Q.
We have already seen that Rent Control Legislation which is a piece of social legislation, meant specifically for weaker sections of the society, who do not own houses. It encroaches upon the freedom of contract between the landlord and the tenant. Consequently it curtails the rights and remedies of the landlord to get the tenant vacated. Landlord's normal rights, vested in him by general law, thus, remain suspended due to the special protective Rent Control Legislation. In case the rented out premises falls in an area which has been declared as 'slum area' under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 19561, in such a situation, it has been made obligatory on the part of the landlord to seek permission in writing, from the authority described as 'competent authority'2, to institute any suit or proceedings for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of such a tenant3. The Act, came into force in Delhi on 8th February, 1957. However, if any decree or order has already been obtained in any suit or proceedings instituted before the coming into force of the Act, for the eviction of the tenant from such a building or land in Slum Area, the permission would be obligatory for the purpose of execution of such decree or order3.
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1. Section 3 of the Act provides for declaration of the slum areas.
2. Section 2(c) of the Act, `competent authority' means such officer or authority as administration may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint as the competent authority for the purpose of this Act.
3. Section 19(1) provides _ "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority, (a) institute, after the commencement of the Slum Arears (Improvement and Clearance) Amendment Act, 1964 (43 of 1964) any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area; or (b) where any decree or order is obtained in any suit or proceeding instituted before such commencement for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in such area, execute such decree or order."
The person desirous of obtaining the aforementioned permission, is required to make an application in writing to the 'competent authority' in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed1. On receipt of such application, the 'competent authority', in terms of principle of natural justice, would give an opportunity to the parties of being heard and after making such summary inquiry into the circumstances of the case, as it thinks fit, shall by order in writing, either grant or refuse to grant such permission2where the competent authority refuses to grant the permission, it shall record a brief statement of reasons for such refusal and furnish a copy thereof to the applicant3.
In Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, MANU/SC/0121/1961: AIR 1961 SC 1589 the aforesaid provisions of the Act, were challenged being violative of articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India on the ground that the Act vests unguided, unfettered and uncontrolled powers in an executing officer while granting or refusing the permission under section 19(3) of the Act. It was contended that neither section 19 of the Act nor any other provision of the Act, indicates the grounds on which the 'competent authority' might grant or withhold permission either for the execution of the decree or for institution of a suit/proceedings for eviction of the tenant. Therefore, the power conferred is arbitrary and offends the fundamental right of landlord under article 14 of the Constitution of India. The same point was contended in a slightly different form by saying that the power conferred on the 'competent authority' by section 19(3) of the Act was an excessive delegation of legislative power and was therefore unconstitutional. Besides this, it was also contended that the vesting of a power in an executive authority to override - at his sweet will and pleasure - rights to property without any guidance from the legislature constituted an unreasonable restraint on the petitioner's rights to hold property, right which in the case of property of the type now in question would include a right to obtain possession from the tenant in order either to improve it by reconstruction or for the purpose of his own use.
However, Supreme Court while rejecting all these contentions observed and held that the discretion vested in the 'competent authority' was not unguided and though the section 19 of the Act did not in terms lay down any Rules for his guidance, the same may be gathered from the policy and the purpose of the Act as set out in Preamble and in the operative provisions of the Act, itself. The Preamble describes the Act as one enacted for two purposes: (1) the improvement and clearance of slum areas in certain Union Territories, and (2) for the protection of tenants in such areas from eviction. These twin objects are sought to be carried out by Chapters II to VI of the enactment. Chapter II which consists of one section - section 3 - provides definition of what are "slum areas" and their declaration as such? The tests for determining whether the area could be declared a "slum area" or not briefly are whether the buildings in the area are (a) unfit for human habitation, or (b) are by reason of dilapidation,
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1. Section 19(2) of the Act.
2. Section 19(3) of the Act.
3. Section 19(5) of the Act.
overcrowding etc. detrimental to safety, health or morals. It is in areas so declared as "slum areas" that the rest of the enactment is to operate. The provisions, however, make it clear that in order that an area may be declared a "slum area" every building in that area need not be unfit for human habitation or that human habitation in every building in such area should be detrimental to the safety, health or morals of the dwellers; Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, MANU/SC/0121/1961: AIR 1961 SC 1589 (1610-1611).
CHAPTER III is headed 'Slum Improvement' and makes provision for two types of orders: (1) to require the improvement of buildings where repairs - major or minor - would make them reasonably habitable for the slum dwellers1, and (2) cases where mere repairs or adjustments would not suffice but what is required is the demolition of the entire building. In the latter case certainly the occupants of the building would have to be evicted and the building vacated and power is conferred for effectuating this purpose vide section 7(1) and 7(3). It might be that the whole area might consist of dwellings of the type which require demolition and it is Chapter IV that makes provision for this category of cases which is headed "Slum Clearance and Re-development". In such cases the buildings in the entire area are to be ordered to be demolished, and in that event the dwellers would, of course, have to vacate, but it is presumed that alternative accommodation would necessarily have to be provided before any such order is made. The process would have to be carried out in an orderly fashion if the purpose of the Act is to be fulfilled and the policy behind it, viz., the establishment of slum dwellers in healthier and more comfortable tenements so as to improve the health and morals of the community, is to be achieved. Chapter V makes provisions for the acquisition of land in order to compass the re-development of slum areas into healthy parts of the city, by providing amenities and more substantial and better accommodation for the previous inhabitants. It is after this that there is Chapter VI whose terms have already been set out. This Chapter is headed "Protection of tenants in slum sreas from Eviction". Obviously, if the protection that is afforded is read in the context of the rest of the Act, it is clear that it is to enable the poor who have no other place to go to, and who if they were compelled to go out, would necessarily create other slums in the process and live perhaps in less commodious and more unhealthy surroundings than those from which they were evicted, to remain in their dwellings until provision is made for a better life for them elsewhere. Though, therefore, the Act fixes no time limit during which alone the restraint on eviction is to operate, it is clear from the policy and purpose of the enactment and the object which it seeks to achieve that this restriction would only be for a period which would be determined by the speed with which the authorities are able to make other provisions for affording the slum dweller-tenants better living conditions. The Act, no doubt, looks at the problem not from the point of view of the landlord, his needs, the money he has sunk in the house and the possible profit that he might make if the house were either let to other tenants or was reconstructed and let out, but rather from the point of view of the tenants who have no alternative accommodation and who would be stranded in the
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1. Vide sections 4 to 6.
