessor and lessee were established. He admitted that he has been employed in India since 1965 but was posted in Mumbai in 1971 and returned to Delhi in 1972. He went to Saudi Arabia and has now returned to India. He alleged that the tenant was called upon to vacate the premises but he did not vacate the same. It was subsequently alleged that as the landlord has now come back and settled down in Delhi and that he has no other suitable accommodation, accordingly, he bona fide requires the possession of the premises for his personal occupation. It was further alleged that Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal (HUF) is the owner of the suit premises and Niranjan Deva Tayal is the Karta of HUF and second notice dated June 22, 1979 was given under instructions by the Constituted Attorney Prem Deva Tayal.

It is pertinent to mention here that the Supreme Court specifically observed that even though the landlord, who sought possession of the premises for his personal requirement was in Delhi at the relevant time i.e., in 1979, the petition was filed through Constituted Attorney and the Niranjan Deva Tayal, who seeks possession for his use being in Delhi and available is conspicuous by his absence through out the proceedings. The tenant, which is a firm Precision Steel & Engineering Works, after having been summoned in the matter, through its Constituted Attorney, filed an affidavit seeking leave to contest eviction petition. In the affidavit tenant while denying, that there is any undivided family styled as Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal contended that the petitioner is not entitled to file a petition under section 14(1)(e) because the purpose of letting was not residential alone but combined purpose of residence-cum-business. It was denied that the tenant entered the premises as licensee and subsequently the contract of lease was entered into.

A specific agreement was pleaded that the tenant, which is a partnership firm was entitled to use the premises for residence of the director and/or partner as also for the office purpose. Reliance was placed on clause 6 of the license agreement, which was really and substantially according to the tenant a contract of lease. It was also alleged that since the inception of the tenancy, the premises have been used both for residential and business purposes to the knowledge of the landlord and local authorities and no objection has been taken on this behalf. The bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord for his personal use and his family was subsequently denied and it was also denied that the landlord has not in his possession reasonably suitable accommodation in Delhi. It was averred that Niranjan Deva Tayal, who claims to be the owner of the premises and for whose personal requirement, the eviction petition has been filed has been residing at some other place and i.e., address of the landlord set out in cause title of the petition filed by the attorney, while giving the dimension of the premises in possession of the landlord measuring as 1000 sq. yards. It was averred that the building now in possession of the landlord is divided in four blocks/four units, each block consisting of four bed rooms, three bath rooms, one kitchen and one living room and one drawing-cum-dining room. It was in terms stated that the whole of the house is in occupation and possession of the petitioner-landlord and he has been residing in the house much prior to the beginning of the tenancy and he is in possession of the same. It was further averred that the petitioner has concealed that he is the owner of another building, as stated above, which is equally big. One other averment made by the tenant was that the petitioner has been managing both the buildings and whenever blocks fell vacant, he lets them out at higher rent. It was specifically stated that the front portion of the suit premises has the same accommodation as the building which the landlord has in his possession at present. In order to point out that the petitioner landlord when he comes into the possession of the premises vacated by the tenant lets out the same at higher rent thereby contravening the law and obtains unlawful enrichment, it was pointed out that the premises of identical size and nature situated at the back of the demised premises were taken on rent by Kirloskar Company during the period 1970-73 when vacated by the tenant the same was let out to Food Corporation of India in 1974-75 and after getting the same vacated, the same was let out in 1976 to Mr. Yash Mahajan and on each such opportunity the rent was enhanced. Accordingly, it was alleged that the eviction petition is malafide and the claim of bona fide requirement is untenable.

In the counter-affidavit filed by the landlord to the affidavit seeking leave to defend what was averred in the main petition was reiterated. With reference to the other building, it was stated that the landlord has no interest in the property and that the petitioner has no other suitable residential accommodation in Delhi. It was claimed that the said property belongs to one K.D. Tayal. Even the dimension of that house was disputed and it was further averred that the same is not used as residential premises but is only a garage block. It was further averred that Niranjan Deva Tayal was serving in Saudi Arabia and therefore, the premises were given on leave and license but now that the petitioner has returned to India and permanently settled down, he requires the premises for his own use. A further statement was made to the effect that the block at the back of the demised property is at present in occupation of Coronation Spinning Company, Dadar and the occupant is entitled to occupy the premises till 1981.

