Q.
Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 deals with stay of suits. According to this glaring provision, no court of competent jurisdiction shall proceed with the trial of any such suit in which the matter in issue (directly and substantially) is pending already before a competent court of same jurisdiction, the subsequent trial of the suit is put under veil, i.e., is abated.
Section 10 reads thus:
"No court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court."
So, if we read the statutory provision of section 10 and interpret it in liberal way we find that a subsequent filed suit may be stayed if:
(i) the subsequent suit is directly and substantially in issue related to the previously filed suit; and
(ii) title, issue and parties are the same; and
(iii) the suit is filed before a competent court of same jurisdiction or having competent jurisdiction to try such suits either within the limits of India or outside India or before the Supreme Court.
The basic object of this provision is to prevent the courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously entertaining and adjudicating upon two parallel litigations in respect of the same issue, cause-of-action, same subject-matter and the relief prayed for. The policy is to bring down the unnecessary workloads of the courts and also to prevent the multiplicity of frivolous litigations. It also aims to avert in convenience to the parties and gives effect to the Rule of Res judicata.
Q.
The object underlying section 10 is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue. The object underlying section 10 is to avoid two parallel trials on the same issue by two courts and to avoid recording of conflicting findings on issues which are directly and substantially in issue in previously instituted suit. The language of section 10 suggests that it is referable to a suit instituted in the Civil Court and it cannot apply to proceedings of other nature instituted under any other statute. The object of section 10 is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits between the same parties in respect of the same matter in issue. The fundamental test to attract section 10 is, whether on final decision being reached in the previous suit, such decision would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit. Section 10 applies only in cases where the whole of the subject-matter in both the suits is identical. The key words in section 10 are "the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue" in the previous instituted suit. The words "directly and substantially in issue" are used in contra-distinction to the words "incidentally or collaterally in issue". Therefore, section 10 would apply only if there is identity of the matter in issue in both the suits, meaning thereby, that the whole of subject-matter in both the proceedings is identical. National Institute of M.H. & N.S. v. C. Parameshwara, MANU/SC/1063/2004 : AIR 2005 SC 242: 2005 (2) ALD 49 (SC): 2005 (2) AWC 1865 (SC): 2005 (1) CTC 156: 2005 (2) JCR 93 (SC): 2005 (1) Kant LJ 486: (2005) I LLJ 566 (SC): 2005 (2) Mah LJ 1: MANU/SC/1063/2004 : (2005) 2 SCC 256.
But subject to provisions and conditions, there is no bar (as is clear from explanation appended to section 10) on the power of an Indian Court to try a subsequently instituted suit if the previously instituted suit is pending before a foreign court.
Res judicata relates to the plaintiff's duty to put forth all the grounds of attack in support of his claim, Alka Gupta v. Narender Kumar Gupta, MANU/SC/0793/2010 : AIR 2011 SC 9.
About the enforcement of section 10, the Supreme Court, observed in case of Manohar Lai v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hira Lal, MANU/SC/0056/1961 : AIR 1962 SC 527: (1962) Supp 1 SCR 450.--"As soon as the conditions appended to section 10 are satisfied, a court cannot proceed with the subsequently instituted suit since the provisions contained in section 10 are mandatory in nature and no direction is left with the Court."
Q.
In P.V. Shetty v. B.S. Giridhar, MANU/SC/0478/1981 : AIR 1982 SC 83: (1982) 3 SCC 403, it was held that for the application of this section, the following conditions must be satisfied:
(1) The present section applies only to suits and not to applications and complaints.
(2) There must be two suits, one previously instituted and other subsequently instituted.
(3) The matter in issue in subsequent suit must be directly and substantially in issue in the previous suit.
(4) The parties in the previous suit and the subsequent suit are the same.
(5) The parties are litigating under the same title in both the suits.
(6) The previously instituted suit must be pending in the same court in which the subsequent suit is brought or in any other court in India or in any court beyond the limits of India established continued by the Central Government or before the Supreme Court.
(7) The Court in which the previous suit is instituted must have jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit.
