The law relating to joint liability or group liability has been elaborately dealt with and covered by sections 34, 149, 120A and 120B of the Code. The doctrine of combination in crime is, that when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose win contributed to the wrong doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone1.
Section 34, I.P.C. says:
When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
Section 34 of the Code creates no specific offence. It only intends to cover situations in which a criminal act is committed by several persons; and it is not easy to demarcate the extent and quantum of participation by each one of such several persons. In such a situation it was considered proper that all such persons be declared liable for the criminal act done by them jointly. This section embodies the principle of joint liability in the doing of criminal act, the essence of joint liability being the existence of a 'common intention'.
'Common intention' should not be confused with 'similar intention'; it means 'intention common to all. To come within the mischief of this section the following ingredients must be present:
(a) there must be a common intention to commit a crime;
(b) such act must be committed in furtherance of the common intention; (c) such act must result in the commission of a crime;
(d) such common intention must be common to two or more persons;
(e) such persons (more than two or more) must have done the act or must have participated in the commission of that act.
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1. Bishop's Commentaries on Criminal Law (Vol. 1).
Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the section is the element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises under section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was a plan or meeting of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of section 34, be it prearranged or on the spur of the moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true contents of the section are that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself; Harbans Singh v. State of Haryana, MANU/SC/0170/2005 : AIR 2005 SC 2989.
In Mahboob Shah v. Emperor, 721 IA 148 (PC): MANU/PR/0013/1945 : AIR 1945 PC 118 the following principles were laid down by the court:
(i) Under section 34 of the Penal Code, essence of liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention, animating the accused, leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention.
(ii) To invoke the aid of section 34 successfully, it must be shown that the Criminal act complained against was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention; if this is so then liability for the crime may be imposed on any one of the persons in the same manner as if the acts were done by him alone.
(iii) Common intention within the meaning of section 34 implies a prearranged plan, and to convict the accused of an offence applying the section it should be proved that the criminal act was done pursuant to the prearranged plan.
(iv) It is difficult, if not impossible, to procure direct evidence to prove the intention of an individual, in most cases it has to be inferred from his act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case.
(v) Care must be taken not to confuse same or similar intention with common intention; the partition which divides "their bounds" is often very thin; nevertheless, the distinction is real and substantial and if overlooked will result in miscarriage of justice.
(vi) The inference of common intention within the meaning of the term under section 34 should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deductible from the circumstances of the case.
In Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana, 1999 Cr LJ 1634 (SC) it was held that to apply section 34, I.P.C., apart from the fact that there should be two or more accused, two factors must be established:--
(i) Common intention, and
(ii) Participation of the accused in the commission of an offence. If the common intention is proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual accused, section 34 will be attracted as essentially it involves vicarious liability, but if participation of the accused in crime is proved and common intention is absent, section 34 cannot be invoked. In every case it is not possible to have direct evidence of common intention. It has to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case.
The principle of joint-liability arises out of common intention followed by an act in furtherance of such common intention. This is clearly illustrated by the well-known case Mahboob Shah v. Emperor, 721 IA 148 (PC): MANU/PR/0013/1945 : AIR 1945 PC 118, wherein one Allah Dad was shot dead by a bullet from the gun used by one of the accused who came to rescue their cousin who had been attacked by Allah Dad and shouted for help. The two accused were armed with guns, and each one of them aimed at two different individuals shot from the gun of Wali Shah, the latter only received injuries from a bullet shot by Mahboob Shah. (See the case in detail, infra). Of the three accused, Wali Shah, whose shot killed Allah Dad absconded and could not be brought to trial, and the other two were prosecuted for murder under section 302 read with section 34, I.P.C. The Sessions Judge convicted him of the offence and sentenced him to death. On appeal, their Lordships of the Lahore High Court held that the case fell within the ambit of section 34, and as to their "common intention", it was said that "common intention to commit the crime which was eventually committed by Mahboob Shah and Wali Shah came into being when Ghulam Qasim Shah shouted to his companions to come to his rescue and both of them emerged from behind the bushes and fired from their respective guns."
Their Lordships of the Privy Council however disagreed with the view of the judges of the High Court. In their opinion there was no evidence of common intention to the evidence that the appellant "just have been acting in concert with Wali Shah pursuance of a concerted plan when he along with him rushed to the help of Ghulam Qasim". In their view the common intention of both was to rescue Ghulam Qasim and both of them picked up different individuals to deal with. Evidence is lacking to show that there was any pre-mediation to bring about the murder of Allah Dad. At the most, they can be stated to have "similar intention but similar intention is different from 'common intention' and one should not be confused with the other.
