No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all the cases and contingencies that may possibly arise, and it is an established principle that courts must possess inherent powers from the express provisions of law, which are necessary to their existence and the proper discharge of duties imposed upon them by law. Section 482 of the Code confers no increased power on the High Court which it did not possess before. It merely safeguards all existing inherent powers possessed by a High Court, necessary, among other purposes, to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section 482 Cr PC are to be exercised in making orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482 reads:
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
In Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, MANU/SC/8149/2007 : AIR 2008 SC 527, the Supreme Court held that section 482 of Cr PC does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court; (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res itsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a Court of Appeal or Revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the power, Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage; Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, II (2006) CCR 137 (SC); Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, III (1992) CCR 326 (SC): MANU/SC/0532/1992 : 1992 (4) SCC 305, and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, MANU/SC/0061/1963 : AIR 1964 SC 1.
Exercise of power under section 482 of the Cr PC in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Cr PC. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Court. All Courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, contcedere videtur et id sine qua res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exists. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the report, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto; State of Orissa v. Saroj Kr. Sahoo, IV (2005) CCR 299 (SC).
In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/0086/1960 : AIR 1960 SC 866, the Apex Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the First Information Report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirely do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Cr PC, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an inquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it, accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment, Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under section 482 of the Cr PC and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhanan Lal, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335; the observations of the case have been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Saroj Kr. Sahoo, IV (2005) CCR 299 (SC). A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:
"(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirity do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156(1) of the Cr PC except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of section 155(2) of the Cr PC.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under section 155(2) of the Cr PC.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so-absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Cr PC or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings or where there is a specific provision in the Cr PC or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for weaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
The power under section 482, Cr PC cannot be invoked to prevent the trial of the petitioners/accused solely by referring to the overt act played by the accused as spoken to by the witnesses in the case of the co-accused and his Court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 482, Cr PC quash the proceedings and prevent the trial.
In Moosa v. Sub-Inspector of Police, II (2006) CCR 445 (FB); their Lordships of the Hon'ble High Court with reference to the observation of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; State of West Bengal v. S.K. Guha, MANU/SC/0120/1982 : 1982 (1) SCC 561; T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, AIR 2001 SC 2637 summarized the legal position as follows:
(i) The inherent powers of the High Court reserved and recognized under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are sweeping and awesome; but such powers can be invoked only-
(a) to give effect to any order passed under the Code of Criminal Procedure; or
(b) to prevent abuse of process of any Court; or
(c) otherwise to secure the ends of justice,
Such powers may have to be exercised in an appropriate case to render justice even beyond the law;
(ii) Considering the nature, width and amplitude of the powers, it would be unnecessary, inexpedient and imprudent to prescribe or stipulate any strait-jacket formula to identify cases where such powers can or need not be invoked.
(iii) But such powers can be invoked only in exceptional and rare cases and cannot be invoked as a matter of course. Where the Code provides methods and procedures to deal with the given situation, in the absence of exceptional and compelling reasons, invocation of the powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not necessary or permissible.
(iv) The fact that an accused can seek discharge/dropping of proceedings/acquittal under the relevant provisions of the Code in the normal course would certainly be a justifiable reason, in the absence of exceptional and compelling reasons, for the High Court not invoking its extraordinary powers under section 482, Cr PC.
(v) In a trial against the co-accused the prosecution is not called upon, nor is it expected to adduce evidence against the absconding co-accused. In such trial the prosecution cannot be held to have the opportunity or obligation to adduce all evidence against the absconding co-accused. The fact that the testimony of a witness was not accepted or acted upon in the trial against the co-accused is no reason to assume that he shall not tender incriminating evidence or that his evidence will not be accepted in such later trial.
(vi) On the basis of materials placed before the High Court in proceedings under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (which materials can be placed before the Court in appropriate proceedings before the subordinate Courts) such extraordinary inherent powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot normally be invoked, unless such materials are of an unimpeachable nature which can be translated into legal evidence in the course of trial.
(vii) The judgment of acquittal of a co-accused in a criminal trial is not admissible under sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act to bar the subsequent trial of the absconding co-accused and cannot hence be reckoned as a relevant document while considering the prayer to quash the proceedings under section 482 Cr PC. Such judgments will be admissible only to show as to who were the parties in the earlier proceedings or the factum of acquittal.
(viii) While considering the prayer for invocation of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction to serve the ends of justice, it is perfectly permissible for the Court to consider the bona fides - the cleanliness of the hands of the seeker. If he is a fugitive from justice having absconded or jumped bail without sufficient reason or having waited for manipulation of hostility of witnesses, such improper conduct would certainly be a justifiable reason for the Court to refuse to invoke its powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(ix) The fact that the co-accused have secured acquittal in the trial against them in the absence of absconding co-accused cannot by itself be reckoned as a relevant circumstances while considering invocation of the powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(x) A judgment not inter partes cannot justify the invocation of the doctrine of issue estoppel under the Indian Law at present.
(xi) Conscious of the above general principles, the High Court has to consider in each case whether the powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deserve to be invoked. Judicial wisdom, sagacity, sobriety and circumspection have to be pressed into service to identify that rare and exceptional case where invocation of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction is warranted to bring about premature termination of the proceedings subject of course to the general principles narrated above.
In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, MANU/SC/0027/2002 : 2002 (3) SCC 89, the fact of the case was that, the Inspector of Police (Fraud Squad) submitted a charge-sheet against the respondents in the aforesaid case allegation commission of offences punishable under sections 465, 468, 471 and 420 read with section 120B of the IPC. On receipt of complaint made by COD, the cognizance was taken by the CIM, fumkur.
Respondents filed application before the Karnataka High Court under section 482 of the Cr PC, 1973. The High Court observed that there was no definite evidence to show that the accused respondents were directly involved.
Aggrieved by the said order quashing of the proceedings, this appeal has been filed on behalf of the State of Karnataka.
It was observed that, while exercising power under section 482 of the Cr PC, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debite justifiable to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceedings if it finds initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise defeat the ends of justice when no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact.
The court further observed: "If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance, has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in the exercise of the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole if as it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complaint that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexations, in that even there would be no justification for interference by the High Court.
In S.M. Seshagiri v. State of Andhra Pradesh, MANU/SC/0068/2008 : AIR 2008 SC 787, the Supreme Court held that the High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to interfere with the investigation and/or trail of criminal cases and should not shall the investigation and/or prosecution. However, if the High Court is satisfied that the complaint does not disclose commission of any offence or prosecution is barred by limitation or that the proceedings of criminal case would result in failure of justice, then it may exercise inherent power under section 482 of Cr PC. In N. Naveen Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, MANU/SC/8147/2008 : AIR 2009 SC 241, it was held that section 482 Cr PC did not empower the Court to review its own judgment by exercising inherent powers.
© Universal law Publishing Co.