In Rajesh Singh v. Manoj Kumar, MANU/MP/0216/2009 : AIR 2010 MP 16, the respondent plaintiff earlier had filed a civil suit for declaration in respect of the property in dispute. Present petitioner filed his written statement in the said suit denying the title of the plaintiff. Plaintiff, therefore, filed another suit under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act against the present petitioner for ejectment. In said suit also present petitioner denied the title of the plaintiff. In view of the common issue, whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property, the defendant filed an application under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for staying the subsequent suit for ejectment. Said application stood dismissed by the order which is impugned in this petition. Therefore, it is held that section 10 of the CPC will not be attracted as the question of title in suit for ejectment is not directly and substantially in issue but is incidental and collateral.
Matter in Issue:
As regards the words "matters in issue" as occur in the section, it means the entire matter in controversy in the suit and not merely one of the several issues. In other words, identity of some of the issues in both the suit is not sufficient to attract the section. Thus, the fact that the subject-matter of the previous suit is overlapping with the subsequent suit will not attract the section. Where the earlier suit was for recovery of rent for certain period and subsequent suit is for recovery of rent for subsequent years and ejectment, the matter in issue in the two suits would not be deemed to be same and section 10 would not apply; Bhola Prasad v. Jagpata, 1954 ALJ 696, on consolidation of suits, where the cause-of-action is between the same parties and where issue is almost same, the Allahabad High Court held in case of P.P. Gupta v. East Asiatic Comp., MANU/UP/0036/1960 : AIR 1960 All 184 that--
"A court has inherent power to consolidate different suits between the same parties in which the matter in issue is substantially the same."
In Pukhraj D. Jain v. G. Gopalakrishna, (2004) 4 SCALE 688: MANU/SC/0364/2004 : AIR 2004 SC 3504: 2004 (3) A WC 2214 (SC): 2004 (3) CTC 308: JT 2004 (5) SC 329: (2004) 3 MLJ 183 (SC): (2004) 7 SCC 251, it was held by the Supreme Court that, the proceedings in the trial of a suit have to be conducted in accordance with provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 no doubt lays down that no court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed. However, mere filing of any application under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 does not in any manner put an embargo on the power of the court to examine the merits of the matter. The object of the section is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue. The section enacts merely a rule of procedure and a decree passed in contravention thereof is not a nullity. It is not a litigant to dictate to the court as to how the proceedings should be conducted, it is for the court to decide what will be the best course to be adopted for expeditious disposal of the case. In a given case the stay of proceedings of later suit may be necessary in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and harassment of parties. However, where subsequently instituted suit can be decided on purely legal points without taking evidence, it is always open to the court to decide the relevant issues and not to keep the suit pending which has been instituted with an oblique motive and to cause harassment to the other side.
Gupte Cardiac Care Centre and Hospital (Petitioner) v. Olympic Pharma Care Pvt. Ltd. (Respondent), 2004 AIR SCW 2427
M/s. Gupte Cardiac Hospital, Nasik filed a suit (dated 20th December, 2001) in the Court of Civil Judge, Nasik against Olympic Pharma Care Ltd. Delhi, the dispute in litigation was that 'Heart and Lung Machine' marketed by 'Olympic Pharma Care' from Germany was delivered and installed in the hospital. The performance of machine was not found satisfactory. Gupte Cardiac Care Hospital in the plaint claimed recovery of Rs. 28,3500 (advance compensation equivalent to additional amount spent on purchasing another machine and interest on two sums).
Olympic Pharma Ltd. filed another suit in the High Court of Delhi (Original side) to claim Rs. 20 lakh alleged to be outstanding by way of balance price of machine and interest thereon (dated 10th January, 2002).
The issue disputed at Bar is that the two suits arise out of the same transaction. Cause-of-action of one party arrayed as plaintiff would be its defence in the suit where it is arrayed as defendant. There are two plaintiffs and two defendants in the suit at Nasik while there is only one plaintiff and one defendant in the suit at Delhi but there is substantial identity of the parties in the two suits. The issues arising for decision would necessarily be the same. Only one of the two suits can be decreed. The decree in one suit in favour of the plaintiff in that suit would entail the dismissal of the other suit. That would avoid the possibility of any conflicting decree coming into existence. And certainly the duplication of evidence, oral, documentary both, would be avoided. The parties and the Courts would save their time and energy which would needlessly be wasted twice over.