The tenant was rejected leave to defend, and even the High Court confirmed the said order of the Rent controller.

Two judgments were delivered in the matter. The majority judgment was pronounced by the Desai, J., on behalf of himself and Baharul Islam, J. On the other hand, minority judgment was delivered by Justice A.P. Sen, J.

Findings of the Court: It was held that - Undoubtedly the procedure prescribed in Chapter IIIA of the Act, is materially different in that it is more harsh and weighted against the tenant. But should this procedural conundrum change the entire landscape of law? When a landlord approaches Controller under section 14(1) proviso (e), is the court to presume every averment in the petition as unchallengeable and truthful? The consequence of refusal to grant leave must stare in the face of the Controller that the landlord gets an order of eviction without batting the eyelid. This consequence itself is sufficient to liberally approach the prayer for leave to contest the petition. While examining the question whether leave to defend ought or ought not to be granted the limited jurisdiction which the Controller enjoys is prescribed within the well defined limits and he cannot get into a sort of a trial by affidavits preferring one set to the other and thus concluding the trial without holding the trial itself. Short-circuiting the proceedings need not masquerade as a strict compliance with sub-section (5) of section 25B. The provision is cast in a mandatory form. Statutory duty is cast on the Controller to give leave as the legislature uses the expression 'the Controller shall give' to the tenant leave to contest if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such fact as would disentitle the landlord for an order for recovery of possession. The Controller has to look at the affidavit of the tenant seeking leave to contest. Browsing through the affidavit if there emerges averment of facts which on a trial, if believed, would non-suit the landlord, leave ought to be granted. Let it be made clear that the statute is not cast in a negative form by enacting that the Controller shall refuse to give to the tenant leave to contest the application unless the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order etc. That is not the mould in which the section is cast. The provision indicates a positive approach and not a negative inhibition. When the language of a statute is plain, the principle that legislature speaks its mind in the plainest language has to be given full effect. No canon of construction permits in the name of illusory intendment defeating the plain unambiguous language expressed to convey the legislative mind. And the legislature had before it Order 37, an analogous provision where leave to defend is to be granted and yet avoiding the phraseology of the CPC, namely, 'substantial defence' and 'vexatious and frivolous defence', the legislature used the plainest language, 'facts disclosed in the affidavit of the tenant'.

The language of sub-section 5 of section 25B casts a statutory duty on the Controller to give to the tenant leave to contest the application, the only pre-condition for exercise of jurisdiction being that the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground mentioned in section 14(1)(e). Section 14(1) starts with a non obstante clause which would necessarily imply that the Controller is precluded from passing an order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises in favour of the landlord against the tenant unless the case is covered by any of the clauses of the proviso. The proviso sets out various enabling provisions on proof of one or the other, the landlord would be entitled to recover possession from the tenant. One such enabling provision is the one enacted in section 14(1) proviso (e). Upon a true construction of proviso (e) to section 14(1) it would unmistakably appear that the burden is on the landlord to satisfy the Controller that the premises of which possession is sought is; (i) let for residential purposes; and (ii) possession of the premises is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family etc. and (iii) that the landlord or the person for whose benefit possession is sought has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. This burden, landlord is required to discharge before the Controller gets jurisdiction to make an order for eviction. This necessarily transpires from the language of section 14(1) which precludes the Controller from making any order or decree for recovery of possession unless the landlord proves to his satisfaction the conditions in the enabling provision enacted as proviso under which possession is sought. Initial burden is thus on the landlord."