Their Lordships, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence of the offence of murder imposed by the High Court.
In Vithal Laxman Chalawadi v. State of Karnataka, MANU/SC/0861/2010 : AIR 2011 SC 173, the Supreme Court held that where the appellant with two person objected to construction of drain. Evidence shown that three appellants armed with gandasi and other two with dangs caused injuries to deceased. Evidence of Doctor proved
that accused had used blunt side of Gandasi. So prior intention confirmed. Appeal dismissed and Supreme Court upheld the life imprisonment which was given by the High Court.
In Satyavir Singh Rathi v. State, MANU/SC/0546/2011 : AIR 2011 SC 1748 the Supreme Court held that where the police officials killed innocent victims on account of common intention to kill a hard core wanted criminal without any identity as criminals. Specific role to each individual accused police party as the firing at car was undoubtedly with a clear intent to annihilate those. No appeal by state against deemed acquitted for offence under section 302/307, 34. The modification of conviction to one under 302/307, 34 by High Court is proper. In furtherance of the common intention of all accused police officials liable to conviction under section 300/34.
In Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, MANU/SC/0048/1954 : AIR 1955 SC 216: 1955 Cr LJ 572 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that it is well established that a common intention presupposes prior concert. It requires a pre-arranged plan because before a person can be vicariously convicted for the crirninal act of another, the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all. The inference of common intention should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the circumstances of the case. The incriminating facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation on any other reasonable hypothesis.
In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Rohan Singh, 1996 Cr LJ 2884 (SC) the Supreme Court relied on the view of this court in Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, MANU/SC/0048/1954 : AIR 1955 SC 216: 1955 Cr LJ 572, and observed that: "Common intention necessarily implies a pre-arranged plan or prior concert or prior meetings of minds. Thus there is a sharing of the purpose, which is lacking in a case where several persons have the 'same or similar intention'. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and each can have the same intention, namely, the intention to kill, and each can individually inflict a separate fatal blow and yet none would have the common intention required by the section because there was no prior meeting of minds to form a pre-arranged plan".
The issue of liability of different members of a group of people divided into mutually antagonistic or hostile groups, especially when there is free fight between them, is one of the most difficult aspects of joint-liability. In Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/0385/1995 : AIR 1995 SC 1956 a similar question was raised, wherein four persons, each belonging to two groups attacked each other and in the result one person died. Both the trial court and the High Court had held that there was a free fight and every assailant was accountable for his own individual acts committed. However, the Supreme Court held that, in a free fight, there was a movement of body of the victims and assailants and in such a situation it will be difficult to specifically ascribe to one accused the intention to cause injuries sufficient to cause death.
Participation is a necessary element or condition precedent to a finding of joint-liability. The Supreme Court in Kantian Ramayya Munipally v. State of
Bombay, MANU/SC/0050/1954 : AIR 1955 SC 287 observed that, it is the essence of the section 34 that the person must be physically present at the actual commission of the crime. He need not be present in the actual spot, he can, for instance, stand guard by a gate outside ready to warn his companions about any approach of danger or wait in a car on a nearby road ready to facilitate their escape, but he must be physically present at the scene of the occurrence and must actually participate in the commission of the offence in some way or the other at the time the crime is actually committed.
Section 149, I.P.C. provides:
If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.
This section covers such cases in which several members of an unlawful assembly may be held guilty of an offence if their 'object' is the same though all of them may not have actually participated in doing of that act.
To invoke section 149, I.P.C., the following ingredients must be present:
(a) There must be an unlawful assembly. What is an unlawful assembly has been explained below;
(b) There must be five or more persons forming such an unlawful assembly;
(c) There must be some common object of such an unlawful assembly. Here the word "common" must be distinguished from "similar"; it means "common to all and known to the rest of them and also shared by them".
(d) There must be a commission of an offence by anyone or more members of such unlawful assembly.
(e) The commission of such offence by anyone or more members of such unlawful assembly must be in the prosecution of the common object shared by all and each one of the members of such unlawful assembly;
(f) The offence committed in prosecution of a common object must be such that each one of the members of such unlawful assembly knew was likely to be committed in the prosecution of the common object.
