Ans. Section 30 of the Evidence Act, provides that when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who make such confession.
Thus in the instant problem the confession of Raju can be taken into consideration as against Sadhu Ram and Raju as they are tried jointly. But the confession made by Rakesh may not be taken into consideration by the Court as he is not tried jointly with Sadhu Ram and Raju. (Illustration to section 30)
But it is to be noted that the confession of a co-accused can be used only in support of other evidence and cannot be made the foundation of a conviction, nor can it be called in aid to supplement evidence and in no case can it be used to fill-up the gaps in the prosecution evidence; Indra Mohan v. State of Assam, 1982 Cr LJ (NOC) 127 (Gau).
Ans. No, the statement of Sanjay cannot be admitted as an evidence against Pravin because section 60 of the Evidence Act provides that oral evidence must, in all cases, be direct, that is to say, if it relates to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw it.
Here in the instant case, whatever Sanjay had deposed was told to him by Babin and Sanjay himself did not see Pravin murdering Ratan Seth. This type of evidence is called hearsay evidence and such evidence is not admissible as evidence.
Thus when a witness testifies as to the information having been given to him by another and the latter is not examined, the testimony of the witness is not admissible being hearsay; State (Collector, Central Excise) v. Papas Kumar Shome, 1985 Cr LJ 871: 1984 (2) Crimes 190: 1984 (58) Cut LT 127: 1985 (5) ECC 23: MANU/OR/0209/1984 : 1984 (18) ELT 278 (Ori).
Ans. Yes, as per section 14 of the Evidence Act, the fact is relevant.
Section 14 of the Evidence Act provides that facts showing the state of mind like intention, ill-will etc. are relevant. Further, Explanation 1 of this section states that existence of state of mind should not be general but regarding a particular matter which is in question.
In the present problem, the act of Naresh of defaming Ramesh by publishing a statement on a previous occasion, shows the ill-will on the part of Naresh towards Ramesh. It proves Naresh's intention to harm Ramesh's reputation by the particular publication in question. Thus this fact is relevant under section 14 read with Explanation 1.
Ans. Section 25 of the Evidence Act provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. Section 26 provides that no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer shall be proved as against such person, unless it should be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.
However, section 27 of the Evidence Act lays down that when any fact is discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Whether it amounts to a confession or not. Thus under section 27, an information which even if amounted to a confession and was made to a police officer under any circumstances, so much of the information as strictly relates to the discovery of facts is admissible as evidence. In Bodh Raj v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 2002 SC 316: AIR 2002 SC 3164: 2002 Cr LJ 4664: 2002 AIR SCW 3655: 2002 (4) Crimes 182: MANU/SC/0723/2002 : (2002) 8 SCC 45: 2002 (4) SCJ 128: 2002 (5) SLT 111: 2002 (8) SRJ 477: (2002) 6 SCALE 266: 2003 SCC (Cri) 201: 2002 (6) Supreme 132, it was held that the exact information given by the accused which leads to discovery of the incriminating article may be proved against such person and such information can become the basis of convicting the accused. In Delhi Administration v. Balakrishan, MANU/SC/0093/1971 : AIR 1972 SC 3: 1972 Cr LJ 1: 1972 (1) SCJ 347: 1972 Mad LJ (Cri) 205: MANU/SC/0093/1971 : (1972) 4 SCC 659, the apex Court held that a statement even by way of confession made in the police custody which distinctly relates to facts discovered is admissible in evidence against the accused.
In the instant problem, the portion of the statement, "the knife by which I killed Ramesh" is admissible in evidence.
Ans. Section 91 of the Evidence Act provides that when the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the term of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible.
Section 65(c) provides that secondary evidence may be given of the existing condition or contents of a document when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time.
Thus in the instant problem oral evidence as to the contents of the lease deed is not admissible as evidence, under section 91 of the Evidence Act, because the term of the lease was reduced to writing and for proving the contents thereof, the lease deed must be produced in original.
Secondly, as the lease deed which was in possession of Amar is lost, the secondary evidence as to the contents thereof can be produced by taking recourse to section 65(c) of the Act and Gautam may obtain a certified copy of the lease deed from the Registration Department and produce the same as secondary evidence in the Court.
Ans. No, the evidence produced by the defence Counsel to show that Gopalaswami is a dishonest man is not admissible as evidence under section 153 of the Evidence Act.
Section 153 of the Act provides that when a witness has been asked and has answered any question which is relevant to the inquiry only in so far as it tends to shake his credit by injuring his character, no evidence shall be given to contradict him, but if he answers falsely, he may afterwards be charged with giving false evidence.