After setting out the relevant provisions of the Rent Control Act, the Court observed that the increased tempo of industrialization since the independence resulted in mass migration of population from rural to urban areas. This urbanization process resulted in phenomenal demand for housing accommodation. Harsh economic law of demand and supply operated with full vigour to the disadvantage of the under privileged. To checkmate the profiteering by the owners of property and to protect the weaker sections, most of the States in our country enacted legislation for the protection of tenants of premises situated in urban and semi-urban areas. These legislations have been enacted with the avowed object of putting a fetter on the unrestricted right of re-entry enjoyed by the landlords with a view to protecting the tenants assuring security of tenure. This avowed object and purpose for enacting legislation must always inform and guide the interpretative process of such socially oriented beneficial legislation. But the language of the statute has to be kept in view to determine the width and ambit of protection. Normally in all such statutes a provision is inserted prescribing enabling provision under which landlord can recover possession and thereby restricted the unfettered right of re-entry. One such provision normally to be found in all such statutes is the one which enables a landlord to recover possession if he bona fide requires the same for occupation by himself or for the use of the members of the family dependent on him. If the landlord seeks possession bona fide for his personal requirement, he must commence the action by filing a petition and the tenant would be entitled to appear and defend the action. While defending the action in an adversary system the tenant would file his written statement raising contentions which in terms would focus the attention of the court on questions of facts in dispute on the basis of which issues on which parties are at variance would be framed. Both the parties would lead evidence and ultimately on evaluation of evidence the Court/Controller would determine the issues on the principle of preponderance of probability and answer the issues one way or the other determining the fate of the petition.

That was the position under the Act. On the introduction of Chapter IIIA a notable departure has been made in the Act with regard to the procedure for trial of actions brought under sections 14A and 14(1)(e). When a petition is brought before the Controller under section 14(1)(e) a summons has to be issued to the tenant and when the summons is served the tenant cannot straightway proceed to contest the petition for eviction from the premises but either he must surrender possession or seek leave to contest the petition. While seeking leave he must file an affidavit setting out the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction. This is the scheme of sections 25B(1) and (4). Then comes section 25B(5) which provides that the Controller is under a statutory duty, note the expression "shall give leave to the tenant to contest the application"-to grant leave if the 'affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession' of the premises on the ground mentioned in section 14(1)(e), i.e., bona fide requirement for his personal use or the use of the members of his family.

While comparing the summary trial as provided in Rent Control Act, with that of Order 37 in Code of Civil Procedure, the Court made the following observation:

"Let us recall the procedure for obtaining a decree or order for eviction against a tenant entitled to protection of Rent Act other than Delhi Rent Act. What would the court expect the landlord to prove before he seeks to recover possession from the tenant on the ground that he bona fide requires possession for his own use or the use of the members of his family? In a catena of decisions it has been decided that in order to succeed the landlord should show that the premises have been let out as a residence or for residential purposes; that the landlord needs to occupy the premises which may imply that either he has got no other accommodation in the city or town in which the premises in question are situated or the one in his possession does not provide him a suitable residence and he is required to shift to the premises in question, that his need is genuine and that it is not merely a fanciful desire of an affluent landlord who for the fancy of changing the premises would like to shift to the one from which the tenant is sought to be evicted; that he is acting bona fide in approaching the court for recovery of possession; and that his demand is reasonable. These facts have to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court and once the trend of judicial opinion as expressed by the Court went so far as to say that the Court cannot pass a decree on compromise because the statute has cast duty on the Court to be satisfied about the requirement of the landlord and a compromise decree was held to be a nullity; Bahadur Singh v. Muni Sabrat Dass, (1969) 2 SCR 432 and Kaushalya Devi v. Shri K.L. Bansal, MANU/SC/0450/1969: AIR 1970 SC 483. Certain States have in their respective legislations also imposed an additional condition before the landlord can obtain possession for personal requirement viz. before making a decree or order of eviction the Court must weigh the relative hardship of the landlord and the tenant and if greater hardship is likely to be caused to tenant, the Court is under an obligation to refuse to pass the decree notwithstanding the fact that landlord has proved his requirement. Rent Restriction legislation enacted by States may differ from State to State. Restrictions on the landlord's unfettered right to re-entry may be stringent or not so stringent depending upon the local situation. But the underlying thrust of all rent restriction legislations universally recognised must not be lost sight of that the enabling provisions of the Rent Restriction Act, are not to be so construed or interpreted as would make the protection conferred on the tenant illusory by a liberal approach to the desire of the landlord to evict tenant under the camouflage of personal requirement. It is not for a moment suggested that a landlord should not get possession if he genuinely requires the premises for his own use and occupation. That much incidental element of ownership in a country governed by mixed economy is still being recognised though in the wake of agrarian reforms the tenants of agricultural land have been made the owners thereof in almost the whole country. But that is a subject with which we are not concerned. We must proceed on the accepted principle that the one element of ownership, viz., right to personally occupy and enjoy, stands legislatively recognised when an enabling provision was made while restricting the unfettered right of the landlord to re-enter demised premises at his sweet will giving him an opportunity to seek possession on the ground of personal requirement. But care has to be taken to visualize that the lust for increasing rent by getting the premises vacated masquerading under the garb of personal requirement does not overreach the Courts. This is the gist of observations of this Court in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, MANU/SC/0313/1978: AIR 1979 SC 272 where it was held that the expression 'reasonable requirement' in section 11(h) of the Jammu & Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966, undoubtedly postulates that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need nothing but a desire as the High Court appeared to have done in that case. This observation was quoted with approval in Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, MANU/SC/0491/1979: AIR 1980 SC 161. In Kewal Singh's case this Court repelled challenge to the constitutional validity of section 25B of the Act.