open if an order for eviction were passed. The Act, itself contemplates eviction in cases where on the ground of the house being unfit for human habitation it has to be demolished either singly under section 7 or as one of a block of buildings under Chapter IV. So long therefore as a building can, without great detriment to health or safety, permit accommodation, the policy of the enactment would seem to suggest that the slum dweller should not be evicted unless alternative accommodation could be obtained for him; Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, MANU/SC/0079/1961: AIR 1961 SC 1602 (1611).
In view of this scenario, it was laid down that there is enough guidance to the 'competent authority' in the use of his discretion under section 19(1) of the Act and as such section 19 is not obnoxious to the equal protection of laws granted by article 14 of the Constitution. It was further held that the guidance could be derived from the enactment and that it bears a reasonable and rational relationship to the object to be attained by the Act and in fact, would fulfill the purpose which the law seeks to achieve, viz., the orderly elimination of slums, with interim protection for the slum dwellers until they were moved into better dwellings. However, before concluding the Supreme Court in reply to the aforesaid argument on behalf of the appellant-landlord, held that-
"In regard to this matter we desire to make two observations. In the context of modern conditions and the variety and complexity of the situations which present themselves for solution, it is not possible for the legislature to envisage in detail every possibility and make provision for them. The legislature therefore is forced to leave the authorities created by it an ample discretion limited, however, by the guidance afforded by the Act. This is the ratio of delegated legislation, and is a process which has come to stay, and which one may be permitted to observe is not without its advantages. So long therefore as the legislature indicates, in the operative provisions of the statute with certainty, the policy and purpose of the enactment, the mere fact that the legislation is skeletal, or the fact that a discretion is left to those entrusted with administering the law, affords no basis either for the contention that there has been an excessive delegation of legislative power as to amount to an abdication of its functions, or that the discretion vested is uncanalised and unguided as to amount to a carte blanche to discriminate. The second is that if the power or discretion has been conferred in a manner which is legal and constitutional, the fact that Parliament could possibly have made more detailed provisions, could obviously not be a ground for invalidating the law; Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, MANU/SC/0079/1961: AIR 1961 SC 1602 (1612)."
In response to the next point urged by Petitioner that power conferred on the 'competent authority' was an excessive delegation of legislative power, it was held that this submission is really another form or rather another aspect of the objection based on the ground of an unfettered discretion or power which has been dealt above. It was observed that so long as the legislature indicates its purpose and lays down the policy it is not necessary that every detail of the application of the law to particular cases should be laid down in the enactment itself. The reasons assigned for repelling the attack based on article 14 would suffice to reject this ground of objection as well; Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, MANU/SC/0079/1961: AIR 1961 SC 1602 (1612).
With regard to the objection of violation of the right to hold the property under article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, it was observed that the same was saved by article 19(5) of the Constitution for the reasons that the restriction imposed on the exercise of the right was reasonable, since it is not at the 'sweet will and pleasure' of the 'competent authority' that the permission to evict could be granted or refused, but on the principles gatherable from the enactment as explained above. In this regard Court held:
"Learned Counsel further urged that the right to hold property under article 19(1)(f) included the right in the owner of a building to evict a tenant and enter into actual or physical occupation of the property. Counsel is, no doubt, right in this submission but the 'freedom' to 'hold property' is not absolute but that, as he himself admitted, is subject, under article 19(5), to "reasonable restrictions" being placed upon it "in the interests of the general public". It was not suggested that slum-dwellers would not constitute "the general public" and that if a legislation was designed to grant them protection, it could not be justified as one in the interests of the "general public", because obviously the interests of such a vast number of the population in the country, their health, well-being and morals would, apart even from themselves, necessarily impinge upon and influence, for good or evil, the health, safety, well-being and morality of the rest of the community as well. The only question that is capable of argument is whether the restriction is reasonable. A considerable part of learned Counsel's argument on the reasonableness of the restriction was devoted to showing that the vesting of an unfettered or unguided power in the competent authority to permit or not to permit eviction rendered the restriction unreasonable. This, as would be seen, is really a different form of presenting the case of the objection under article 14, and what we have said in dealing with the first point of the learned Counsel would answer this portion of the objection.
There are, however, a few more matters which have relevance about the objection on the score of the restriction not being reasonable within article 19(5) and the tests to be applied to determining its reasonableness to which we should refer. It has already been pointed out that the restrictions imposed on the right of the landlord to evict have a reasonable and rational connection with the object sought to be achieved by the Act, viz., the ultimate elimination of slums with protection to the slum-dwellers from being meanwhile thrown out on the streets. The question might still remain whether this restriction on the rights of the landlords is excessive in the sense that it invades and trenches on their rights in a manner or to an extent not really or strictly necessary to afford protection to the reasonable needs of the slum-dwellers which is the aim and object of the legislation to subserve. The criteria for determining the degree of restriction on the right to hold property which would be considered reasonable, are by no means fixed or static, but must obviously vary from age to age and be related to the adjustments necessary to solve the problems which communities face from time to time. The tests, therefore, evolved by communities living in sheltered or placid times, or laid down in decisions applicable to them can hardly serve as a guide for the solution of the problems of post-partition India with its stresses and strains arising out of movements of populations which have had few parallels in history. If law failed to take account of unusual situations of pressing urgency arising in the country, and of the social urged generated by the patterns of thought-evolution and of social consciousness which we witness in the second half of this century, it would have to be written down as having failed in the very purpose of its existence. Where the legislature fulfils its purpose and enacts laws, which in its wisdom, is considered necessary for the solution of what after all is a very human problem the tests of "reasonableness" have to be viewed in the context of the issues which faced the legislature. In the construction of such laws and particularly in judging of their validity the Courts have necessarily to approach it from the point of view of furthering the social interest which is the purpose of the legislation to promote, for the Courts are not, in these matters, functioning as it were in vacuo, but as parts of a society which is trying, by enacted law, to solve its problems and achieve social concord and peaceful adjustment and thus furthering the moral and material progress of the community as a whole; Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, MANU/SC/0079/1961: AIR 1961 SC 1602 (1612-13)."