Section 141, I.P.C. defines for 'unlawful assembly' in the following words:
In Sajjan Sharma v. State of Bihar, MANU/SC/0020/2011 : AIR 2011 SC 632, the Supreme Court held that where firing by unlawful assembly on a villager. Appellant lives in same village as informant but no name in FIR. Appellant's father and brother who seenas members of unlawful assembly were named in FIR. Appellant identified at time of incident but no particular role assigned. Evidence of witness also as one of members of unlawful assembly. Court can't relied upon evidence so appellant acquitted giving benefit of doubt.
In Shaji v. State of Kerala, MANU/SC/0544/2011 : AIR 2011 SC 1825, the Supreme Court held that where Murder committed by members of unlawful assembly with arms. Medical evidence showing that injury caused by that member was fatal. All members were not armed. So insufficient to prove common object. Conviction of other accused with aid of section 149 were Improper.
An assembly of five or more persons is designated an "unlawful assembly", if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is--
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First- |
To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or |
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Second.-- |
To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or |
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Third.-- |
To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or |
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Fourth.-- |
By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or |
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Fifth.-- |
By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do. |
Explanation.--
An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly.
An assembly of five or more than five persons, combined for one or the other purposes indicated in section 141, is declared in law an 'lawful assembly'.
In Mizaji v. State of Uttar Pradesh, MANU/SC/0040/1958 : AIR 1959 SC 572 it was held that section 149 has two parts. The liability of a member of an unlawful assembly may arise for an offence committed by any member of the assembly in two ways. The first is where the other member commits an offence, which was in fact the object of the assembly. The second is where the common object to commit an offence was different from the offence which was actually committed:
(a) The accused X, Y, Z, J and K were alleged to have entered into A's house in order to get forceable possession of the house. With the lathis they were carrying, grave injuries were inflicted on A's limb and he was dragged out of his house to some distance where either J or K shot him dead with a hidden pistol. Advise on the group liability of the persons involved in the case.
(b) A, B, C, D and E armed with a handgun, a spear, a lathi, a sword, and a knife respectively with the common object of taking forcible possessionof land from M, N or 0 enter on the land in their possession. The latter who are in possession try to checkmate instruction and in the fight A alone fires and O is killed. Decide the liability of A, E, C, D and E for the killing of O and refer to precedents.
In such a case the member not actually committing the offence will be liable for that offence only if he knew that such offence was likely to be committed in the course of the prosecution of the common object to commit the offence originally thought of.
The expression "know" does not mean a mere possibility, such as might or might not happen, it imports a high degree of probability. Further, it indicates a state of mind at the time of the commission of the offence and not the knowledge acquired in the light of subsequent events. Under section 149, the liability of the other members for the offence committed during the continuance of the occurrence rests upon the fact whether the other members knew before hand that the offence actually committed was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. Such knowledge may reasonably be collected from the nature of the assembly, arms or behaviour, at or before the scene of action; Gajanand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, MANU/SC/0173/1954 : AIR 1954 SC 695.
Section 149 of Indian Penal Code postulates an assembly of five or more persons having a common object i.e., one of those named in section 141, I.P.C. and then doing of the act as by the members of it in prosecution of that object. The basis of constructive guilt under section 149 is mere membership of an unlawful assembly. Under section 149, if the accused is a member of an unlawful assembly, the common object of which is to commit a certain crime, and such a crime is committed by one or more of the members of that assembly, every person who happens to be a member of that assembly would be liable for the commission of the crime being a member of it irrespective of the fact whether he has actually committed the criminal act or not. There is a distinction between the common object and common intention. The common object need not require prior concert and a common meeting of minds before the attack, and an unlawful object can develop after the assembly gathered before the commission of the crime at the spot itself. There need not be prior meeting of the mind. It would be enough that the members of the assembly which constitutes five or more persons, have common object and that they acted as an assembly to achieve that object. In substance, section 149 makes every member of the common unlawful assembly responsible as a member for the act of each and all, merely because he is a member of the unlawful assembly with common object to be achieved by such an unlawful assembly. At the same time, one has to keep in mind that mere presence in the unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object and that is shared by that person. The common object has to be found and can be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case; Rabindra Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, I (2006) CCR 44 (SC).
Though sections 34 and 149, I.P.C. seem to overlap, yet there is a marked difference between the two.
(a) Section 34 does not create an offence, it merely lays down a rule of law; section 149 creates a definite offence and deals with the punishment of that offence alone. Thus being a member of unlawful assembly is by itself an offence.
(b) Under section 34 common intention is the decisive test, whereas in section 149 common object of the members of an unlawful assembly must be established.
(c) Participation or presence in the criminal act is essential to fix liability under section 34. Membership (not necessarily presence) is the foundation of the liability under section 149.