This section is based on the principle that, if questions are allowed to asked merely to discredit a witness by injuring his character, it will result in the introduction of matters altogether foreign to the enquiry, and that if controversy about the matters so introduced is allowed, the court would be occupied with deciding not the merits of the case but merits of the witness and, thus the suit might be indefinitely protracted. (Batuk Lal, Law of Evidence).
Ans. Section 112 of the Evidence Act provides that the fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within 280 days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.
Thus under section 112 of the Act the point of time of birth of the child is made the deciding factor in determining the legitimacy of the child and not the time of conception; Palani v. Sethu, MANU/TN/0712/1924 : AIR 1924 Mad 677. Under section 112 of the Act, the presumption of legitimacy is conclusive even if birth takes place so soon after marriage that the child must have begotten before it. In such a case the marriage inspite of the fact of pregnancy is considered as an acknowledgement that the child to be born is the husband's.
Thus in the instant problem Anil is legally the father of the child.
Ans. No, Ramakant will not succeed because section 116 of the Evidence Act lays down that no tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property.
In Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh, AIR 1915 PC 96, the Privy Council observed that a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord's title, however, defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord. Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in many cases. In a very recent case Bhogadi Kannababu v. Vuggina Pydamma, MANU/SC/2687/2006 : (2006) 5 SCC 532: AIR 2006 SC 2403: 2006 AIR SCW 3052: 2006 (2) Cur CC 293: 2006 (3) JCR SC 101: MANU/SC/2687/2006 : (2006) 5 SCC 532: 2006 (6) SCJ 414: 2006 (6) SRJ 236: (2006) 5 SCALE 642: 2006 (4) Supreme 329, the Supreme Court held that even if the landlord does not have any title to the rented property, he can maintain an application for eviction and obtain a decree/order of eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent and sub-letting.
Ans. No, the court must not record the evidence of Pushpita against Anant, because section 126 of the Evidence Act lays down that no barrister, attorney, pleader or vakil shall at any time be permitted to disclose any communication made to him by his client during the course and for the purpose of his professional employment.
In the present case Anant communicated to Pushpita regarding the rape committed by him on Rakhi, during the course and for the purpose of employment of Pushpita as his counsel. Therefore under section 126 of the Evidence Act, Pushpita must not be allowed to give evidence against Anant. Here it is immaterial that in view of the Advocate (i.e. Pushpita), the offence of rape is a serious crime under IPC and capital punishment should be awarded to a rapist.
Ans. Section 101 of the Evidence Act lays down that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.
In the present case, it is Vineet who asserts that he was adopted by Raghubir Prasad and by reason of such adoption, he became entitled to half of the property of late Raghubir Prasad. Therefore, the onus of proof lies on Vineet to show that he was adopted by Raghubir Prasad and not on Smt. Narayani to show that he was not so adopted by the said Raghubir Prasad.
Ans. In a case before a court, the Court concerned takes a lenient view of all the facts, circumstances and evidence corroborating the charges framed by police and allegations made in F.I.R. etc., in a Criminal Case. Then it comes to conclusion on the basis of both criminal laws and constitutionalism keeping in mind the justice to parties.
In this case, the different juridical. Senses and issues are required to be examined by the Court concerned.
Normally, it is not in practice to consider each and every individual evidence available. Hence the court has to make an exception in this case since it involves certain alleged odious deeds of few individuals.
In order to import full and impartial justice the exception is must. Further the criminal jurisprudence entails that a thorough appreceation of records needs to be done in order to do a complete justice.
Again in a criminal trial, evidence of the eye witness requires a careful assessment and must be evaluated for its credibility. Since the fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon the stated principle that "no man is guilty until proven so", hence it most caution is required to be exercised in dealing with situations where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the Court. There must be a string that should join the evidence of all the witnesses and thereby satisfying the test of consistency in evidence amongst all witnesses. It is also fact that in criminal jurisprudence the evidence has to be evaluated on the touch stone of consistency. Such consistency is the keyword for upholding the conviction of accused.
In case of Suraj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 11 SCR 286: AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 631, may be referred here in this case. Where the court observed that:
"The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story, consistency with the account of other witness is held to be creditworthy. The probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation."
Hence on all these grounds in this case of insolvency of large number of accused and large number of witness, the court has to prosecute only the accused person, all the facts and circumstance have been proved in the scale of corroborative evidence of the witnesses and at the same time to acquit to them against whom, the benefit of doubt supports and allegations are not proved in full and final extent.
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