Judged in the light of the above, the Court found that the restrictions imposed cannot be said to be unreasonable. The ban imposed on evictions is temporary, though its duration is not definite. In the very nature of things the period when slums would have ceased to exist or restrictions placed upon owners of property could be completely lifted must, obviously, be indefinite and therefore the indefiniteness cannot be a ground for invalidity - a ground upon which the restriction could be held to be unreasonable. Again, there is an appeal provided from the orders of the competent authority to the Chief Administrator. In such cases, if the "competent authority" oversteps the limits of his powers or ignores the policy behind the Act and acts contrary to its declared intention, the appellate authority could be invoked to step in and correct the error. It would, therefore, be a provision for doubly safeguarding that the policy of the Act is carried out and not ignored in each and every case that comes up before "the competent authority". The procedure laid down by the Act for the hearing by the "competent authority" and the provisions for enquiry, renders the "competent authority" a quasi-judicial functionary bound to follow fixed rules of procedure and its orders passed after such an enquiry are to be subject to appeals to the Administrator. These safeguards are very relevant for judging about the reasonableness of the restriction. In considering these matters one has to take into account the fact that there has been an unprecedented influx of population into the capital, and in such a short interval, that there has not been time for natural processes of expansion of the city to adjust itself to the increased needs. Remedies which in normal times might be considered an unreasonable restriction on the right to hold property would not bear that aspect or be so considered when viewed in a situation of emergency brought about by exceptional and unprecedented circumstances. Just as pulling down a building to prevent the spread of flames would be reasonable in the event of a fire, the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the impugned legislation has to be judged in the light of actual facts and not on a priori reasoning based on the dicta in decisions rendered in situations bearing not even the remotest resemblance to that which presented itself to Parliament when the legislation now impugned was enacted; Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, MANU/SC/0079/1961: AIR 1961 SC 1602 (1613-1614).
The important point to be noted at this juncture is that after the judgment of Supreme Court in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, MANU/SC/0079/1961: AIR 1961 SC 1602 as mentioned above, the legislature incorporated sub-section (4) in section 19 of the Act by way of an amendment with effect from 27-2-1965 by virtue of which it was laid down that before granting or refusing the permission under sub-section 3, 'competent authority' shall take into account the following factors, namely:-
(a)whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted;
(b)whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas;
(c)such other factors, if any, as may be prescribed.
Under these circumstances, earlier sub section 4 was re-numbered as (5) in section 19. It is pertinent to mention here that with regard to the 3rd factor nothing has been prescribed till date by the legislature and as such only two factors are there which the 'competent authority' is under obligation to take into account. Further, various judgments hereinafter discussed have held that these two factors are alternative, exhaustive and mandatory in nature; C.R. Abrol v. Administrator under the Slum Areas, (1970) RCJ 899. Meaning thereby the 'competent authority' has to see whether either of these factors exist in a particular case and if answered to this query is in the affirmative the permission has to be granted to the landlord. In this way, the aforesaid factors have been held to be alternative. Besides this, the 'competent authority' cannot look into any other factor whatsoever while considering the application of the landlord moved under section 19(2) of the Act. In this sense these factors are exhaustive. Moreover the 'competent authority' is under obligation to look into these factors mandatorily.
Question of law decided: (a) The competent authority was bound to make a preliminary inquiry into the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties under section 19(1) with a view to be able to decide on the basis of such a preliminary inquiry whether permission should be given to the landlord to institute proceedings for the eviction of the tenant; (b) the preliminary finding given by the competent authority under section 19 is not res judicata between the parties and the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties would have to be decided afresh by the Rent Controller, if necessary; (c) The factors to be considered by the competent authority under section 19(4) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 are alternative, exhaustive and mandatory. In other words, even if either of the factor is present in a particular case, the permission has to be granted by the competent authority to the landlord. Besides this, no other factor can be taken into consideration by the competent authority and as such, in that sense, they are exhaustive. Moreover, competent authority has to mandatorily consider those factors, failing which his order would be vitiated.
Facts of the case: The Arya Paratinidhi Sabha, Punjab, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the Arya Samaj, Kishan Ganj, Delhi, a society not so registered both made an application under section 19(1) of the 'The Alum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956' (hereinafter called the Act) to the competent authority for permission to evict the tenants alleging themselves to be the landlords vis-…-vis those tenants on the ground that the premises had been purchased in auction from the Government in reality by the Arya Samaj Benami in the name of Sarla Gupta. Later, the Arya Samaj, Kishan Ganj Delhi and Smt. Sarla Gupta had executed a deed of trust in favour of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Punjab whereby the legal ownership of the property in premises vested in the trustees, namely, 'The Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Punjab', the beneficial owner being the Arya Samaj, Kishan Ganj, Delhi. Later Sarla Gupta also executed a deed of disclaimer by which she disclaimed any title to the premises and admitted the legal title to be in the name of Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Punjab. Sarla Gupta did not join as an applicant in the above mentioned petitions under section 19 of the Act. The tenants resisted the petitions on the ground that they were the tenants of Sarla Gupta but not of the Arya Pritinidhi Sabha, Punjab and the Arya Samaj, Kishan Ganj, Delhi. They denied that the title to the premises had vested in the Arya Pritinidhi Sabha, Punjab and pointed out that the Arya Samaj, Kishan Ganj, Delhi was not a registered body and could not, therefore, maintain the petition against the tenants. The competent authority held that the Arya Samaj, Punjab was not proved to be a registered body and the relationship of landlord and tenants between the parties was also not proved. The competent authority, therefore, declined to grant permission to them for the eviction of the tenants. It did not, therefore, inquire into the question whether the tenants could find alternative accommodation within their means if they were eventually evicted from the premises. In the appeal, filed by the alleged landlords to the Administrator, the order of the competent authority was reversed and permission for instituting the proceedings for eviction of the tenants was granted on the view that where a tenant denies his relationship with the alleged landlord filing the petition under section 19, the permission must invariably be granted. The reason given was that in granting permission in such cases neither party is put to any loss. The alleged landlord could approach the Tribunal vis-…-vis the jurisdiction to decide the question of tenancy and obtain the eviction of the tenants. On the other hand, if the alleged landlords failed to prove their status as landlords, they would be unsuccessful in evicting the tenants and the permission granted under section 19 of the Act would not in any way prejudice the tenants.