Court further observed:

"It is indisputable that while examining the affidavit of the tenant filed under section 25B(4) for the purpose of granting or refusing to grant leave to contest the petition the landlord who has initiated the action has to be heard. It would follow as a necessary corollary that the landlord may controvert the averments made in the affidavit of the tenant but the decision to grant or refuse leave must be based on the facts disclosed in the affidavit. If they are controverted by the landlord that fact may be borne in mind but if the facts disclosed in the affidavit of the tenant are contested by way of proof or disproof or producing evidence in the form, of other affidavits or documents that would not be permissible. It is not the stage of proof of facts, it is only a stage of disclosure of facts. Undoubtedly, the rules of natural justice apart from the adversary system we follow must permit the landlord to contest affidavit filed by the tenant and he can do so by controverting the same by an affidavit. That would be an affidavit in reply because tenant's affidavit is the main affidavit being treated as an application seeking leave to contest the petition. But, the matter should end there. Any attempt at investigating the facts whether they appear to be proved or disproved is beyond the scope of sub-section (5) of section 25B. Viewed from this angle the decision in Mohan Lal's case rendered by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court is far in excess of the requirement of section and the view taken therein does not commend to us."

It was, however, urged that section 37(1) makes it obligatory for the Controller to not only hear the landlord but examine evidence at the stage of granting or refusing to grant leave to contest. Section 37(1) provides that no order which prejudicially affects any person shall be made by the Controller under the Act, without giving him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the order proposed to be made and until his objections, if any, and evidence he may produce in support of the same have been considered by the Controller. Sub-section (2) of section 37 provides that subject to any rules that may be made under the Act, the Controller shall, while holding an inquiry in any proceeding before him, follow as far as may be the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of evidence. Section 37(1) prescribes procedure to be followed by the Controller in a proceeding under the Act and sub-section (2) makes it clear that subject to the rules that may be made under the Act, the Court has to follow the practice and procedure of the Court of Small Causes inclusive of the provision for recording of evidence. However, in this context it is advantageous to refer to sub-section (7) of section 25B. It reads as under:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 37, the Controller shall, while holding an inquiry in a proceeding to which this Chapter applies, follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of evidence."

Sub-section (7) of section 25B opens with a non-obstante clause and provides that while holding an inquiry in a proceeding to which the Chapter IIIA applies, the Controller has to follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. Section 25B(1) leaves no room for doubt that it is a self-contained code and that is why sub-section (7) had to open with a non-obstante clause. It is crystal clear that while holding the inquiry under Chapter IIIA which incorporates section 25B, the Court has to follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes. It was, however, submitted that the non-obstante clause excludes the application of sub-section (2) of section 37 and not sub-section (1) of section 37 and, therefore, when leave to contest is sought by the tenant not only the landlord can contest the same which is indisputable but the Controller will have to follow the procedure prescribed in section 37(1), namely, inviting the objections, taking into consideration, the evidence that may be produced, etc. If section 37(1) is attracted and the evidence has to be produced and the Controller is bound to take that evidence into consideration, the evidence can as well be oral evidence which necessitates the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. If that is contemplated by section 37(1), incorporating it in section 25B would be self-defeating. On the contrary even the exclusion of section 37(1) will necessarily follow from the provision contained in sub-section (10) of section 25B which reads as under:

"(10). Save as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the procedure for the disposal of an application for eviction on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, or under section 14A, shall be the same as the procedure for the disposal of applications by Controller."