(d) Section 34 requires two or more persons involved in the commission of the offence. Section 149 requires five or more persons of an unlawful assembly in the commission of an offence.
(e) Section 34 provides for 'common intention' which requires a preconcerted plan or agreement; whereas section 149 speaks about 'common object' does not necessarily require any pre-concert.
A criminal conspiracy is the agreement of two or more persons to do an illegal act or to do a legal act by illegal means. Sections 120A and 120B, I.P.C. deal with criminal conspiracy. While section 120A defines 'crirninal conspiracy', section 120B provides punishment for this offence.
Section 120A reads:
When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,--
(1) an illegal act, or
(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.
Explanation.--
It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.
In Sushil Suri v. CBI, MANU/SC/0563/2011 : AIR 2011 SC 1713, the Supreme Court held that where two Chartered Accountants had dishonestly and fraudulently opened several fictitious accounts in some banks with an intention and object to facilitate of bank finance for the purpose other than stated in the loan application. Accused persons submitted to the bank, fake and forged invoices of fictitious/non-existent supplier. Essential ingredient of criminal conspiracy is agreement to commit offence between accused. Commission of crime alone enough to bring about a conviction under section 120B. Appellant with Directors and Chartered Accountant defrauded revenue and in the process cheated the public exchequer of crores of rupees and were convicted under section 120B, 420, 409, 471 of IPC.
In State (C.B.I./S.I.T.) v. Nalini, (1999) 5 Supreme 60 (Rajiv Gandhi murder case) the apex Court held that an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act amounts to criminal conspiracy. The illegal act may or may notbe done in pursuance of the agreement but the very agreement is an offence and is punishable. Everyone of the conspirator need not have taken active part in the commission of each and every one of the conspiratorial acts for the offence of conspiracy to be made out. The prosecution need not necessarily prove what the perpetrators expressly agreed to do and/or caused to be done the illegal act. The agreement may be proved by necessary implication, under section 120B, I.P.C. In the impugned case the accused were charged and convicted under section 120B read with section 302, I.P.C. by the designated Court. The accused appealed to the apex Court to set aside the conviction.
The ingredients of section 120A, I.P.C. are as stated below:
(1) There should be an agreement between two or more persons who are alleged to conspire;
(2) The agreement should be to do or cause to be done:
(i) an illegal act1, or
(ii) an act which may not itself be illegal but be done by illegal means.
The word 'illegal' is defined in section 43 of the Code as 'applicable to everything which is an offence, or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action'; and a person is said to be 'legally bound to do whatever it is illegal in him to omit'.
Reading sections 43 and 120A together it would appear that two or more persons would be guilty of a criminal conspiracy whenever they agree to do or cause to be done acts, which are an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code or any special or local law, or which are prohibited by law, or which furnish ground for civil action. Leaving the case of punishable offences or other acts prohibited by law aside, acts which might furnish ground for a civil action may be either (a) breaches of contract, or (b) wrongs independent of contract, committed by an individual acting alone or by two or more persons acting in combination. A wrongful act must necessarily be so in two or more acting in concert.
In Bimbadhar Pradhan v. State of Orissa, MANU/SC/0024/1956 : AIR 1956 SC 469 the apex Court observed that, it is not necessary that each one of the conspirators should be aware of the acts done by any of conspirators during the course of the conspiracy. The acts done by any of conspirators in furtherance of the purpose the conspiracy are relevant as merely indicative of what the object of the conspiracy was. What is relevant is that there should be one conspiracy to which specific persons were parties and not series or conspiracies, for the liability of each conspirator has to be fixed in relation to the particular conspiracy entered into by him with the others.
Section 120B punishes for the offence of 'criminal conspiracy' in the following manner:
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1. See section 43 for definition of 'act'.
(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.
This section has classified conspiracy into two classes for the purpose of punishment. The first class is, where the conspiracy is to commit an offence of serious nature i.e., offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life etc. The second class covers conspiracy to commit offences other than those covered under the first category.
In Manjit Singh v. CBI, MANU/SC/0067/2011 : AIR 2011 SC 806, the Supreme Court held that where three accused were being tried by the Designated Court (TADA) and confession of the accused charged for the offence under the TADA act. Recording information about commission of an offence under TADA and Investigation handed over to CBI by State Government accused role as king pin and co-accused committed offence. There is incriminating evidence against accused. Intention of accused was not to cause terror but to prevent information regarding another crime so dismissal of charges by TADA Court. Supreme Court upheld the conviction of accused under section 302, 120B IPC.