Under these circumstances tenants filed writ petitions challenging the orders dated 27-5-1969 whereby permission for institution of proceedings for the eviction of the tenants was granted under section 19 of the Act by the Administrator sitting in appeal under section 20 of the Act. It was argued on behalf of tenants/petitioners that the order granting permission for eviction of the tenants was without jurisdiction on two grounds; (1) because the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties was not proved, (2) because the Administrator did not consider, though he was required to do so, under section 19(4) of the Act whether the tenants would be able to find alternative accommodation within their means on eviction.
Findings of the Court: Delhi High Court, while considering the aforesaid writ petitions, in response to the first ground, held that the competent authority was bound to inquire and come to a decision as to whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties and that it has no jurisdiction to grant the permission to the landlords for the eviction of the tenants unless and until it finds that such a relationship existed between the parties. The twin object of the Act as spelt out in its long title is the improvement and clearance of Slum Areas, and the protection of tenants in such areas from eviction." While the rest of the Act is concerned with the improvement and clearance of the slum areas. Chapter VI thereof is concerned with the protection of tenants in slum areas from eviction. Under the general law, i.e., the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or the principles of justice, equity and good conscience underlying it, the landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy of his monthly tenant by notice given either under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or under the principles underlying it. Restrictions on this right of landlord have been placed by the Rent Control Legislation in Delhi first by the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, which was later succeeded by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. When, therefore, the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 was enacted, section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 had already restricted the right of the landlord to evict the tenant. A landlord may terminate the contractual tenancy by notice. Nevertheless the statutory tenancy continued and the eviction of the tenant could not be obtained unless the landlord satisfied the court of the existence of any of the specified grounds on which alone the eviction would be ordered. As recognized by the Supreme Court, therefore, in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, MANU/SC/0121/1961: AIR 1961 SC 1589 an additional restriction on the right of the landlord to evict the tenant is imposed by section 19 of the Act. The protection given by section 19 is available only to the tenants. The Act does not define either "landlord" or "tenant". It is clear, therefore, that the relationship of landlord and tenant has to be determined according to the general law. Section 2(f) of the Act defined "occupier". An occupier may be of five kinds as specified therein. Out of them only two kinds are tenants. The benefit of section 19 is not, therefore, available to the other kinds of occupier. It would appear necessary, therefore, for the competent authority to determine if the person claiming benefit of section 19 is a tenant vis-…-vis the applicant landlord before it can decide to grant the permission or to refuse the permission to the landlord for the eviction of the tenant.
Since the relationship of landlord and tenant has to exist before the application under section 19 is made by the landlord, it is a condition precedent which must be satisfied before the landlord can make an application under section 19. The competent authority proceeds on the basis that such relationship exist before it can decide the specific question whether the permission should be granted or not. The jurisdiction of the competent authority under section 19 is, therefore, to grant or not to grant the permission for eviction. But the exercise of this jurisdiction depends on the fulfillment of the jurisdictional condition that the application is made by a landlord for permission to evict a tenant. When the relationship is admitted by the parties, the competent authority straightway proceed to decide, whether the permission sought by the landlord should be granted or not. If the relationship is denied by the landlord then the competent authority must dismiss the application of the landlord on the ground that no permission is needed under section 19 for the filing of a suit for possession based on title. If the relationship is denied by the tenant then the competent authority theoretically got two courses open to itself. It may either refer the landlord to the Civil Court for a finding that the relationship exists between the parties. Such a finding becomes res judicata between the parties. The landlord can file a petition under section 19 on the basis of such a finding and the tenant could not thereafter dispute the relationship. The competent authority can proceed to decide whether the permission to the landlord should be granted or not. But such a course of action would encourage frivolous denials of relationship of landlord and tenant. Section 19 has given jurisdiction to the competent authority to decide a certain question. Jurisdiction would be made largely infructuous if a mere denial of the relationship by the alleged tenants could put the competent authority out of action and unable to proceed further. Therefore, the second course which is the only possible one in the circumstances, and which must be adopted by the competent authority, is to determine whether the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties. The competent authority does not have the final jurisdiction to determine the existence of the relationship. Its authority extends only to make a preliminary inquiry into the relationship solely for the purpose of knowing, whether it can proceed further under section 19 to decide the main question whether permission should be granted or not. The finding given as a result of the preliminary inquiry will not be res judicata between the parties and would be liable to be questioned collaterally either by a civil suit or by a writ petition. The mere fact that the question of relationship cannot be finally determined by the competent authority is, however, no reason why it should not be inquired into at all by it.
It was also observed that the preliminary inquiry into the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant can be magnified into a full scale trial by a litigious tenant to defeat delay or the grant of permission by the competent authority under section 19. For, under section 19(3) inquiry into the main question whether the permission should be granted or not is itself to be "such summary inquiry into the circumstances of the case as it (competent authority) thinks fit". A fortiori the preliminary inquiry into the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant by the competent authority would be even more summary.