The Supreme Court on above observation held:
The suit at Nasik been instituted first in point of time, by reference to section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the trial of suit at Delhi, being the latter suit, shall be liable to be stayed. It would be proper to transfer the suit at Delhi to the court at Nasik for purpose of hearing and decision thereat.
Q.
Section 10 and section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are the important provisions and both prevent multiplicity of suits. Where section 10 stays the trial of subsequent suit, section 11 comes into force when section has completed its role. Provision of section 11 enacts that once a matter is finally decided by a competent court, no party can be permitted to re-open it in a subsequent litigation. The basic difference between the provisions of section 10 and section 11 is that section 10 stays the proceedings (subsequent suit) of two parallel litigations but when, once a previously instituted suit is finally decided and becomes final in law, the parties are barred to reopen it (suit) in a subsequent litigation.
The basic object and operation of the provisions of section 11 were rightly observed by the Supreme Court in a reading case of Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, MANU/SC/0295/1960 : AIR 1960 SC 941: (1960) 3 SCR 590.
"The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving finality to judicial decisions, what it says is that once a res judicata, it shall not be adjudicated again. Primarily, it applies as between past litigation and future litigation, when a matter - whether on a question of fact or of a question of law - has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because in appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceedings between the same parties to canvass the matter again."
In State of Karnataka v. All India Manufacturers Organisation, MANU/SC/2206/2006 : AIR 2006 SC 1846: 2006 (4) Kant LJ 369: (2006) 4 SCALE 398: MANU/SC/2206/2006 : (2006) 4 SCC 683, the Supreme Court observed that, the doctrine of res judicata is based upon the three known maxims--
(1) Nemo debet bis vexari pro uno et eadem causa.--No man should be vexed twice for the same cause.
(2) Interest republice ut sit finis litium.--It is in the interest of the state that there should be an end to a litigation.
(3) Res judicata pro veritate acipiture.--A judicial decision must be accepted as correct.
Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 reads:--
"No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly an substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court.
The expression "former suit" shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.
For the purpose of this section, the competence of the Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such court.
The matter above referred to must in a former suit have been alleged by one party and, either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly by the other.
Any matter which might or ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit, shall be deemed to have been a matter directly or subsequently in issue in such suit.
Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.
Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall for the purpose of this section, be deemed to claim under the person so litigating.
The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and references in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to a proceeding for execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.
An issue heard and finally decided by a court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised."
From the abovementioncd statutory provision of section 11, as given in statute (Code of Civil Procedure, 1908), the scope and amplitude of the provision is explicitly clear from the explanations appended thereto.
Q.
"Matter in issue" is distinct from the subject-matter and the object of the suit as well as from the relief that may be asked for in it and the cause-of-action on which it is based. It is the "matter in issue" and not the subject-matter of the suit that forms the essential test of res judicata. Here, "matter in issue" broadly stands for a particular relief following a specific provision of law by way of a cause-of-action, where title, parties and issue are the same.
Means either the subsequently proposed suit should be between the same parties or their legal heirs or assignees.
Same title means same capacity, i.e., the demand should be of the same quality in the second suit as was in the first suit. The term "same title" has nothing to do either with cause-of-action or with the subject-matter of the two suits.
Fourth condition is that the court which has decided the former suit must have been a court competent to try the subsequent suit. Explanation II to section 11 makes it clear for the purpose of res judicata, the competence of court shall be determined irrespective of any provision as to a right of appeal from the decision of such court. The question whether there is bar of res judicata does not depend on the existence of a right of appeal but on the question whether the same issue has been heard and finally decided; Ram Gobinda v. Bhakta Bala, MANU/SC/0586/1971 : AIR 1971 SC 664: (1971) 1 SCC 387: (1971) 3 SCR 340.