It would appear at a glance that sub-section (10) operates to bring in section 37(1) after leave to contest is granted. However, if there is any provision in section 25B for dealing with an application under that section that would prevail over other provisions of the Act. While considering an application amongst others under section 14(1) proviso (e), if at the time of considering the application for granting leave the procedure under section 37(1) is to be followed it would render sub-section (10) superfluous and redundant. If section 37(1) were to govern all proceedings including the application for leave to contest the proceedings, sub-section (7) and sub-section (10) would both be rendered redundant. On the contrary the very fact that sub-section (7) provides that while considering the affidavit of the tenant seeking permission to contest the proceedings the practice and procedure of the Small Causes Court will have to be followed itself indicates the legislative intention of treating Chapter III A and especially section 25B as self-contained code and this conclusion is buttressed by the provision of sub-section (1) which provides that every application by landlord for recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in section 25B. Any other section prescribing procedure for disposal of application covered by sub-section (1) of section 25B will be excluded. And that will also exclude section 37(1). The stage for considering the application for leave to contest the petition is anterior to the stage of hearing the substantive petition for eviction and the procedure for the disposal is prescribed in sub-section (7). After grant of leave to contest sub-section (10) of section 25B comes into operation and it makes it abundantly clear that the procedure prescribed while holding an inquiry consequent upon the granting of leave to contest shall be the same as required to be followed by Controller. This directly points in the direction of section 37(1). Therefore it is crystal clear that section 37(1) is not attracted at the stage of considering an application for leave to contest filed under sub-section (4) and examined under sub-section (5) of section 25B.

Thus, it was laid down as under:

"What follows then. The Controller has to confine himself indisputably to the condition prescribed for exercise of jurisdiction in sub-section (5) of section 25B. In other words, he must confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant. If the affidavit discloses such facts-no proof is needed at the stage, which would disentitle the plaintiff from seeking possession, the mere disclosure of such facts must be held sufficient to grant leave because the statute says on disclosure of such facts the Controller shall grant leave'. It is difficult to be exhaustive as to what such facts could be but ordinarily when an action is brought under section 14(1) proviso (e) of the Act whereby the landlord seeks to recover possession on the ground of bona fide personal requirement if the tenant alleges such facts as that the landlord has other accommodation in his possession; that the landlord has in his possession accommodation which is sufficient for him; that the conduct of the landlord discloses avarice for increasing rent by threatening eviction; that the landlord has been letting out some other premises at enhanced rent without any attempt at occupying the same or using it for himself; that the dependents of the landlord for whose benefit also possession is sought are not persons to whom in eye of law the landlord was bound to provide accommodation; that the past conduct of the landlord is such as would disentitle him to the relief of possession; that the landlord who claims possession for his personal requirement has not cared to approach the Court in person though he could have without the slightest inconvenience approached in person and with a view to shielding himself from cross-examination prosecutes litigation through an agent called a constituted attorney. These and several other relevant but inexhaustible facts when disclosed should ordinarily be deemed to be sufficient to grant leave. And now to the facts of this case. Really no elaborate discussion is necessary but what is stated herein is with a view to pointing out with respect how contrary to well-established principles and the mandatory requirements of the statute the learned Controller and the High Court dealt with the matter. The learned Controller in para two of the judgment set out five different defences raised by the tenant in his affidavit seeking leave to contest the petition. The learned Controller then proceeded to note in para 3 of the order that the petitioner filed a counter-affidavit and also filed the sale deed of the house at 32, Anand Lok and further stated that the landlord has only one house of his ownership and that is the demised premises. In summarising the contentions raised by the tenant in his affidavit the learned Controller overlooked two most important contentions: (1) that though the landlord Niranjan Deva Tayal for whose benefit the petition was filed has been in Delhi since 1972 yet the leave and license agreement in favour of the tenant was renewed in 1972 and 1973 which would mean that even though Niranjan Deva Tayal, the real landlord whose proxy is Prem Deva Tayal, the constituted attorney, did not seek possession but renewed the so called leave and license agreement which would necessarily imply that he was not in need of the premises and that he has some accommodation in his occupation which he considers sufficient and could occupy it as of right. If that was not to be, he should have so stated in the petition. But the glaring lacuna in summarising the contentions made by the learned Controller is that the tenant stated in his affidavit that an identical unit at the back of the demised premises fell vacant in 1973 when Kirloskar & Co. vacated the same and the same was let out to the Food Corporation of India at enhanced rent. The learned Controller did not note the fact that a notice seeking eviction was served in 1974 and that too on the ground that Niranjan Deva Tayal requires the premises for his personal occupation because he bona fide needs the same and yet no follow up action was taken till 1979 when on June 22, 1979, a second notice of eviction was served. If in a regular trial these facts are proved, is there any doubt about the outcome of the petition? There was the further averment of which proper summary is not made that even Food Corporation of India appears to have vacated the premises at the back of the demised premises and the same is in occupation of Coronation Spinning (India) and it is admitted that the same were let out up to and inclusive of the year 1981. The averment is that every time a fresh letting is indulged into it is done after raising the rent. Could not the bona fides of the landlord on disclosure of these facts be put in issue? Surprisingly, contrary to the provision of law the learned Controller took the affidavit and counter-affidavit and reply affidavit as unquestioned evidence and proceeded to decide all disputed questions of fact. Is this at all contemplated by section 25B? If not, the whole order would be without jurisdiction. But the more objectionable part overlooked by him is that the landlord who seeks possession for himself and is admittedly in Delhi has not stated a single word on oath about his requirements as to in what right he is occupying the premises in which he is at present staying, why after nearly seven years he is required to vacate the same and what necessitates his seeking possession of the front portion when identical unit at the back, fell vacant thrice during the period be was permanently in Delhi. If these facts without further elaboration disclosed in affidavit of the tenant are not sufficient to grant leave, we would find it difficult to see a single case in which leave could ever be granted which would mean that the landlord fortunately having premises in Delhi where rents are fantastically high can hold tenants at ransom on the threat of eviction on the ground of personal requirement and on refusal of leave obtain possession."

Thus, majority judgment¹while allowing the appeal set aside the order of Rent Controller as well as that of the High Court and granted the tenant leave to defend the petition of eviction and remitted the case before the Learned Controller for proceeding according to law. Though, even the minority judgment²allowed the appeal and granted the leave to defend, however, took a contrary view on the question of law laid down in the matter. It observed as under.

Minoirty view:-

"There is a definite public purpose behind the enactment of Chapter IIIA introduced by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976. The words "if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in clauses (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 or under section 14A" used in sub-section (5) of section 25B are to be interpreted in a manner which is in consonance with the intention of the Legislature and must be construed in a sense which would carry out the object and purpose of the Act. The construction to be adopted must be meaningful and innovative. A mechanical and literal construction of these words detached from the context of the other provisions as also the object and purpose of the enactment will reduce this beneficial legislation to futility.

Section 14A of the Act, was enacted to confer the right to recover immediate possession, upon persons who being in occupation of any residential premises allotted to them by the Central Government or any local authority, were required, in pursuance of any general or special order made by that Government or authority to vacate such residential accommodation, or in default, to incur the liability to pay penal rent. The whole object in section 14A was to ensure that all Government servants to whom residential accommodation had been allotted by the Government or any local authority, should vacate their Government accommodation, if they have any house of their own in the Union Territory of Delhi.

Further, experience in the past showed that landlords who were in bona fide requirement of their accommodation for residential purposes under clauses (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 were being put to great hardship due to the dilatory procedure of the suit. It was felt in the public interest that such landlords who were in bona fide requirement of their residential premises for their own occupation or for the occupation of any member of their family dependent on them, should 

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not be subjected to protracted trial of a civil suit with concomitant rights of appeals.