In reply to the second limb of the argument to the fact that the 'competent authority' was required to consider under section 19(4) of the Act whether the tenant was able to find alternative accommodation, the High Court took the view that it concerned entirely with the construction of section 19(4). Section 19(4) has two aspects. The first is, whether it is mandatory. The second is, whether it is exhaustive. In the absence of any rules made under section 19(4)(c) only two considerations have been specified to be taken into account by the competent authority namely; (a) whether alternative accommodate within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted; & (b) whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas. Court held that these two considerations appear to be alternative and not cumulative. If the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the Slum Area then the premises may have to be either demolished or improved by repairs. This would involve the vacation of the premises by the tenant even if the tenant is too poor to find accommodation within his means. For, as observed by the Supreme Court in Jyoti Parsad's case, "the Act itself contemplates eviction in cases where on the grounds of the house being unfit for human habitation it is to be demolished either singly under section 7 or as one of a block of buildings under Chapter IV. So long therefore as a building can, without great detriment to health or safety, permit accommodation, the policy of the enactment would seem to suggest that the slum dweller should not be evicted unless alternative accommodation could be obtained for him." But if on the other hand, the eviction of the tenant is not necessitated by the demolition or repairs of the premises then the competent authority must consider if alternative accommodation within his means would be available to the tenant if he were evicted. If it comes to the conclusion that he would not find such alternative accommodation within his means then the competent authority is precluded from granting the permission for his eviction.
While heavily relying upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, MANU/SC/0121/1961: AIR 1961 SC 1589 the High Court construed section 19(4) as being mandatory and exhaustive even though such construction may prevent the landlord from being evicted except on one of the grounds expressly mentioned therein. The discretion given to the 'competent authority' to give or refuse permission under the un-amended section 19 was to be exercised, according to the Supreme Court, on principles gatherable from the enactment. It is well-known that such discretion if exercised on irrelevant or extraneous consideration, would have been struck down as illegal and ultra vires. The legislature therefore inserted a new sub-section (4) in section 19 to give effect to the observations of the Supreme Court expressly laying down the considerations which must guide the competent authority in exercising the discretion. The new section 19(4) says "in granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (3) the competent authority shall take into account the following facts." The legislature, has therefore, enacted what it considers to be the relevant considerations which will guide the competent authority.
On the facts of the case, the Court while taking note of the fact that all the tenants in the matter were financially quite well off, therefore they could afford alternative accommodation. The court further while taking note of their reprehensible conduct observed that they were not entitled to discretionary relief in these writ petitions. Finally on the facts of the case, the court observed as under:
"Doctor C.R. Abrol is a medical practitioner having two clinics. His son Satish Chander is a Government officer getting a basic pay of Rs. 825 plus allowance per month. Mela Ram is a shopkeeper with a certain stock-in-trade and also a certain income from his shop. And yet all these three Petitioners have stated that they do not own any immovable properties. Such a statement shows a shocking disregard for veracity on their part. In paragraph 17(x) of the written statement filed by the respondent it has been stated that the tenants have been in arrears of rent for the last four years. In the rejoinders, the tenants did not deny this fact. They merely stated that they were ready and willing to pay the rent to Sarla Gupta and that they had sent it to her by money order. The tenants were duty bound to pay rent. A valid tender of rent was not made by them inasmuch as they did not deposit the rent in Court and alternatively did not send the rent to the landlord by money order each month. The tenants have thus failed to pay rent to the landlords for over five years without justification.
But neither the competent authority nor the Judicial Secretary purported to decide whether the tenants were able to obtain alternative accommodation within their means if they were evicted. Satish Chander does not reside in the premises at all and is also getting Rs. 825 as pay plus the usual allowances. He is, therefore, in a position to get alternative accommodation within his means and further he does not require any alternative accommodation at all. Doctor R.C. Abrol and Mela Ram have not come up honestly with declaration of their means. Their own means were facts within their special knowledge. They suppressed them altogether by stating that they had no moveable or immovable property. In view of this the affidavit filed by the landlords regarding the means of Doctor C.R. Abrol and Mela Ram had to be believed. According to those affidavits both doctor Abrol and Mela Ram are men of means, able to find alternative accommodation within their means. It is only because neither the competent authority nor the Judicial Secretary considered this question that we had to do so to avoid the sending back of these cases again for consideration of this point by the competent authority. After all the delay that has already occurred, we thought it imperative not to delay these cases further. In view of the above finding by us it is un-necessary for us to send the cases back to the competent authority."
Finally, the High Court said that permission granted by the Judicial Secretary to the landlord for eviction of the tenants was, therefore, justified though not for the reasons given in the impugned order.
2.
Q.