This expression means that the Court who decided the matter in issue should have duly applied its judicial mind and had decided the matter following the due procedure of law. In case of Madukar D. Shende v. Tarabai, MANU/SC/0016/2002 : AIR 2002 SC 637: 2002 (50) BLJR 509: 2002 (6) Bom CR 552: (2002) 2 Bom LR 295: (2002) 1 Cal LT 44 (SC): (SC Supp) 2002 (2) CHN 13: 2002 (1) JCR 448 (SC): JT 2002 (1) SC 74: (2002) 1 MLJ 181 (SC): (2002) 1 SCALE 103: MANU/SC/0016/2002 : (2002) 2 SCC 85: (2002) 1 SCR 132, the plea of res judicata is mixed question of law and fact. It was not raised in plaint and no issue or res judicata was framed and tried in the suit. There was no submission that raising plea of res judicata made before any lower courts or High Court. It cannot be raised before Supreme Court for the first time and at hearing.
In the case of Ramachandra Dagdu Sonavane v. Vithu Hira Mahar, MANU/SC/1731/2009 : AIR 2010 SC 818, the appellants held filed earlier suit before the Civil Court inter alia seeking an order of permanent injunction against respondents on the ground that they were watandars of suit lands and the were in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said lands. Respondent has set up a defence that since he was the adopted son of the deceased, he had the right, title and interest in the suit land. The Trial Court after elaborate discussion has answered the issue framed against the respondent and had concluded that the respondent failed to prove that he was the adopted son of the deceased. In the subsequent proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Officer, the issue was whether respondent was the adopted son of the deceased. It is held that since the issue of adoption was already decided between the same parties by a competent Civil Court, the Sub-Divisional Officer could not decide that issue and without giving any decision on that issue could not have allowed the claim of the respondent. The principles of res-judicata would apply to the proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Officer.
In Chandrabhai K. Bhoin v. Krishna Arjun Bhoin, AIR 2009 SC 1675, the Supreme Court held that an order passed without jurisdiction would be a nullity. It will be a coram non-judice. It is non est in the eye of law. Principles of res judicata would not apply to such cases.
In Nabin Majhi v. Teja Majhi, MANU/WB/0099/1978 : AIR 1978 Cal 440: (1978) 2 Comp LJ 150 (Cal): 82 CWN 1097, the facts of the case was, the plaintiff instituted the suit claiming partition by metes and bounds of their half share in the suit property. The principal defence of the defendant was that prior to this suit he had instituted a suit against the plaintiffs in the first court of the Munsif at Rajpurghat for a declaration of title to 10 acres of land. The said suit was decreed on finding that there was an amicable partition of the suit property-It was urged by the defendants that the finding of the learned Munsif in the said title suit would operate as "Res judicata" in the present suit.
The learned subordinate Judge overruled the contention of the defendant that the finding in the earlier suit operated as "Res judicata" in the present suit for he took the view that the Court of the Munsif in which the earlier suit was instituted was not competent to try the present suit. On the merits, of the case the learned subordinate Judge held that there was no previous partition although the plaintiffs had a half share and the defendant had the other half, the defendant was in possession of 15 or 16 bighas of land, and the plaintiff were in possession of 7 or 8 bighas of land. The defence plea of previous partition was disbelieved by the learned subordinate Judge. Accordingly the learned subordinate Judge decreed the suit in a preliminary form declaring the plaintiff is entitled to half share in the suit property. The defendants appeal to lower Appellate Court was also dismissed as the lower Appellate Court also took the same view as that of the Trial Court. The defendant appealed.
Decision by the High Court:
In the present case, the defendant filed the former suit in the Court of Munsif and the plaintiff filed the subsequent suit in the Court of the subordinate Judge. In the former suit, the learned Munsif held that there was previous partition of the suit property, but the learned Munsif not being competent to try the present suit, it cannot be said that finding operates as "Res judicata" in the present suit.
There can be no doubt that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of Munsif is limited and that of the Court of subordinate Judge unlimited. If we are to interpret Explanation VIII without referring to section 11 it may be said that a court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction is a court of limited jurisdiction. An explanation to the section is meant to explain the section itself. In order to ascertain the true meaning of the Explanation VIII, it has to be read along with the provision of section 11 and not in isolation. In the face of the provision of section 11 retaining the said condition for the applicability of "Res judicata" that the former court must be competent to try the subsequent suit, it is difficult for us to accept the interpretation of Explanation VIII as suggested on behalf of the appellant.