In Nandu Rastogi v. State of Bihar, MANU/SC/0851/2002 : (2002) 8 SCC 9 the appellants in the appeals, namely Nandu Rastogi @ Nandji Rastogi and Bal Mukund Rastogi are brothers. They along with one Jagdish Chamar and Mohan Singh were put up for trial before the additional sessions judge. Rohtas who found the appellants and Jagdish Chamar guilty of the offence under section 302/34, I.P.C. and under section 27 of the Arms Act but acquitted Mohan Singh.
They preferred three appeals before the High Court but by a common judgment and order, the High Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed their conviction and sentence. The case came before the Supreme Court.
Decision of the Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court referred to the decision of the SC in Suresh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, wherein it has been observed that, to attract the applicability of section 34 of the Code, the prosecution is under an obligation to establish that mere existed a common intention which requires a prearranged plan because a man can only be variously convicted for the criminal act of another, if it must have been done in furtherance of common intention.
The apex Court further observed:
"To attract the section 34, I.P.C. it is not necessary that each one of the accused must assault the deceased. It is enough if it is shown that they shared a common intention to commit the offence and in furtherance there of each one played his assigned role by doing separate acts, similar or diverse. We, therefore, entertain no doubt that all the five persons who come to the shop of the informant had a common intention to commit the murder of Shankar Rastogi and they acted pursuant to a prearranged plan. Thefacts clearly are consistent with the hypothesis of their acting in furtherance of a common intention. They have, therefore, rightly convicted with the aid of section 34, I.P.C.
In Chandra Bihari Gautam v. State of Bihar, MANU/SC/0322/2002 : (2002) 9 SCC 208 the appellants accompanied by 300-400 persons, armed with deadly weapons like guns, attacked the house of Ganesh Singh. Bholi was shot dead and Nawlesh Singh, Shiv Narain Singh, Kedar Singh, Sanjay Singh and Ajay Kumar were burnt alive inside the room where they were hiding.
The trial court convicted the three accused under section 302 of the I.P.C., and sentenced to death.
The High Court upheld the conviction of the three accused but sentence awarded to them was committed from death sentence to imprisonment for life. They preferred the appeals to the Supreme Court.
Decision of the Supreme Court: It was observed that, section 149 has two parts, first part deals with the commission of an offence by a member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly and the second part deals with the liability of the members of the unlawful assembly who knew that an offence was likely to be committed in prosecution of the object for which they had assembled. In the present case, the appellants, along with others, have been proved to have formed an unlawful assembly, the common object of which was to commit murder and arson and in prosecution of the said common object they raided the house of the informant, armed with guns and committed the offence. The appellants were also proved to have hired the services of some extremists for the purpose of eliminating the family of the complainant.
In the instant case, the prosecution established the existence of the common object of the unlawful assembly for attracting the applicability of section 149 of the I.P.C. and the mere fact that no overt act had been attributed to each of the accused persons was not sufficient to hold that charge under section 149 of the I.P.C. had not been proved against them.
It was held that the appellants had been rightly convicted for the commission of various offences and hence their appeals were dismissed.
In Nallabothu Venkaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, MANU/SC/0692/2002 : (2002) 7 SCC 117 the accused formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and caused the death of the deceased by hurling bombs and causing bodily injuries by axes, knives and spears.
The trial court convicted the accused 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 under section 302 read with section 149, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life.
The High Court, confirmed the conviction of the accused 1 under section 302, I.P.C. The present appeal has been preferred by accused 1, the appellant.
Issue before the Supreme Court: Whether the appellant could be convicted under section 302, I.P.C. (simpilicitor) without aid of section 149, I.P.C. in the absence of substantive charge under section 302, I.P.C.?
Decision of the Supreme Court: On an analytical reading of a catera of decisions of this court, the following broad propositions of law clearly emerges:--
(a) The conviction under section 302 simplicitor without the aid of section 149 is permissible if overt act is attributed to the accused resulting in the fatal injury which is independently sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased and is supported by medical evidence;
(b) Wrongful acquittal recorded by the High Court, even if it is stood, that circumstances would not impede the conviction of the appellant under section 302 read with section 149, I.P.C.; (c) Charge under section 302 read with the aid of section 149 could be converted into one under section 302 read with section 34 if the criminal act done by several persons less then five in number in furtherance of common intention is proved.
It was held that the acquittal of the other accused rendered by the High Court, was wrong and based on misappreciation of record clearly establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt for causing the death of the deceased.
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