Question of law decided: Definition of tenant given under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (in short Rent Control Legislation) would not be applicable to the Slums Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (In short Slum Clearance Act). The word 'tenant' used in the Slum Clearance Act connotes a wider meaning than what is given under Rent Control Legislation. Facts of the case: The respondent let out a portion of his house consisting of five rooms on Ground Floor and two rooms on Second Floor to one Lal Chand, the appellant herein. He filed a suit in the court of Sub-Judge for eviction of the appellant and four others; Kesho Ram, Jhangi Ram, Nand Lal and Kaki Bai alleging that Lal Chand had sublet the premises to them. The eviction of these persons were sought by the landlord on the ground that (1) he required the premises for his own use and occupation (2) he wanted to provide certain essential amenities for himself necessitating reconstruction and that (3) the tenants were in arrears of rent. Vide judgment dated June 6, 1959, the Sub-Judge, First Class, Delhi decreed the suit on the first ground only and rejected the other two contentions. In appeal the learned Senior Sub-Judge confirmed the finding of the Trial Court but he thought that the needs of the respondent would be met adequately if he were given possession of the two rooms on the second floor only. Feeling, however, that there was no provision in the Rent Control Legislation, under which the suit was filed, for giving the possession of a part of the demised premises to the landlord, the learned Judge confirmed the decree of the Trial Court. The High Court upheld that judgment dated 6-2-1962 in Civil Revision on the ground that the landlord required the entire premises for his personal use and occupation. Since the suit property is situated in a slum area, the respondent filed an application under section 19(2) of the Slum Clearance Act, for permission of the 'competent authority' to execute the decree for possession obtained by him against Lal Chand and others. The 'competent authority' after taking into account the factors mentioned in section 19(4) of the Act granted the requisite permission only in respect of two rooms situated on second floor. Consequently permission was refused to execute the decree in regard to the premises situated on the ground floor. Even the Chief Commissioner of Delhi in appeal confirmed the order of the 'competent authority'. Pursuant to this order the defendants handed over the possession of the two rooms on the second floor to the respondent. Having obtained possession of a part of the premises the respondent initiated a fresh round of litigation giving rise to this appeal. He filed a regular Civil Suit No. 435/1966 against Lal Chand, Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram for possession of the remaining rooms on the ground floor. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court on 4th May, 1967. Nand Lal and Kaki Bai were not impleaded to the suit as presumably because they had surrendered possession of the two rooms on the Second Floor, as mentioned above. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Trial Court, Lal Chand, Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram filed Civil Appeal in the Court of Additional Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi. During the pendency of this appeal, Lal Chand died, whereupon his widow and son applied for being brought on record as his legal representatives. The application was contested by the landlord on the ground that by reason of ejectment decree Lal Chand has been ceased to be a tenant and upon his death the right to sue did not survive to his heirs. This contention was upheld by the appellate court who by his judgment dismissed the appeal as also an application filed by Lal Chand's widow and son for being brought on record as their legal representatives. These legal representatives and two other defendants filed second appeal before the High Court against the judgment of the appellate court. The High Court held that on the death of Lal Chand, during the pendency of appeal, the cause of action does not survive to his legal representatives to continue the appeal and that therefore there was no one who could legitimately prosecute that appeal. Accordingly, the judgment of the said appellate court was confirmed and second appeal was also dismissed. The present case arises out of the Special Leave filed by the legal representatives of Lal Chand as also by Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram. Findings of the Court: The Supreme Court also discussed many aspects pertaining to Civil Procedure Code while deciding the matter in favour of the appellant but for the purposes of present discussion on the aspect of Slum Clearance Act it would suffice to mention here that the Apex Court observed that the main contentions raised by Lal Chand, Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram in their written statement were that they were tenants within the meaning of the Slum Clearance Act despite the passing of the ejectment decree against them that the suit brought by the landlord was not maintainable in view of the provisions of that Act and therefore the respondent was estopped from bringing suit since he had already obtained the possession of the two rooms on the second floor in pursuance of the permission granted by the 'competent authority'. The Supreme Court answered the first of these contentions in the light of relevant provisions of the Slum Clearance Act. It was observed that question is whether in view of the section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act, it was obligatory on the part of the respondent to have obtained permission from the 'competent authority'. It was a common ground that such a permission was not obtained and that the building in question was situated in a slum area, the decision of the question turns on the consideration whether inspite of the fact that an ejectment decree was passed against Lal Chand in earlier suit he continued to be a tenant for the purpose of the Slum Clearance Act especially within the meaning of section 19(1)(a) thereof. It was observed that the trial Court held that the Lal Chand ceased to be a tenant after the passing of the ejectment decree and therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit for possession against him was not barred under any of the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act. This question, however, was not dealt with either by the first appellate court or by the High Court in second appeal since they took a view that Lal Chand's death during the pendency of the first appeal, the proceedings had abated. But the Supreme Court decided the question and observed that the word 'tenant' has not been defined in the Slum Clearance Act but section 2(l) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 59 of 1958. defines it as: 2(l) "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is, or but for a special contract would be, payable and includes a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made. This definition has been amended by Act 18 of 1976 but the amended definition also provides by section 2(l)(A) that the word 'tenant' shall not include any person against whom an order or decree for eviction has been made, except where such decree or order for eviction is liable to be re-opened under the proviso to section 3 of the Amending Act of 1976. It is thus clear that in so far as the Delhi Rent Control Act, is concerned, a person against whom an order or a decree for eviction has been passed cannot, generally, be regarded as a tenant. The question which requires consideration is whether the definition of 'tenant' contained in the Delhi Rent Control Act, can be extended to proceedings under the Slum Clearance Act, or, in other words, whether the word 'tenant' which occurs in clause (a) of section 19(1) of the Slum Clearance Act, bears the same meaning which it has under the Delhi Rent Control Act. Section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act, furnishes intrinsic evidence to show that the definition of the word 'tenant' as contained in the Delhi Rent Control Act, cannot be extended for construing its provisions. By clause (b) of section 19(1) no person can, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority, execute any decree or order obtained in any suit or proceeding instituted before the amending Act of 1964 for the eviction of a "tenant" from any building or land in a slum area. Sub-section (2) of section 19 provides that a person desiring to obtain permission of the competent authority shall make an application in the prescribed form. By sub-section (4), the competent authority is required to take into account certain factors while granting or refusing to grant the permission asked for. The first of such factors which is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (4) is "whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted." It is evident that the word 'tenant' is used in section 19(4)(a) to include a person against whom a decree or order for eviction has already been passed because, that provision applies as much to the permission sought for executing a decree or order of eviction referred to in section 19(1)(b) as to the institution of a suit or proceeding for obtaining a decree or order for eviction referred to in section 19(1)(a). If a person against whom a decree or order of eviction has been passed is not to be included within the meaning of the word 'tenant', section 19(4)(a) could not have used the language which it uses, namely, whether alternative accommodation within the means of the 'tenant' would be available to him if he were evicted. In the absence of compelling circumstances and in order to better effectuate the object of the Slum Clearance Act, there is no reason why the word 'tenant' should not bear the same meaning in section 19(1)(a) as in section 19(4)(a). The rule is well-settled that where the same expression is used in the same statute at different places the same meaning ought to be given to that expression, as far as possible. In the instant case, the word 'tenant' has been used at more than one place in section 19 itself and it is only reasonable to construe it in the same sense throughout. The Court also observed that- "The Slum Clearance Act, was passed, inter alia, for the protection of tenants in slum areas from eviction. As observed by this Court in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, MANU/SC/0079/1961: AIR 1961 SC 1602 the Slum Clearance Act, looks at the problem of eviction of tenants from slum areas not from the point of view of the landlord and his needs but from the point of view of tenants who have no alternative accommodation and who would be stranded in the open if they were evicted. The policy of the Slum Clearance Act, being that the slum dweller should not be evicted unless alternative accommodation is available to him, we are of the view that the word 'tenant' which occurs in section 19(1)(a) must for the purpose of advancing the remedy provided by the statute be construed to include a person against whom a decree or order for eviction has been passed. We might mention that a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Bardu Ram Dhanna Ram v. Ram Chander Khibru, AIR 1972 Del 34 (FB) has taken the same view, namely, that the word 'tenant' in section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act, includes a person against whom a decree or order of eviction has been passed." Learned Counsel for the respondent relied very strongly on a decision of this Court in Lakhmi Chand v. Kauran Devi, MANU/SC/0337/1965: AIR 1966 SC 1003 in support of his submission that the word 'tenant' must bear the same meaning in the Slum Clearance Act as in the Delhi Rent Control Act. We are unable to appreciate how the judgment in that case supports the contention of the respondent. All that was decided therein was that a person against whom an order for eviction is passed cannot be a tenant within the meaning of the Delhi Rent Control Act and that the definition of the word 'tenant' as contained in that Act would not be affected by anything contained in section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act. The question which arose in that case was whether section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit in relation to any premises to which that Act applied, for eviction of a 'tenant' therefrom. Not only that no question arose in that case as to whether the definition of 'tenant' as contained in the Delhi Rent Control Act should be extended to the Slum Clearance Act, but the Court observed expressly that: "No question as to what the rights of a tenant against whom a decree of ejectment has been passed in view of section 19 of the Slum Areas Act, are, arises in this appeal, and that the Court was not concerned in the appeal before it with any question as to the protection given by the Slum Areas Act, to tenants.......". The question before us is not whether a person against whom a decree for eviction is passed is a tenant for the purposes of the Delhi Rent Control Act, but whether he is a tenant for the purposes of section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act. Lakhmi Chand's case does not deal with this problem at all. Since the respondent had not obtained permission of the competent authority for instituting the present suit for obtaining a decree for eviction of Lal Chand from a building situated in the slum area and since Lal Chand must be held to be a tenant for the purposes of section 19(1)(a) it must follow that the suit is incompetent and cannot be entertained. The suit is also barred under section 37A of the Slum Clearance Act, 1956 which reads thus: 37A. Bar of jurisdiction.-Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the competent authority or any other person is empowered by or under this Act, to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. The competent authority is empowered under section 19(3) to determine the question where permission should be granted or refused for instituting a suit for obtaining a decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building in a slum area. Consequently, no Civil Court can have jurisdiction in respect of that matter, namely, in respect of the question whether a tenant of a building in a slum area should or should not be permitted to be evicted there from. As a result of the combined operation of section 19(3) and section 37A of the Slum Clearance Act, 1956 that jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the competent authority and the jurisdiction in that behalf of Civil Courts is expressly taken away. Finally the Court held that the word 'tenant' used in the Slum Clearance Act, 1956 connotes a wider meaning than what is given under Rent Control Legislation. It is pertinent to mention here that the case also discussed, as mentioned above, the scope of Order 41, rule 4, CPC and the concept of res judicata under section 11 of the CPC. 3.
Question of law decided: The factors laid down in section 19(4) of the Slum Clearance Act, 1956 are to be read as alternatively. The scheme of the Act, 1956 automatically makes their consideration by the competent authority as cumulative. Facts of the case: The judgment does not give facts of the case and only discusses the question of law involved. Findings of the Court: The Supreme Court while perusing section 19 of the Act and Jyoti Prasad's case held that the scheme of the Slum Clearance Act, is such that even if the 'competent authority' takes into consideration the one factor the other factor is taken care of by the provisions of the Act automatically. Therefore, it was held that the High Court was right in holding that the factors which are mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 19(4) of the Slum Clearance Act, are to be taken into account as alternatively. In this regard, the Supreme Court relied upon its judgment delivered in Jyoti Pershad's case wherein the Constitutional validity of section 19 was challenged and upheld. Supreme Court observed in reference to Jyoti Pershad's case as under: "The validity of section 19 of the Act was challenged and this Court in the case of Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, MANU/SC/0079/1961: AIR 1961 SC 1602, has upheld its constitutional validity. In that case, it was contended that Act has vested in the competent authority the power to withhold eviction in pursuance of the orders or decrees of courts without affording any guidance or laying down any principles for his guidance on the basis of which it could exercise his discretion and thereby vested in him an arbitrary and unguided power to pick and choose the decree-holders to whom he would permit execution and those to whom he would refuse such relief. Court negatived the said contention by observing that the Act was enacted for two purposes; (1) the improvement and clearance of slum areas in certain Union territories, and (ii) for the protection of tenants in such areas from eviction. While considering Chapter III which is headed "Slum Improvement" and Chapter IV which is headed "Slum Clearance and Re-Development" Court observed that in cases where the buildings and the entire area are to be ordered to be demolished, the dwellers would, of course, have to vacate but it is presumed that alternative accommodations would necessarily have to be provided before any such order is made. And the process would have to be carried out in an orderly fashion if the purpose of the Act is to be fulfilled and the policy behind it, namely the establishment of slum dwellers in healthier and more comfortable tenements so as to improve the health and morals of the community, is to be achieved. The Court observed "the policy of the enactment would seem to suggest that the slum dweller should not be evicted unless alternative accommodation could be obtained for him". Court further observed "We need only add that it was not, and could not be, disputed that the guidance which we have held could be derived from the enactment, and that it bears a reasonable and rational relationship to the object to be attained by the Act and, in fact, would fulfil the purpose which the law seeks to achieve, viz., the orderly elimination of slums, with interim protection for the slum dwellers until they were moved into better dwellings. Keeping in mind the scheme of the Act and the interpretation of section 19 as aforesaid, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is required to be appreciated. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court erroneously had interpretated that factors mentioned in sub-section (4)(a), (b) & (c) are to be considered as alternative and not consequetive. It is his contention that both these factors, namely, whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he is required to vacate and whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area are to be decided by the competent authority before granting or refusing the permission under sub-section (3) to institute the suit or the proceedings for obtaining any decree or order for eviction of a tenant from any building or any land in slum area or the permission to execute decree or order obtained in any suit or proceedings before the commencement of the Act. It is contended that the legislature has taken caution in using the word that competent authority shall taken into account following factors as mentioned in clauses (a), (b) & (c) of sub-section 4 before granting or refusing to grant such permission, hence, all factor are required to be taken into consideration jointly." The Supreme Court also observed that at present only two factors are required to be taken into consideration before granting or refusing to grant permission as contemplated by sub-section (3). Considering the provisions of section 19, it is apparent that permission to file suit for evicting a tenant from any building or land in a slum area or to permit execution of such decree or order obtained prior to coming into force of the amendment Act, the competent authority is required to take into account factors mentioned in clauses (a) & (b) of sub-section (4). If the factors mentioned in clause (a) is satisfied, that is to say, if the alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant is available, then there is no reason to hold that second factor is also required to be satisfied before granting permission under sub-section (3). In such a case, there could not be any justifiable reason for the competent authority to refuse to grant permission for filing the suit or proceedings for obtaining any decree or order for eviction of a tenant or for granting permission to execute decree or order, if obtained. Further, clause (b) provides that before granting such permission, the competent authority should be satisfied whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas and if it is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas, then permission for eviction can be granted. In such cases also, a tenant would not be put to any hardship if he is evicted. The reason is, if there is a scheme of clearance of the slum area framed by the competent authority, then as observed by this Court in the case of 'Jyoti Pershad's (supra), the policy of the enactment suggests that slum dwellers should not be evicted unless alternative accommodation could be obtained for him; that if the buildings or the entire area are to be ordered to be demolished, in that event, the dwellers would, of course, have to vacate, but it was presumed that alternative accommodation would necessarily have to be provided before any such order is made. It is true that for some time alternative accommodation may not be provided to the tenant but it is required to be provided within reasonable time. Eviction process and improvement or re-construction process is required to be carried out in an orderly fashion if the purpose of the act is to be fulfilled. Further, if the building is required by the owner for demolition or re-construction or improvement, then section 20A takes care of the tenants. It provides that if the tenant desires to be replaced in the occupation of the building after completion of the work of improvement or re-erection of the building, then he is required to file an application before the competent authority. On the basis of this section, if the tenant is evicted on the ground of improvement or demolition of the building in the slum area, then tenant is required to be provided accommodation in the improved or re-constructed building. Relevant part of section 20A is as under: 20A (1) Where a tenant in occupation of any building in a slum area vacates any building or is evicted therefrom on the ground that it was required for the purpose of executing any work of improvement or for the purpose of re-erection of the building, the tenant may within such time as may be prescribed, file a declaration with the competent authority that he desires to be replaced in occupation of the building after the completion of the work of improvement or re-erection of the building, as the case may be. (2) On receipt of such declaration, the competent authority shall by order require the owner of the building to furnish to it, within such time as may be prescribed, the plans of the work of improvement or re-erection of the building and estimates of the cost thereof and such other particulars as may be necessary and shall, on the basis of such plans and estimates and particulars, if any, furnished and having regard to the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 20B and after holding such inquiry as it may think fit, provisionally determine the rent that would be payable by the tenant if he were to be replaced in occupation of the building in pursuance of the declaration made by him under sub-section (1). 4.
The case has already been discussed above. In addition to the protection given to the tenant under the ordinary law against eviction by landlord under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Rent Control Legislation has imposed further restriction on the right of the landlord to evict the tenant (Let us take the example of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958). This fact is apparent from section 14(1) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. It starts with a non-substantic clause and puts bar on the eviction of the tenant despite lease having been determined. However that bar is lifted to some extent by the proviso to section 14(1), which provides that the order for recovery of possession of premises may be procured from the Controller on application made to him in the prescribed manner on any of the grounds mentioned therein. It is submitted that a tenant can be evicted from the premises only on the grounds mentioned in various clauses of the proviso to section 14(1), section 14A, section 14B, section 14C and section 14D. These rights and remedies of the landlord for eviction of the tenant from demised premises are further curtailed by the Slum Clearance Act (in short Act) because of section 19, which says that if the premises in question is situated in a slum area, as declared under section 3 of the Act, no suit or proceedings for obtaining any decree or order for eviction of the tenant would be instituted nor any decree or order obtained in any such suit or proceedings instituted before the commencement of the Act shall be executed unless and until permission in this regard is sought from the 'competent authority' under section 19(4) of the Act. Before granting or refusing permission, in this regard, the 'competent authority' shall take into account the following factors:- (a)whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted; (b)whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas;
These factors are alternative, exhaustive and mandatory. It is pertinent to mention here that these factors were incorporated in the Act by way of an amendment with effect from 27-2-1965 after the judgment of the Supreme Court delivered in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, in which constitutional validity of the unamended section 19 of the Act was upheld. In reply to the challenge to the said section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act, being violative of article 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India, it was held that there were sufficient guidelines in various provisions of the Act to guide the 'competent authority' at the time of exercising its discretion. In regard to the challenge qua right to property, it was held by the Supreme Court that even this challenge is not sustainable because keeping in mind the object of the Act the restrictins imposed on that right are reasonable and as such fall within the domain of article 19(5) of the Constitution of India.
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