The underlying object behind the enactment of Chapter IIIA was that these classes of landlords i.e., a landlord who was in bona fide requirement of his residential premises for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, or a landlord seeking to enforce the right to recover immediate possession under section 14A of the Act, should not be at the mercy of law's delays but there should be quick and expeditious remedy against his own tenant.

Apart from conferring rights under section 14A to recover immediate possession, a summary procedure for trial of applications made under section 14(1)(e), or under section 14A, was provided for by Chapter IIIA. Section 25A provides that the provisions of Chapter IIIA which contains sections 25A, 25B and 25C and any rule made thereunder shall have effect "notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in the Act, or in any law for the time being in force." By sub-section (1) of section 25B, every application by a landlord for recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clauses (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, or under section 14A, has to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in Chapter IIIA. The conferral of the right to recover immediate possession under section 14A on a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted by the Central Government or any local authority necessitated a consequential change in the law. Such a person, before the enactment of section 14A, could not evict his own tenant because so long as he was in occupation of the residential accommodation allotted to him, he could not satisfy the requirement of clauses (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 that he should not have any other reasonably suitable accommodation. In order that the object of section 14A may not be frustrated, section 25C provides that nothing contained in sub-section (6) of section 14 shall apply to a landlord who is in occupation of any premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority is required to vacate that residential accommodation. There was also a similar change brought about with respect to a claim by a landlord under clauses (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14. Sub-section (7) of section 14 provides that where an order for recovery of possession is made on the ground specified in clauses (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain immediate possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order. Sub-section (2) of section 25C reduces the period of six months to two months."¹

It was also observed that one of the dominant objects with which the legislation was introduced was to mitigate the hardship of landlords who were 

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in bona fide requirement of their residential premises and had made an application for eviction under section 14(1)(e), or under section 14A, and to obtain immediate possession of such premises without well-known travails of our procedural laws. The whole object was to confine the trial only to such cases where the tenant had such a defence as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction under section 14(1)(e), or under section 14A, and to provide for a summary procedure of trial of such applications. The words "if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts" used in sub-section (5) of section 25B of the Act, must therefore take their colour from the context in which they appear.

"Under the scheme of the Act, the grant or refusal of leave under sub-section (5) of section 25B of the Act, is the most crucial stage of the proceedings initiated on an application for eviction by the landlord under section 14(1)(e), or under section 14A, at which stage the Controller has to decide whether the application should proceed to trial. The Controller obviously cannot come to a decision as to whether or not leave to contest should be granted under sub-section (5) of section 25B without affording the parties an opportunity of a hearing. The Controller is not a Court but he has the trappings of a Court, and he must conform to the rules of natural justice. It must therefore follow as a necessary corollary that the Controller has the duty to hear the parties on the question whether leave to contest should or should not be granted under sub-section (5) of section 25B of the Act.¹

Once it is conceded that the landlord has a right to be heard on the question of grant of leave to contest under sub-section (5) of section 25B, it must follow as a necessary implication that he has a right to refute the facts alleged by the tenant in his affidavit filed under sub-section (4) of section 25B and to show that the affidavit filed under sub-section (4) of section 25B by the tenant does not represent true facts. The Controller is therefore bound to give the landlord an opportunity to meet the allegations made by the tenant. The Controller must apply his mind not only to the averments made by the landlord in his application for eviction, but also to the facts alleged by the tenant in his affidavit for leave to contest as well as the facts disclosed by the landlord in his affidavit in rejoinder, besides the other material on record i.e., the documents filed by the parties in support of their respective claims in order to come to a conclusion whether the requirements of sub-section (1) of section 25B are fulfilled. It is difficult to lay down any rule of universal application for each case must depend on its own facts. To ask the Controller to confine only to the affidavit filed by the tenant is to ask him not to apply his mind in a judicial manner even if he feels that the justice of the case so demands. The Controller must endeavour to resolve the competing claims of landlord and tenant to the grant or refusal of leave 

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under sub-section (5) of section 25B of the Act, by finding a solution which is just and fair to both the parties."¹