It is to be noted that Explanation VIII has taken cognition of the general principles of "res judicata" under which the decision of the Courts of limited jurisdiction also operated as "res judicata" in subsequent suits. The expression "court of limited jurisdiction" applies not to ordinary civil court, but to courts which entertain specific matters, such as the revenue courts, court of wards, Court of Pobates, insolvency courts, etc.
If the former court is not competent to try the subsequent suit for the want of pecuniary jurisdiction section 11 will not apply. In these circumstances we are unable to accept contentions made on behalf of the appellants that the findings of the learned Munsif in the former suit that there was a previous partition operates as ''Res judicata" in the present suit for partition instituted in the Court of the subordinate Judge, for the learned Munsif is not competent to try the present suit.
The High Court regarding misjoinder and finally dismissed the appeal.
Q.
Section 11 says that any matter which might or ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in a former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter constructively in issue in that suit.
Constructive means to be well within knowledge or that the party is well presumed to have a particular fact in its mind at a particular point of time.
The Supreme Court while discussing the scope of the words "might" and "ought" as laid down in Explanation IV of section 11, observed in case of Forward Construction v. Prabhat Mandal, MANU/SC/0274/1985 : AIR 1986 SC 391: (1986) 88 Bom LR 128: (1985) 2 SCALE 1123: MANU/SC/0274/1985 : (1986) 1 SCC 100A: (1985) Supp 3 SCR 766: (1986) 1 UJ 167 (SC), that--
The words 'might' and 'ought' have wide amplitude. The word 'might' conveys the idea of possibility of joining all grounds of attack or defence, while the word 'ought' carries the idea of propriety of so joining. An alternative basis on which a claim can be sustained should be set up in any suit to enforce the claim, when it is not set up, the basis omitted in the prior suit should not be allowed to sustain the second suit. The 'test' is whether the parties had an opportunity of controverting it and, if they had, the matter will be treated as actually controverted and decided.
Another important case on constructive "Res judicata" is of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Nawab Hussain, MANU/SC/0032/1977 : AIR 1977 SC 1680: (1977) 2 SCC 806: (1977) 3 SCR 428, wherein a police Sub-Inspector was dismissed by D.I.G. He challenged the said dismissal by filing a writ petition on the ground that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity, but the petition was dismissed. He then filed a suit and raised an additional plea that he was appointed the I.G. and D.I.G. was not competent to pass an order against him. The state contended that the suit was barred by constructive "Res judicata". All the courts including High Court held against the state and the matter was taken to the Supreme Court.
Allowing the appeal and after considering all the leading cases on the point, the court held that the plea was clearly barred by the principle of constructive "Res judicata" as such plea was within the knowledge of the police S.I. and it could have been taken in the writ petition but was not taken at that time. It was observed by Supreme Court:
"When any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former proceeding but was not so made, then such a matter in the eye of law, to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to bring finality in it, is deemed to have been constructively, in issue and therefore, is taken as decided."
The same thing applies to the defendant. He cannot raise such grounds of defence in the subsequent suit which might and ought to have been raised in the former suit. A files a suit against B to recover money on a promissory note. B contended that the promissory note was obtained from him by undue influence. The suit is decreed in spite of his objection. The defendant subsequently wants to challenge the promissory note by fresh suit on the ground of fraud and coercion. This he cannot do as it was his duty to have resisted the former suit on the ground of fraud and coercion as well.
An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legislative purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. The words 'might' and 'ought' have wide amplitude. The word 'might' conveys the idea of possibility of joining all grounds of attack or defence 'ought' carries the idea of propriety of so joining. An alternative basis on which a claim can be sustained should be set up in any suit to enforce the claim. When it is not set up, the basis omitted in the prior suit should not be allowed to sustain the second suit. The 'test' is whether the parties had an opportunity of controverting it and, if they had, the matter will be treated as actually controverted and decided; Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal, MANU/SC/0274/1985 : AIR 1986 SC 391: (1986) 88 Bom LR 128: (1985) 2 SCALE 1123: MANU/SC/0274/1985 : (1986) 1 SCC 100: (1985) Supp 3 SCR 766: (1986) 1 UJ 167 (SC).
The principles of constructive res judicata applies to writ petition . . . Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka, MANU/SC/0088/2011 : AIR 2011 SC 1113.
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